THE AMERICAN HOPE

WILLIAM MORSE COLE

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THE AMERICAN HOPE

THE AMERICAN HOPE

BY

WILLIAM MORSE COLE

NEW YORK AND LONDON
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TO

CATRIONA AND ELIZABETH

IS DEDICATED

THIS EXPRESSION OF THEIR FATHER'S

PHILOSOPHY OF EVERY DAY

PREFACE

STEVENSON, in his "Child's Garden of Verses," says:

"The world is so full of a number of things
I'm sure we should all be as happy as kings."

This is the song of childhood's observation and realization of the obvious good things of life.

Browning, in "Pippa Passes," gives Pippa this song:

"The year's at the spring
And day's at the morn;
Morning's at seven;
The hillside's dew-pearled;
The lark's on the wing;
The snail's on the thorn:
God's in his heaven—
All's right with the world!"

This is a song not merely of childhood's observation and realization, but of youth's conviction—conviction in spite of some contradictory observation. Some singers give up the song early in

their experience of life—when the spirit of youth has flown before its time. With some singers the spirit of youth remains long after the years of youth have sped, and the song still comes to the lips. By a few the song is sung even in the declining years. With most of us, the contradictions of life are too strong. We cannot see our way quite clearly through the labyrinth of experience. We choose a desirable thing, and then some other desirable thing shows itself absolutely incompatible with the first. We formulate a belief, and then another inevitable belief refuses to live with it. We hold to an ideal, and then another ideal shows itself contradictory of the first, or experience laughs at all ideals. We form a policy of conduct, and then another policy, necessary for our ends, interferes with it. Bewildered by the shows of things and by the very real facts of experience, we wonder what life means and some of us begin to wonder whether life is after all worth while.

I am far from convinced that life is for all persons worth while; but I am convinced that it may be made worth while for all, and that in it most of us may find zest. Common experience shows us that things are interesting just in pro-

portion as we understand them. One suspects that those who find life least worth while are those who least understand it. The reading of biography supports the suspicion. Clearly if one can see life as a whole—not only its origin and its purpose, but the big swing of its progress undistorted by temporary setbacks and divagations—one can better judge whether it is worth while and how it can be made best worth while. If one could comprehend the real history of every life since the earliest times, one would know life as it is; one might also fancy well what life will be. Our nearest approach to this is history, biography, and autobiography. Every man is contributing to mankind's knowledge of life just in proportion as he can let his fellows see the truth about himself, or help them to see the truth about themselves. If his place in the world has been big enough, autobiography may be his best contribution to his fellow-man; the charm may lie in the story, but the value will lie in his conclusions about life or in the light which his story casts on the meaning of life. Even if his place in the world is insignificant, he may have learned, possibly out of that insignificance, a meaning of life, and an interpretation of its contradictions, that shall

help his fellows to see new worth and new possibilities in it. To a realization of this fact this book owes its origin. Here are convictions which have grown not out of speculation, but out of the experience and observation of life in rather varied circumstances. Every conviction here is a mature judgment that has stood the test of years of critical comparison with life as I have found it. I have had no preconceived theories to defend, no propaganda to push. I have attempted to find in life a unity that shall bind all its parts together and reconcile apparent contradictions. I have sought to judge not only individual life but national life; and I find not only individual hope but national hope.

The autobiographical note I should like to eliminate altogether. As the conclusions given here are those of experience, however, the nature of that experience is of importance to the validity of the conclusions. It is so easy for the critic to say of the writer "He doesn't know what he is talking about," that I desire to indicate at least something of the opportunity that I have had to know facts. I have omitted all personal reference in the text, but to show the sort of experience and observation out of which the conclusions were drawn, I here sum-

marize the facts which, bearing directly on the conclusions of the text, will help to acquit or convict of prejudice: (1) as an economic member of society, my experience ranges from unskilled work, through the fields of skilled labor and clerical work, to executive position and professional standing (most of these, to be sure, of short duration, but long enough to give the spirit of the occupation), and I have been both city tenant and employing country landholder; (2) in residence, I have dwelt in the open country, in four villages, and in five cities; (3) in educational experience the range has been, as a student, from the common schools and high school, through a vocational school and college, to a professional school, and, as a teacher, from high schools in one of the liberal culture studies, and college in a culture subject, to a professional school in a very practical subject; (4) in family relations, my home has been under the parental roof, in bachelor quarters, and where I am the head of a household of two generations; (5) I have had my full share of bitter disappointments, of miscarried efforts, and even of calumny. These relations should lead to breadth of view. If that is lacking, I am convicted of blindness. The outcome of it all has been not a loss of faith

in mankind, not a shattering of ideals, not even passive submission to circumstance, but a conviction that here in America to-day life is better worth living than it was ever anywhere before —not because life is full of delight here, but because it is full of possibilities. This book expresses the grounds of that conviction.

W. M. C.

Ridgewold, September, 1909.

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THE AMERICAN HOPE

INTRODUCTION

EVERY age has had its own problem, and every age has solved some problem —either wisely or so foolishly as to furnish the horrible example for its successors; but we of to-day find ourselves compassed about with a new problem at every turn, so that, in whatever direction we plan to move, some problem is demanding solution before we take the first step. This is the characteristic feature of the twentieth century. This is what it means to be alive to-day. It is common to remark that really to live, to drink deeply of life, we must thrill to the primitive passions and give them sway. That is true; but to do merely that is to be behind the times—to live in antiquity. Merely to thrill to the primitive passions is not the fullness of life. The biggest life is to bring the primitive passions into such relation with the complex facts

of to-day that those passions shall not defeat their own purposes, as often they do, but shall be effective. Then, indeed, when the tide of primitive instincts is brought into conscious conflict with the various interests and hopes and ambitions of modern civilization, life tingles with a flood of emotion that was beyond even the fancy of the early man. We read in romance and history of the loves and hates and tendernesses of the men of old, and we thrill at the bigness of them; we forget the stagnation of the intervals. There were days of passion so intense that the world and life itself were counted as nothing if they lay in the contrary scale; but there were weeks and months of lifelessness, or listlessness—such that the hibernation of the bear was nearly as interesting. It is true to-day that the primitive passions lead men to fling life itself as a bauble into the scale, but the bargain is far more thrilling because into it enter a hundred other considerations—each with its tissues woven through the human heart—which were no part of the consciousness of the man of old.

It is common to say of a man that he takes life too seriously. The remark is a contradiction in terms. Never before had men the opportunity

to live so richly as to-day; and the man who does not live richly is wasting an opportunity that no one before him ever had. It behooves him to take that opportunity seriously—not with a long face, but reveling in the joy in it, the laughter in it, the absurdity and nonsense in it, the struggle in it, the disappointments in it, the agonies that are a part of its discipline, the submergence of self in the bigness of it, the glory that may grow out of it.

It is the part of a man, then, to look in the face the problems of the twentieth century, to see how they may enter into his life, and how far he may get into the heart of them and thrill with the meaning of them. This is what the normal American is suddenly waking to find that he may do. It is singular, however, that he goes about it with so little plan. He plunges in where wise men fear to tread, and is wrapped in virtuous content if only he can assure himself that he means no harm. This is well as far as it goes, but we may wisely seek something better. There must be certain fundamental philosophical principles, dear however unconsciously to American hearts, upon which the American citizen who wishes to live deeply and solve problems wisely in this twentieth century may fall back

in time of doubt. These he may hope to apply with some success in the handling of practical matters. The search for these is the most profitable work we may undertake.

In this book is no attempt to solve specific problems. We seek rather an acceptable philosophy that underlies all the problems of American life—one that can be expressed in common language and may, in that useful form, help us in these busy days to meet life squarely. In the attempt to discover fundamental principles in modern problems, we may have to deal often with alternatives. It may happen, indeed, that several ideals are each to be held loyally, and yet two of them in certain circumstances may be in conflict. It was a characteristic of old times that life was so slow-moving that men could devote themselves in leisurely fashion to one thing at a time. To-day we cannot stop for that. Life goes rushing by, and we must seize it now. We must decide which of two conflicting ideals is more fundamental. It chances, however, that in deciding we often find that one may be brought into accord with the other, without giving up its own fundamental beauty, and in the end we find a unity in what at first appeared to be irreconcilable diversity.

CHAPTER I

THE GROUND OF HOPE

THE fundamental ground of American hope is the prevailing idealism of the American character. No doubt to many this statement sounds like a joke. They say that Americans have no ideals at all. Our first task is to determine whether this is true. Do we Americans as a people live to produce material things and to get sensuous pleasure, or do we live for ideals? Do we live for things which are grasped chiefly by the five senses, or for ideals which primarily exist in our own minds—or, if one wishes to be more exact, in our own hearts and souls? It is true that American communities, more, probably, than any other communities in the world, are business communities. We seem to be devoted to the production of material things, and, from the profit that we get out of them, to the display of material resources and the enjoyment of material pleasures. The realistic novelist is undoubtedly correct in repre-

senting this sort of thing to be the conspicuous phase of American life, but he is correct only as he is a realistic novelist. The cold, hard facts are as he has pictured them; but life is not made up of cold, hard facts. The real thing in any life is not what we get and what we show and what we do, but it is what we think and what we feel and what we aspire to. This does not mean that a man is judged by his intention rather than by his accomplishment, but simply that the real test of the man and of the man's life lies in what goes on inside of him and not in the things that we see and hear and feel about him.

If a man gets out of his business the same sort of enjoyment that the scientist gets from the quest after truth, the same sort that the painter gets from a great achievement, the same sort that the musician gets from a thrilling interpretation, his life is quite as full of ideals as theirs. The test of idealism is whether the enjoyment is in the ideal or in the thing. In the case of every one of these men the joy comes in only a slight degree from the thing in itself. It comes chiefly from the sense of power, from the sense of victory in struggle, from the human meaning of the thing accomplished.

With the business man of this type, ambition is directed chiefly toward a recognition in himself of the human qualities which give him attainment—rather than toward tangible things desirable for themselves. For this ambition only is he willing to work so hard and so long. The satisfactions are in the mind and the heart, as ideals attained; though it chances that the outward objects to which they appear to be attached are often very gross material. It chances, moreover, that the thing which he attains, though desirable chiefly as a sign of inward qualities, is in the mind of the common man a thing in itself to be desired. Whether it is his fault that his critical sense sees no unfavorable difference between a big awkward factory turning out its myriads of cheap, coarse commodities, and the piece of sculpture or the musical composition, which thrills and ennobles thousands of human souls, is a matter for examination later; it has nothing to do with the question whether the man is an idealist. The essential point here is that so far as he himself can see—and so far as we, taking for the moment his point of view, can see—his joy in life is quite as thoroughly an enjoyment of ideals as the joy of the painter, the sculptor, the liter-

ary man, the philanthropist. To be sure, these ideals often manifest themselves outwardly in things which an æsthetic critic calls abominations, but it is none the less true that to the owner they are ideals: so the owner is an idealist.

Never before were so many noble ideals at the fore in governing human activity as in America to-day—charity not of the purse only but of the heart and the hand, uprightness not only in private life but also in business, self-sacrifice in the effort to serve the community as a whole, and, even among men whose aims seem most selfish, devotion to the immediate family. When the normal American whose life seems to be absorbed in the effort to get money is not influenced by the love of contest and the love of power as already suggested, he is usually actuated chiefly by a desire to make prosperous, and possibly envied as prosperous, those who are dear to him in his own family. The very restlessness, the very unwillingness to stop and enjoy life, of which Americans are commonly accused, are but tokens of an impelling ideal. If we cannot stop to enjoy what we have earned, it is obvious that the motive behind the earning is not materialistic or sensual, but is idealistic; and the only thing needed to make the whole sit-

uation wholesome is that the ideals shall be focused on something worth while, for now they are in pitiful degree dissipated in fruitless quests after specters of happiness or perverted in harmful efforts to do good.

Two general types of idealism exist in the human mind, the collectivistic and the individualistic. Often the two types meet in the same person; and then a contest is likely to be in progress between them. The collectivistic ideal demands that everything shall be subordinated to the wish of society as a whole, that is, to the collection of individuals making up the whole community — whether that community be a neighborhood, a town, a state, a nation, or the world. The collectivist believes that no individual has a right to seek his own purposes in violation of the desire of the community. The individualistic ideal, on the other hand, demands that each individual shall seek the thing which seems to him best worth while, and shall do so unhampered by any regulations of society except as regulations are necessary to protect the rights of other individuals. The individualist believes that the community has no right to seek its purposes in violation of the desire of individuals. To express this in a more striking

fashion, the collectivist believes that an individual notion or action cropping out from the mass of general notions and actions of the community is rather to be repressed than encouraged; but the individualist believes that such an outcropping is likely to be a manifestation of something bigger than the common experience and therefore especially worthy of consideration—at least until it has been fairly tested. To the collectivist, the common will is the highest manifestation of good; and that common will is nothing, in the last analysis, but public opinion. To the individualist, on the other hand, the most sacred thing is individuality, is that thing in which each man differs from his fellows; for that is the thing which must have come from a source bigger than man himself.

It is notable that few men are absolute collectivists or individualists: most of us cherish some ideals of each sort; and that is why most of us are inconsistent in both our thinking and our conduct. In a sense, every man is both a collectivist and an individualist in his ideals, and so far as he is thoughtful he must be so; and his task in the conduct of life is to see that he is each in the proper circumstances. The choice between them is always one of emphasis. Each

is right in itself. In any case of practical conduct, that one must be preferred which in that particular case will bring the greater good. In our American life and history both are recognized, and in the common ideal of what we call "Americanism" they are mingled in delightful complexity; and each man puts the emphasis on one of them or the other according to his natural habit of mind. It is a part of our task to disentangle them and identify each in its various phases.

The common catch words of American idealism are liberty, brotherhood, and democracy. It chances that the second and the third of these are collectivistic, and the first individualistic. The first has been most talked about. The problem has always been, and still is, to provide liberty consistently with brotherhood and democracy. The reconciliation of them all lies in one simple ideal which is coming to be recognized as the true American characteristic—however deeply it may sometimes be hidden or overridden—namely, a sense of responsibility. There is no such thing as liberty for any man if a sense of responsibility does not check the exercise of liberty in other men. There is no such thing as an endurable democracy, or

government by the people, if a sense of responsibility does not control the people. There is no such thing as brotherhood if a sense of responsibility does not underlie the fraternal relations.

It is equally true, however, that this sense of responsibility has its tendencies toward individualism as well as toward collectivism. "To thine own self be true," Polonius's advice to Laertes, in "Hamlet," is the commonest form of recognition of individualism. The highest good I know is the good *my* consciousness, *my* conscience, *my* intelligence, *my* heart, tell me is the highest good. I am a traitor to myself, to the only authority my Maker gave me, if I accept anyone's else decision about my conduct or my ideas. I may distrust my own judgment, and deliberately transfer the decision to another, or to what I believe to be an inspired book; but in that case I am still carrying out my individuality in choosing the guide. For me to take any guidance thrust upon me from without, on the other hand, is to undo myself, is to forfeit my individuality, is to commit spiritual suicide. The thing that my personality, my individuality (which was created in me but not by me), declares to be best worth while, for me is best

worth while. I cannot decide it otherwise, for such a decision could not emanate from me. To accept such a decision from any outside source, even though that source be the public opinion of a whole community, is to deny my Maker. A sense of responsibility to myself, therefore, demands as a mere matter of self-preservation that I obtain liberty—liberty to fulfill my individuality in thoughts, emotions, conduct.

This demand for liberty, for individualism, is not merely egotism. Both the history and the hope of progress show it to be vital not only for the individual but for the community. As long as men are satisfied with conditions as they exist, taking either an average condition or a dead level of uniformity, no one makes any move to change. Every advance of the human race has been under the pressure of individual ideals more or less antagonized by the collective sense of the community. A strict sense of brotherhood and of democracy, neglecting the responsibility to the self, would have surrendered to that pressure; for if public opinion and the wish of one's brother are to determine conduct and belief, the dreamer of strange dreams must keep them to himself. It is the unlike-

ness of the individual to the mass, the outcropping of differences, that brings about change for better or for worse. The highest debt we can owe the community is to bring out those ideals which make life worth while to us, and give other men an opportunity to pass upon them and see how serviceable they may be to the community as a whole. Any compromise by which we yield to antagonizing claims of brotherhood, or of democracy, and suppress our ideals, may be treachery to that which our Maker has given us as our possible service to our day and generation. Thus the individualistic is interwoven with the collectivistic ideal.

It is easy enough for the pessimist to deny that it is worth while to make the mass see any new ideals. Men, he says, are not going to mend their ways; they cannot mend their ways; and the reformer is only wasting his strength, his substance, and his good nature, in an effort to make people accept any but the ideals which belong to them in the mass. This is a matter big enough for discussion in a chapter by itself. Before undertaking it, however, we may wisely consider in some detail just what is the status of a sense of responsibility in American life to-day.

There is no denying the fact that, taking the social organism as a whole, we have in America in the last few years shaken off much of the sense of responsibility which was common in the men and women of fifty years ago. Many observers believe that the blame for this can be laid largely at the door of our educational system. The common educational notion of to-day is that education must be primarily interesting, that the pupil must learn only what he likes to learn, and that he had better not do anything at all than do it with distaste. We have forgotten that in all education the proper aim is not to get the *thing* done, but to cultivate the *power* to do. We have made it so easy for the child to do the thing, that he has never learned to give the hard or distasteful obedience. He has lost the sense of responsibility. The school has come, moreover, to undertake tasks which not many generations ago were accomplished at home. In these respects, too, the school has been getting the thing done and has neglected to train the pupil in the power to do. The result has been a double weakening all along the line; the school by undertaking more things and undertaking to make them all easy has doubly reduced the number of things from

which the pupil can learn to be responsible for hard or distasteful tasks well done. Making school more interesting has been a great achievement; but this remedy for an old disease has given rise to a very serious new disease, for which in practice the remedy has come to be further inoculation with the germ of the disease itself. Throughout the public school system, the pupil is practically never given a task and left to stand or fall on the accomplishment of that particular thing. Always he finds loopholes, excuses, apologies, makeshifts, other chances. The thing is arranged so that he doesn't have to do just that thing, just right, at just that time. He is never held responsible for any definite thing, and so he doesn't know what responsibility is. The teacher will pull him through, somehow. Each laxity, moreover, makes him more dependent, less responsible, for the next task.

This process has been particularly noxious because, while it has been going on, the population has been largely increased by immigrants who, however desirable they may be from the economic, moral, and racial standpoint, have had entirely different educational standpoints, or no educational standpoints at all. These peo-

ple have come to look upon the state, and in educational matters its representative, the school, as the only depositary of responsibility. The state is in their minds supposed to safeguard the rights of all in such fashion that the individual has only to safeguard his own rights in ways in which the state seems a little deficient. It occurs to no one, therefore, to look out for the rights of others.

It would be easy to enumerate hundreds of ways in which this lack of responsibility affects most of our communities. The evil is enhanced by the concentration of population in cities where the individual is easily lost sight of. The unfortunate results range all the way from the wrecking of industrial organizations, railroads, and banks, to the vandalism of hoodlums and irritation aroused by the unthinking automobilist. The lack of control springs from our characteristic American good nature, which means that for fear of being unpopular we allow evils to go on until they become intolerable. We are like the weak parent who allows the child innumerable small disobediences, until the limit has been reached, and then awards for one offense no worse than the rest a punishment really adequate for the accumulation. This is not

government, but despotism. We are discovering our weakness and we are mending our ways.

In view of all this, we have reason to find great confidence in the future of America; for in spite of the sapping influence of recent educational practice, which might well have destroyed all sense of responsibility among us, we remain a responsible people. We do rise to the occasion—when we see it. Our failure is to see the occasion until it is an eyesore. Our ideals are sound at bottom; our hearts are right; but as we aren't yet quite sure what we are driving at, and as we haven't stopped to see how our various ideals are related to one another, we are likely not to see quite straight, or to think quite straight about what we see.

We are fond of saying, and we surely have much ground for it, that public opinion can do anything in America. So long as that is true, and so long as a sense of responsibility is really the foundation of American ideals, as we have seen it to be, obviously the hope for our future is immense if we can only bring the public to some sort of agreement as to what we really wish this country to be.

CHAPTER II

THE POWER OF CHOICE

AS was suggested in the first chapter, many pessimists deny that it is worth while to try to educate public opinion to any point of view about anything. They admit that public opinion is all-powerful; but they deny that public opinion can be created. It is the master, not the servant, of individuals. The purpose of this chapter is to examine this proposition. It happens to involve a very old philosophical problem—one which has held a prominent place in the discussions of philosophers and theologians for twenty-five hundred years. This problem is of interest just now and here because it may cast some light on the American future. There is admittedly great hope for America if the problem is given the common answer; the purpose of this chapter is not merely to defend the other answer, but to show an even greater hope in it.

One of the very delightful essays of modern

times is that of Mr. George Meredith, on "Comedy and the Uses of the Comic Spirit." Mr. Meredith has no fault to find with taking life seriously, but he thinks it absurd for us, while we are taking it seriously, not also to have out of it the fun which is about us on every hand. Mr. Meredith would have us see that people are not responsible for what they do, and that, instead of irritation, and pessimism, and bitterness, we should take things that are contrary to our own notions of the seemly as so much added to the spice of life, as so many elements in the humor of life. To the ordinary man this notion that a man is not responsible for what he does is rank heresy, but certainly it is an interesting heresy worth examination. The fact as Mr. Meredith states it is so easily demonstrated, not only logically but in the experience of every one of us, that the wonder is that so big a protest is raised at every suggestion that it is the truth. Let us examine it, not with hair-splitting quibbles over the meanings of words, but with common sense.

The first acts of an infant are surely governed by either inheritance or surroundings. For our present purposes it is quite indifferent which of these two causes is at work. Nobody pretends

to believe that the first motions of an infant are the result of any conscious will. He kicks because the exercise feels good or the changing position relieves a cramped muscle. He struggles for food because the motor nerves respond to appetite. The particular forms of motion are determined by his inherited bodily structure or the circumstances that make up his environment. These become habit. As he develops in intelligence and activity, he may modify these motions, but always in response to an impulse from within or a call from without. He does not himself bring about either the impulse or the call. He merely obeys. Each obedience, moreover, sets up new activities; for each gives him pleasure or displeasure, and the emotion leads to continuance, discontinuance, or the substitution of another activity. Before he consciously thinks at all, he is a small bundle of habits not of his own choosing. The time soon comes, however, when the child finds an opposition—either from the outside or within his own consciousness—between his appetites and desires, on the one hand, and, on the other, the penalties or pains or inconveniences which he must endure if he seeks gratification. Whether these oppositions are given the name

of moral struggle or not matters nothing. All psychologists admit that there is a period during which these oppositions and struggles of will are unmoral, during which no notion of right and wrong enters into the child's consciousness.

It is commonly believed that as the child grows older, however, a notion of right and wrong enters into his decision as to what he shall do. What form does this rightness or wrongness take in the child's mind? It may be purely an ideal, or it may be altogether materialistic. The opposition may be between an appetite, for instance, on one hand, and an ideal of loyalty to a parent; between an appetite and loyalty to a sense of honor; between an appetite and loyalty to dignity; or it may be between an appetite and another appetite; or between loyalty to one ideal and loyalty to another ideal. It is common to say that the choice between an appetite and loyalty is moral, and between an appetite and another appetite is unmoral; and the distinction is for ordinary purposes sufficiently good; but, for the purpose in hand, it is necessary to understand that there is fundamentally no distinction in the mind of the child. The real question which the child settles in his

own mind is this: which of the two things at hand is, at the present moment, with the knowledge that he now has, with the power of forecasting the future which is his, with due regard to the circumstances about him, the better thing? If at this particular time, in these particular surroundings, he thinks better of the satisfaction of that appetite than he does of the alternative, it is absolutely inevitable that he shall choose the satisfaction of that appetite. It may very well be true that five minutes later his point of view will have shifted, his loyalty may have come to the front, his forecast of the future may be more accurate, his imagination to see the wholeness of the thing may have revived. If he has what is commonly called a moral sense at all, he then is wiser for the wrong choice and endures the pangs of remorse. Yet it is true that if he were back where he was five minutes ago, he would still choose the thing that he chose five minutes ago. The whole question is one of emphasis. Things do not look to him now as they did before, and it is just because things look different that he has chosen differently. He cannot turn from the thing which at any moment looks to him best worth while. The thing which seems to him best worth while may

so far have taken possession of his mind that all other things bear perverted relation to it. He may not see straight; but he must choose as he sees. It would be treachery to his own soul if he did otherwise.

It is a commonplace to say that our deliberate choices of yesterday are the unconscious habits of to-day. Looking back into the past, we can see that the choices which we as children made in the dawn of moral consciousness have affected our point of view and our judgment about many things happening years later; for the point of view of each of us has been influenced very largely by the experiences that have grown out of the earlier points of view. Most of us are at one time or another seized with certain notions, developing out of our point of view or coming into it from the outside world, that loom to us very big. These notions take possession of us, and make all other things look small or mean in comparison. They are our dominant ideas.

If in an early choice between two things or two courses of action our imaginations were dominated by certain aspects of that choice and the result of the choice pleased us, it confirmed that domination. If the result of the choice

merely failed to displease us, it at least left the domination undisturbed. A sort of permanent unconscious and possibly perverted point of view was established; and it is inconceivable that we should make a choice different from the earlier choice until right relations have been established in our minds between that early domination and the facts of life. Repentance and remorse are experiences so common that most of us have come to believe that we in some error of moral choice in the past deliberately chose that thing which we knew to be worse. When we come to think of it, however, we see that we did not make a choice which we at the time knew to be wrong. We may have recognized the evil in the thing chosen, but we believed that that particular evil was offset by some very particular good—that the thing which, under *ordinary* circumstances, would appear to us to be wrong was, under the peculiar circumstances of *that* time and place, well worth while. Choice is determined by the point of view *at the moment* of choice. We may have known that the thing chosen would under normal conditions violate the moral dictates of all human experience, violate our own notions of right and wrong, but we at least believed that such ex-

perience was necessary for our own development as human souls acquainted with good and evil —or, to put it in another way, we believed, because of the momentary domination of a false notion, that the thing which we chose was for that particular occasion the best thing. Possibly the mere experience of rebellion just then seemed the most desirable thing in the world. Our common moral standards were thrown overboard under the domination of moral standards which for that particular moment loomed for us bigger than all the experiences of the past.

Each one of these choices, moreover, has tended either to confirm or to break down some experience of other times. We may indeed have gone on year after year with occasional lapses into what for us in normal conditions are staggering sins, and as we look back we may suffer distinct anguish of remorse; and yet on the approach of new temptation we may fall under the spell of the old domination. When the domination is on us we believe that we have seen a new light; we believe that we have grown stronger and can laugh at temptation; and we go down again into sin, not because we have chosen wrong rather than right, but simply be-

cause our imagination misleads us, or our memory fails us, or our judgment is twisted. It is inconceivable that with two things before him a man should choose that which to his mind is at that moment the less desirable. He may know with his intellect that a bird in the hand is worth two in the bush; but if just now and here his desire is for the sight of two birds rather than for the touch of one, he cannot choose the one. He may know with his intellect that wine is a mocker; but he remembers that it is a mocker only "the morning after," and he is thinking of "now"; now looms bigger than to-morrow; let wine mock—to-morrow. He knows with his intellect that sufficient unto the day is the evil thereof; but the troubles ahead are *his* troubles, they are a part of *his* life, *his* personality, sacred to him; he will make the most of them; and so he cherishes them, broods over them, until they grow to absurd magnitude, and his life is a burden to him and to all his friends. We do not always choose wisely, for we do not at all times see straight, think logically, feel truly; but we must choose what looms biggest at the moment of choice.

It is common for virtuous people to declare that their basis of choice is morality. They

say that they have chosen this or that not because it was desirable, but, in spite of its being undesirable, because it was right. They do not realize that they contradict themselves. Their remark implies that right may be undesirable. What they mean is simply that they are looking beyond the desires of self here and now, to the welfare of the future self, or of the community. With such vision they find desirable a thing that if they were taking the standpoint of the selfish present moment would look undesirable —or they see as ultimately undesirable a thing that in the narrow selfish judgment of the moment would look desirable. The choice of the moral man is different from that of the unmoral man or the immoral man just in the degree that his vision is wider and truer. He sees the big truths and the eternal truths, and these swallow up the petty truths of the moment which dominate the other man. It is true that the moral man chooses a thing because it is moral; but he has previously decided that it is moral only because, using the best judgment at his command, he believes that it best fulfills his proper relation to his own future, to the community, and to God—that is, that it is desirable. We find, then, that even he who says that he is

governed in his choices only by moral principles is really impelled to choose as he does only because his heredity and his environment make him see things in certain aspects—as desirable or undesirable.

The necessary outcome of all this is a clear recognition of the fact that men and women are not responsible for their conduct. What we do to-day is determined largely by what we thought and felt about human affairs yesterday; and what we thought and felt yesterday was determined by what we thought and felt the day before; and so on back to our earliest experiences. Much of what we have thought and felt has been due to our education, conscious or unconscious. Much of it, at least many biologists will so tell us, has been due to inheritance; but even in fields where inheritance has left us free, it is a fact that when our power to know the truth has given us wise choices, these choices have helped to make future choices wise; and when we have been able to choose only foolishly, these foolish choices have reduced the probability of future wisdom. Each of us is the product of a past which at the moment he had no power to change.

The reason that this doctrine has found so

slight acceptance is simply that most people are afraid to admit that the sinner is not shameful. In spite of the Gospel, forgiveness is not popular. We dislike even to throw the mantle of forgiveness quite over our own sins. We cherish the fiction that we have been naughty. To many, moreover, this doctrine that choice is not free seems to throw the doors open wide to all kinds of harm and vice. Such people neglect to look at the other side. If a man must choose foolishly when he sees or thinks or feels mistakenly, he must by the same law choose wisely when he sees and thinks and feels truly. To tell him that he is not to blame for choosing foolishly does not make him foolish, and it does not take away from him the desire for the best. It only makes him see, when in his normal state, the necessity for fortifying himself against the obsessions that make a fool of him. He can no more choose the wrong when he sees the truth, even though he knows he is not responsible, than he can choose the right when his previous experience leaves him unable to recognize it. It is no more my praise when I have done right than it is my blame when I have done wrong. My unworthiness of praise and my freedom from blame cannot affect my con-

duct. To know that I am not blamable for my sins does not increase my capacity or even my willingness to do wrong. In the cases where I have resisted temptation, I have done so because, for me, at the particular moment when the temptation appeared, loyalty to some virtue has seemed of far more importance than any personal satisfaction in yielding. The fact that this is no credit to me and that no discredit belongs to me for the sins that I committed does not make sin seem to me any more desirable than it did before I knew that I was neither praiseworthy nor blameworthy.

There is one circumstance, however, in which it may be true that a general acceptance of this doctrine of irresponsibility would remove one of the influences for right conduct. So far as men now do right only because they are afraid to do wrong—afraid of divine wrath,—the community would suffer if men believed themselves free from blame. Yet to banish the doctrine on this ground would be like defending a superstition because it might chance to keep men from evil. This would be to doubt the value of truth. The fear of divine wrath is really effective over only a comparatively small number of mankind. Many are skeptical about such wrath, many hope

to escape it by repentance, and many, striving after virtue for virtue's own sake—as the only positive worth-while,—could not strive more effectually whatever fear of punishment might pursue them. We shall see, as we proceed, that the community can provide for the protection of virtue, and can do it far better than by fostering any false notion of the nature of the human will.

Out of this theory of moral irresponsibility comes, as a matter of singular fact, a very considerable sense of responsibility. If it is not within our power to choose otherwise than as the vision and the thought and the emotions of the moment dictate, it is our big task to see that the vision and the thought and the emotions shall be at their best. It is not always in a man's power to see straight and to think correctly and to feel truly; but when he is at his best he can do all three reasonably well. When he is at his best he wishes to be wise always. That is the time to prepare for wisdom. That is his opportunity. The knowledge that it is his opportunity is his hope of salvation. The old answer to the question whether man is free to choose good or evil was that he could always *will* to do right, could at least always *will* to make the effort to *learn* what was right. That

is just what we here deny. A man cannot will to do anything until his soul has inspired him with a wish for that thing, and the wish is built up out of his inheritance and the experience of the past. All conduct must occur at some definite moment of time. A man necessarily wishes the thing best worth while for him, but the momentary satisfactions of sense may at each moment of opportunity seem to him better worth while than the result of any effort to learn of any other worth-while. He may prefer the other worth-while in the abstract, but the preference may not be strong enough, at any particular moment of opportunity, to make that other worth-while seem quite worth the effort to acquire it. So he may stagnate unless he can be made not only to see the vision, but to hold to it long enough to make it his domination; then he is saved.

Here is the first responsibility growing out of the doctrine of irresponsibility—the responsibility to self. Every man has his inspired moments when he is better than himself. He must take his turn while the tide serves. He may snatch strength and virtue in those moments when the soul is drinking in the highest that the world has to give. He may make these

highest things more and more his dominant notions. He is not fated to sin. The golden moments he may coin into the treasure of his soul. He is to-day affecting his future not only by creating its possibilities, but by setting up certain irrevocable barriers. He is tending to-day to make dominant in his future certain points of view, certain antipathies, and certain passions. The opportunities of to-day will never recur in just the same form, and to-morrow may be too late to nourish a seedling or to kill a weed. To-day may destroy the one or root the other. As a consequence of to-day's neglect of an opportunity to direct the current in the right direction, he may spend years in vain regret and pitiful helplessness. Only a realization of to-morrow's comparative helplessness can make him see the value of to-day's opportunity. Out of to-morrow's helplessness grows to-day's sense of responsibility.

> "There is a tide in the affairs of men
> Which taken at the flood leads on to fortune;
> Omitted, all the voyage of their life
> Is bound in shallows and in miseries."

Suppose he is not aware that his hope lies only in an opportunity to snatch the truth dur-

ing the moments when he is better than himself. Suppose he is indifferent to his real hope and is uninspired—a mere groundling. What then is his hope? He cannot by the will raise himself, for he has no will to do so, and he has no wish that can father the will, and he has no knowledge that can father the wish. Here is the second responsibility springing from the doctrine of irresponsibility. If I know that it is within my power to make a certain person see better ideals, see more truthfully the facts of life than he can now do—so that he will choose rightly instead of wrongly,—and if I realize how important it is that he should do so, it is my business to give him the opportunity. Indeed, if I can see the thing this way, not only may it be my business to help him, but it may be absolutely essential for my happiness to do so. If I believe that that service rendered to him is more important to my fulfillment of my destiny than the thing which I should do otherwise, I must from the nature of the will itself make every effort to enlighten him. That is to me the thing best worth while. I do not choose it; I am by my very nature forced to it. Any failure on my part to take up that responsibility must be due to the fact that I cannot see his need in its right

relation to my own, and, therefore, to me the thing that I am striving after in my different course is better worth while than the effort to enlighten him. I may, indeed, believe that by omitting to serve him I shall retain means and time and strength to serve a greater number of persons in a wider field of enlightenment; and, if that is the case, it is absolutely impossible for me to will to give my attention immediately to him. If, on the other hand, I can see his need as more important than any other, I am compelled to serve him; and so far as his need and my need are a need of the community, I have become, out of my individuality working through his individuality, a servant of the community.

It is obvious, however, since according to the doctrine here indicated we are not responsible for our sins, that we are not responsible directly for our failure to help others by giving them what enlightenment we can. If I do not help my brother, my failure is due to my inability to see the value of helping him. If I saw it, I could not avoid helping him. This seems to wipe all moral responsibility out of human nature. If I am not responsible for my own adoption of wrong, am not responsible for failing to see the value of my own better self, and

am not responsible for failure to enlighten others out of the inspiration that I gather, even though that might set them right, it would seem as if there is no hope for anyone. The hope lies in the fact that enlightenment does come to us sometimes from extraordinary things, not as a direct result of our wills, but as a result of the progress of human nature and human society through the evolution of the ages. If the mere writing of this chapter makes me see, in proper relation to other things, my duty to enlighten others, I am thereby forced to make efforts for their enlightenment. If I induce others to think these things, and if they see the true responsibility of this doctrine of irresponsibility, a force for good is at work in widening circles. A man must seek the biggest good when he recognizes it. Anything else is suicide. No man can stir up in himself the wish for right, or the will to seek the right; but inspirations to be at our best are all about us of innumerable sorts, appearing in innumerable ways, at unexpected times—in the manifestation of that "enduring power, not ourselves, which makes for righteousness." Everyone recognizes this whether he believes in immortality and a personal God or not. History presents the

fact that there is such a power. It is manifested in the gradually improving right sense of mankind, and, regardless of the many cynics, the majority of mankind not only believe in it but are trying to be coworkers with it. The world is wiser, and better, and happier, and less selfish, than ever before in its history; and the constant discoveries of corruption and selfishness and materialism arise not from a degraded condition of the majority, but simply as exceptions which stand out notably only because the general level of righteousness has improved so much that the things which previously seemed to be normal are now conspicuous for their rarity. The opportunities for seeing the truth, for cultivating the power of thinking straight, and for warming the heart, are growing in number every day.

Some people profess to believe this doctrine of the will blasphemous. They cannot with complacency believe that God ever allows wrongdoing as a matter of natural law. They wish to believe that all sin comes into the world against God's will. Such a notion, it should be observed, implies that God is not supreme, —— some antagonist, some evil one, has estranged man's will from God. If it were true, God

would be no god at all. Some other god would need to be above him as the Supreme. The rational notion is that the Supreme is not a god of whims, of chance, of happenings out of a clear sky, but a god whose ways are unchanging. If he is a god of law, the human will, which is the most important of created things, must be subject to laws. Indeed, when we come to think of it, the contrary notion is either nonsense or absurdity. If a man's will is not determined by the law of his being, one of two other things must explain it—imposition from without, or chance. If the choice is imposed from without, there is no such thing as a man's will at all; for in the first place, if imposed from *without*, it is *not his;* and, in the second, so far as he is concerned, it is *not* his *will*. Whatever such a thing is, it is outside our discussion here. We are not concerned with such things as a fall on the ice, or a shake of the head in palsy; we are concerned with intentional acts, for these alone manifest will. To explain *intention* by *outside compulsion* is to talk sheer nonsense, is to contradict oneself. To say, on the other hand, that chance determines will is to commit an absurdity. If chance governs my intentions, I am likely, after a lifetime of reasonable morality, to

plan a burglary, to murder my neighbor in his bed, to carry off a case of diamonds—that is, I am quite as likely to do this as is the professional burglar. No wonder Launcelot Gobbo remarked: "It is a wise father that knows his own child!" If this theory of chance is true, it is indeed a wise man that knows his own deeds! Is it chance that some men are always sober and some always drunk; that some are always honest and some always thieves; that some are always kind and others always brutal? The dice must be loaded! There is no alternative; we have seen that imposition from without is nonsense, for then the intention is not intention; we have seen that chance intention is absurd, for it makes me intend what I abhor; the only possible origin of intention remaining is that of the natural law already expounded. This is the only theory that is consistent with the notion that God is rational. If man could not conceivably do wrong, there would be no virtue, no happiness, no value in doing right. Man would be an automaton. Wrong must be possible in order to give life an object—the acquisition of character, which is the power to withstand evil and accomplish positive good. Yet if God imposed intention on man from above, or made

him subject to chance intention, man would still be an automaton, as we have seen. The only possible situation consistent with an ideal of good, then, is man's freedom to work out his own progress by natural law—that is, as we have seen, directed in the first instance by his inheritance and his environment, but enabled through his golden moments to overcome his primary limitations, and to make exalted notions dominant and creative of new life, new power, new will.

It is interesting to note one curious inconsistency in the doctrine of those who believe that man is responsible for what he does and that he is blameworthy or praiseworthy accordingly. They are well aware of the fact that often a trivial incident determines a course of action fraught with great results; and yet they determine the rank of every man by the issue. An extreme case of this is common in the thought of those who hold to the old New England theology. Suppose two sinners attend revival services on the same evening, one to scoff and the other to pray. The intending scoffer is touched by the anecdotes of the evangelist or convinced by his logic, and is converted. The other is unmoved and unconvinced. We are told that if both should die before morning, the

one who had attended the meeting with the will to scoff would be saved; but the other, with the will to believe, would be condemned. In one case the preacher chanced to say things which met the point of view of the sinner, and in the other case he failed to do so. It is surely contrary to all American notions of the worth of manhood to distinguish between these men on any such chance as that. It is common to talk of rescuing a man from sin. Surely if he is "rescued" from without, he is as guilty as if he had committed the sin. The escape lies in his good fortune, not in his worth. Everyone would be rescued from all sin if the right helper were always in the nick of time with the maximum influence. Rationally we cannot give the meed of praise for virtue to one who has been rescued in time, and so we may not give the word of blame to one who has gone down in blindness and stupidity and hardness of heart. George Meredith is right. Men and women in this world are not to be blamed for sin and praised for virtue: they are to be merely pitied or admired. Sympathy must be in any case theirs. We may laugh with them when their stupidity ends in comedy, and we may stand in awe when it brings tragedy. When, on the other hand, we see wisdom, we draw inspiration; and

then out of that enlightenment we see new ways open to ourselves.

Is this doctrine, that we are not responsible for our conduct, consistent with American ideals? Some common American beliefs are apparently contradictions of it, but these will be found on analysis either untrue or really allied to it. It is common, for instance, to say that in America a man's will is all-powerful, that a man is what he makes himself, that a man is recognized not for what circumstances may happen to have labeled him, but for what he is in himself. These statements are more nearly true in America than elsewhere in the world, and yet they are far from true here. Each assumes that a man is at some stage of existence a formless mass of raw material which he, as a sort of god outside that mass, proceeds to mold into the shape that his will dictates. They neglect the fact that the will is in the mass, is governed by the mass, and can work primarily only through the mass. Even if we grant that the will through God can attain the most exalted things, we still have to make allowance for the fact that in some cases the will to seek God's aid was never aroused, and that in others the aid sought was never for exalted ends. No one pretends to believe for a moment that all men are

actually equal in power, or in charm, or in interest, or in influence. We are compelled to recognize differences, and we realize that these differences in men spring largely from differences in opportunity; but the essence of the American idea is that, though we recognize differences in men, we shall not look upon one man as more or less respectable or reprehensible than another except as in his relation to the community he may prove himself so. We wish to know not who he is, but what he is good for. We do not care whether his power of service in the community is derived from inherited talent, from patient self-cultivation, or from simple good nature. Though the man who has risen by self-cultivation is given most admiration, we do not usually grant him greater outward consideration. Such extra consideration as we give him is less a personal tribute than a recognition of the possible value to the community of the powers which he has proved himself to have; that is, it is still his value as a man, as a possible factor in civilization, that calls for our esteem: we are not paying abstract tribute, we are simply valuing men at what they are good for. This is as it should be. Every man is what he has been made by inheritance, by personal surroundings, by chance influence, and by

the big influence of the progress of the race. Since he could not have been otherwise, he is what he is by exactly the same law as that by which we are what we are. He is simply our brother.

So far we have been concerned only with the past. What of the future? Since a man is what he is because he has always chosen thus and so out of the experience of the past—or his past has literally chosen for him—it is true that his future will be controlled, willy-nilly, by its own past. For the same reasons that he has been unable to escape the evil that his inheritance and his surroundings have thrust upon him, he will be unable to avoid the good that wise friends enable him to see. He seeks that which looks best worth while at the moment of choice, and nothing else appeals to him. Make him see and feel the best, and he cannot avoid it. It is air and food and drink to him. If the enlightened see his need, they have no alternative but to try to enlighten him: they cannot help it. If they are successful in enlightening him, if they give him a greater power of vision, a clearer head, a warmer heart, he has no alternative: he must take the better thing: the eye and the head and the heart seize it for him, and he has no power or wish even to protest. These friends cannot make him over;

they cannot make a new man of him: but they can influence his conduct, and that may be what the community wants; then his conduct, by giving him new experiences, may make a new man of him.

Out of this grows our encouragement to strive for the progress of the race. The truth makes men free. It is the essence of truth to prevail. If we cannot make prevail our notions of truth, we are either mistaken in our notions, or we are incompetent apostles. The assurance that men have no power to avoid the truth when they once see it gives each man courage to go on preaching his individual notion of truth. He knows that if it is false it cannot prevail, and that if it is true he may some day learn to present it so forcibly to his fellows that they have no alternative but to follow it. Here is the individual bringing his gift to the community; and no greater gift can the community receive than the biggest thing any individual soul has been able to find in this human experience. The finest thing in life is for each man to find that which is for him the biggest thing and then show his treasure to his fellows. Anything less than this is treachery first to himself and then to mankind.

This, then, is the nature of our hope. Men are

so made that they follow the best they see—that thing which at each moment of choice looms best to them. When they see the truth, see it so clearly that it dominates their vision, they cannot follow error. Our task is to find the truth and make it dominant not only for ourselves but for others.

CHAPTER III

THE SPRINGS OF PROGRESS

THE discussion of the preceding chapter has been intended to show that the possibility of a change in conditions of whatever sort lies not at all originally in the individual will. Our willing is all done for us by the soul which our experience has developed out of our inheritance. We may all have a very strong influence over the involuntary choice of others, for our relation to them is among the experiences which determine their choices. Each choice of each soul is determined by the vision, true or untrue, perverted or straight, all-embracing or constricted, which the individual may have at the moment of choice. We are now concerned to see how it happens under these conditions that man does actually progress.

Four theories are offered as to the normal method by which society advances. Three of these lay stress on heredity, and the other on the influence of surroundings. Those who attribute

power to heredity are divided into two opposing schools: those who believe that a parent may transmit only characteristics which the parent himself inherited, and those who believe that he may transmit characteristics which he has acquired during life. The extremists of those who believe in the transmission of acquired characteristics go so far as to say that a child may inherit from its father and mother, chiefly from the mother, practically any mental or moral trait that they with sufficient determination wish it to inherit—or, to be more specific, that the will of the parents directed toward desired traits for a year preceding the birth of the child practically creates those traits in the child's nature. This effect is produced chiefly by the mother, though the father's influence is active during a short period. Under this theory, a woman whose life has been selfish, sensual, narrow, may by a supreme effort of will make her child generous, spiritual, and broad-minded. At the other extreme of the four theories of progress is that which denies that parentage has any influence over the child. It is worth while to examine each of these theories in some detail. Before doing so, however, it is well to note one fact. In none of these theories is any offense for the believer in divine interposition in

the affairs of men. All ways are open to God. He can work as well through parental influence, and natural selection, and the influence of surroundings, as he can through miracles and visions. He can as easily interpose in the affairs of men through these agencies as through any. These theories of progress do not attempt to explain away the hand of God, but only to show some of the methods by which the supreme work is done.

We may well examine first the theory of prenatal influence — the theory which declares that the child's character is largely determined during the months immediately before birth. This assumes that the influence of parents overpowers that of earlier ancestors. It assumes, too, that the parent transmits to the child his state as it is at the time of making the child. It assigns to parenthood a function bigger than merely the creation of a new body composed out of the bodies of the parents—with certain characteristics attached. Parentage, in this theory, is not merely a formative act, putting into shape material already existing: it is a creative act, bringing into the world not only a body but a soul that may be bigger than the springs from which it came. If in the months before conception the mother

and the father are striving after purity, and kindness, and breadth of vision, if during pregnancy the mother is devoted to the cultivation of these things, her effort is impressed upon plastic material in the unborn child; and in that child, before the direct experience of life can harden that material into creases and folds and ruts of error and misapprehension, the ideal, which in the mother may have had to struggle against years of unwisdom and bitter experience, may become the germ of a beautiful domination. So she has created in her child a thing which she was not able to mold even in herself. What she strives to be, but because of hardness of heart may not be, her child becomes. Let her once see the vision of truth, feel the inspiration of the creative power, become dominated with the passion for realizing her better self, and in the child will be realized what the mother's inheritance and experience of the past have made impossible for her.

This belief is the most reasonably hopeful that the mind of man has discovered. If we of this generation can go far in making our children what we please, even though that is no farther than making them strive after righteousness, the hope for the future is abounding; for their strife after righteousness will assure the righteousness

of their children. Couple this theory with the principle of choice explained in the last chapter, and a new day is within our vision. If it is true that a man who really sees the good is thereby forced to help others to see it, if it is true that a man who really sees the good must strive after it, if it is true that a man really striving after the good can beget children who will attain it, the progress of man is dependent solely on a recognition, by the enlightened, of the exact task before them. The hope of the situation lies in the fact that each year finds the task reduced. The enlightenment not only scatters the darkness but kindles new lamps. Is this all too good to be true? Is it the vagary of a dreamer? Before attempting a decision, let us turn to the other theories.

Many deny the power of the mother peculiarly to influence her child during pregnancy, and yet believe that characteristics which the parent has acquired may be transmitted. They deny, for instance, that a parent who inherited a deceitful nature may transmit frankness by a struggle for frankness during pregnancy; but they admit that if such a parent in his earlier life has acquired frankness, in spite of his inheritance, that frankness will descend to the child. Similarly with evil

characteristics; they may be acquired and transmitted, but only after they have become second nature. The essence of this theory, therefore, is a belief that the good and the evil which each generation makes second nature for itself is made a part of the inheritance of the race, and may go on accumulating interminably.

The third theory denies that any characteristics are transmitted unless they have been inherited. The ground for this theory is the belief that the germ of life is continuous from generation to generation, and that it is not modified by anything happening to the individual—unless it lacks nutrition. The physiology of the matter is the belief that each child at birth has within its sexual organs the germs that shall serve its parental function for life, and that the character of these is therefore already determined. Hence, in this theory, nothing that one may do or acquire will affect the inheritance that one gives one's children. At first thought, this theory seems to imply that no change is possible between parent and child or from generation to generation. That would be true if parentage were single; but since in all higher animals two parents are involved in every new life and no new life can inherit all the characteristics of each parent, the characteristics final-

ly inherited are combinations of the two sets of characteristics—some from the father, some from the mother. A hope of progress lies in the happy combinations of characteristics. Finally, we have what in nature is called a "sport." No type of living thing has been known always to breed true. The "odd stick" occurs now and then. We call it an "odd stick" only because we cannot trace the cause of its variation from the type of its parents. The fact is simply that sometimes offspring inherit characteristics unlike either parent or any known ancestor, and that these variations are continued, or may be continued, in their descendants. Under this theory of heredity, therefore, progress lies in two forces—the opportunity for children to be superior to their parents because of a more fortunate combination of characteristics in the two parents than in either alone, and in the tendency of nature to advance occasionally, in a sport, by a leap. These forces, it is true, may result in a backward process, but by the evolutionary theory of the survival of the fittest such unfortunate offspring cannot long survive and perpetuate themselves in a world where higher types are the standard. So in the end these laws are forces directed for progress. Their influence, moreover, is greater than may at first

appear. The combination of characteristics in parents may yield children superior to either parent not only because the child may inherit only the best of each parent, but because the characteristics may so fortunately combine as to create something new. An analogy is found in the chemical world. Two atoms of hydrogen, an irritant gas, combined with one atom of oxygen, another irritant gas, form a molecule of water, a soothing fluid. No amount of mere mixing of hydrogen and oxygen will make anything but hydrogen and oxygen; but the moment a true union of those elements occurs, a new thing, with new characteristics, is created. So it may be with heredity. Nature protects fortunate unions, but she strives to exterminate the issue of those that are unfortunate.

It is worth while here to see how great is the antagonism between the theory which declares that parents may make their children what they like and that which declares that they can transmit only what they inherited. If it is true, as one theory declares, that no change can be made in the parental germ after birth, the parents cannot by their life affect what they transmit to their child. The only evidence which the advocates of this theory can give is that no change

in the physical nature of parents, by mutilation or otherwise, can be shown to have passed, even in remote effect, to offspring. For instance, amputation of the tail of mice for many generations has produced no effect on offspring. Tails persist. In other words, the acquired characteristic is not transmitted. Many instances of this sort are good evidence. Such evidence is purely negative, however, and a few doubtful cases tend to support the contrary doctrine. The real flaw in the reasoning is in the fact that we are not sure that what applies to bodily characteristics is true also of mental and moral. It may be true that a requisite for perfect physical manhood, such as two eyes for the children of one-eyed parents, is supplied by nature, and yet not be true that mental and moral traits lost by parents are inherited by children. The world of mind is still very imperfectly understood, and its relation to the world of matter is even less understood. We cannot say surely that the law of one is the law of the other. An idealist, who believes that all matter is but the manifestation of ideas, is only amused at the thought that a supposed germ in a child at birth preordains the character of that child's child. The materialist, on the other hand, believing that mind is only a mode of motion for

matter, sees no escape. Even the materialist, however, believing, as he does, that the germ must be properly nourished and that inadequate nourishment may affect the child's inheritance, may admit that the life of the parent, affecting the nutrition of the germ, may affect the character of the child. Those who deny the transmission of acquired characteristics do not usually admit that mental and moral characteristics enter into the nourishment of the germ; but since such characteristics are admitted by them to be in the germ at conception and at birth, it would seem natural to admit that, as the physical character may be changed by the quality of nourishment, mental and moral influences may have some effect.

Finally, we have to consider the belief that character is produced only after birth and only by environment—by the external circumstances of physical being, education, association. According to this theory, two children of whatever parentage, taken at birth and given the same food, clothing, shelter, education, recreation, associations, will grow up similar in character; and this will be true in all cases where the environment is actually and not merely apparently the same. This is a favorite theory of social workers who are striving primarily for model tenements, model

feeding, model schools, model entertainments. There is much evidence not only that children of model homes have grown up better citizens than children of the street, but that model surroundings have reformed incorrigible children. Unfortunately, all such evidence is matched by children of model homes who have gone to the bad, and by children of extreme poverty, ill-nourished, ill-taught, ill-governed, who have become model citizens. There is inspiration for right living in wholesomeness and cleanliness and kindness, but it is by many doubted whether that inspiration is really effective unless it chances on good ground. In the child dominated by the passion of pride, no kindness quells temper and stimulates affection as it does in the child naturally loving. Such passions are manifested even before the child is conscious that he has individuality. They are inborn. With one child the kindness never gets the chance of influence that it gets with the other. In one case it meets its like: in the other it must fight its way. To expect the two children to reach the same goal is to deny them individuality. If only environment affects character, parentage is a wholly impersonal function which may as well be performed by proxy.

We have, then, four theories of progress. Let

us review them in the order in which they recognize parentage as a factor. The theory of prenatal influence declares that a man and a woman by diligent strife to attain certain ideals in themselves, particularly in the year before their child is born, may start that child's career with a decided bent, a decided predisposition, almost a domination, toward those ideals. The others who believe in the transmission of acquired characteristics, even though they deny the special influence of the prenatal period, declare that every virtue, every power, every vice, every weakness, developed in the parent, tends to perpetuation in the child; and so virtue or vice is accumulating, multiplying itself geometrically in the exact ratio by which we acquire it. Those who deny the transmission of acquired characteristics declare that progress lies only in the fortunate mating (and it is not possible always to foresee) of parental characteristics, and in the occasional happy "sports" of nature. Finally, those who deny every influence but environment declare that all children are born with equal possibilities; if man gives them the best opportunities, they will be equally blessed and equally a blessing.

No one of these theories is susceptible of absolute proof—proof to satisfy all reasonable minds.

Each of them has its sincere believers, and each has scoffers. The reasonable attitude is one of hope. All four theories mean progress for the race. The first, if true, means rapid progress so far as people may be brought to comprehend it and guide their lives by it. The second means steady progress with the growth of personal virtue and strength. The third means progress by the slow immutable laws of nature assisted by the obedience of man. The last means progress chiefly as man can merge his individuality in the mass and take a view to great extent communal. It chances that these four theories contradict each other only negatively. Each attributes progress to one source; but its skepticism regarding other sources is not essential to its own positive elements. Positively, the theories may all be true. Indeed, that would be the height of progressive fortune. It is unquestionably true that environment does affect character. We all know that hunger and indigestion and cold are not good for the temper; that luxury does not tend to purify the flesh; that evil communications corrupt good manners; that familiarity with sin dulls the sensibilities and the conscience. Let us make the most of it, and do what we can to improve the environment of our children and of

our neighbor's children—and in these days the neighborhood knows no bounds. It is also true in the minds of all but a small class that a fortunate mating in parentage is a factor in the character of children. That surely the community cannot afford to neglect. We have good ground to believe that character deliberately built up in the past, not merely the issue of a fortunate chance mating, is transmitted, in increasing vigor in each generation, to the future. Finally, we have some ground, more than a mere hope and faith that it is so because it ought to be so, for believing that the struggle of men and women after righteousness may actually issue in their children in more transmitted ingrain righteousness than they themselves ever gained. This hope and faith make life a bigger and a holier thing than anything else conceivable can do. It gives a sort of immortality on earth—our individualities projecting themselves down the ages in an ever-growing realization of righteousness.

It is noteworthy that the theory of the will given in the last chapter is consistent with the positive elements of all these theories. We were concerned in that chapter with learning just why a man is what he is: we found it to be because from inheritance and experience he at one time

or another reached certain conclusions about what is best worth while, and that those conclusions led to other experiences which in turn led to new conclusions, and so on interminably. So man is a creature of the force of circumstances. All these theories help to explain what are the circumstances determining the man. As we have seen, in their positive elements they may all be true. It seems to be the part of reason, in outlining a plan of progress, to assume that they are so.

One thing binds all these theories together. All are effective through parentage, or at least through the home. Whatever our conclusion may be as to the real source of progress, therefore, we must apply it first in the domestic relation. To that we will proceed. Then we may examine environment as it effects men and women outside of the home.

CHAPTER IV

THE MARRIAGE TIE

IT is difficult to state offhand what is the American ideal with regard to marriage. It is certainly true that America has always maintained that the only dignified motive in marriage is love. Not merely in the comic papers but throughout American life we find it common to laugh, or to sneer, or to speak with bitter denunciation, of the custom of marriage for convenience or marriage for money; and the fact that the comment is sometimes a laugh and sometimes a sneer and sometimes a denunciation indicates sufficiently that the point of view is not at all a pose, but is as a whole sincere. There have been plenty of marriages of convenience and for money among Americans, but the fact that public opinion has met them with so little favor is an indication that they are exceptions. The only point in this connection about which there can be any difference of opinion as to American ideals is what Americans mean by love. It is a dangerous thing

for anyone to attempt any definition of love. We can talk about it more easily than we can define it; and of course in a discussion of this sort the matter in hand is not love in the abstract, like that love which St. Paul spoke of as the greatest thing in the world, but love as ideally existing in the marriage relation. The love of a girl for her father and of a boy for his mother are conspicuous among the beautiful things, but they are not quite the same sort of thing as the love of husband and wife. Quite as different are the love of brother and sister, and of two brothers, and of two sisters. The matter of age has little to do with it. In all the various forms of affection certain elements are common. Delight in the presence of the other, desire to serve the other to the extent of self-sacrifice, faith in the other—these and many other elements are common to all forms of personal affection. The beauty of love between man and woman lies in part in all these elements. In an attempt, therefore, to define or merely to discuss the ideal relation of marriage, we assume between husband and wife the elements common to all affection, as found in the various other relations already mentioned, but we expect to find also something distinctive.

It has not been uncommon to say that the fea-

ture which distinguishes love between man and woman from the commoner sorts of affection is that it consists of an absolute union of interests—physical, mental, moral, and spiritual. That is true as far as it goes, but it does not sufficiently take into account the fact that this sort of union persists occasionally between mother and daughter, between mother and son, between father and daughter, and in the various other relations already mentioned. It is notable, however, that in these unions no idea of marriage can be entertained—either between the parties to the union or between one party to the union and an outsider; for if either person in such a union entertains the thought of marriage possibility, the seed of disunion is not only present but perceived. Such a union is complete, then, only when it goes with an incompleteness of life—an abandonment of one of the functions of life. The ideal love is surely more than this. It is a complete union for a complete life. Let us find its distinctive feature.

It is the fashion in these days to analyze things largely from the standpoint of evolution. We may go back as far as we like in history, or go down in our own time as far as we like in the scale of biology, and we shall find that sex is simply nature's provision for getting desirable off-

spring. Parthenogenesis—unmated parenthood—may in several generations produce either too much variation from a desirable type, because unbalanced by a corrective influence, or too much monotony. The only reason for sex in the human relation is that offspring may partake of the nature of two parents and the transmitted characteristics may be fortunate. It is obvious, therefore, that the one natural motive of married love, as distinguished from the other types of love, is the propagation of the race.

This notion of common parenthood, on the other hand, covers a far wider field than at first appears. Though it is based on a physical fact, it enters all the phases of the common life. Clearly under the first notion of heredity given in the last chapter—that is, the power of prenatal influence—this notion of common parenthood may, at least to the mother, be the whole of life, for she knows that every act, every word, every emotion, may influence the whole life of her child. The prospect of common parenthood under any conditions must affect the moral life of the parents, even though they believe only in the influence of environment. Again, the whole mental attitude of the parents toward life in general may be largely influenced by their anticipation and realization of common

parenthood. Finally, the whole spiritual activity of their natures, since parenthood is perhaps the most beautiful thing on earth, must be largely governed by this common thought. It must remain true, therefore, that the idea of common parenthood is the underlying idea of the marriage relation, and although there is no such thing as parenthood without the physical relation, the physical occupies absolutely the smallest part in the relation as a whole. Indeed, the physical relation has absolutely no reason to be, no excuse for being, no apology for being, except in the notion of common parenthood. Our analysis, then, gives us warrant for hazarding a definition of love between man and woman. In the first place, it is a domination—a thought that fills the mind and brooks no denial—and is always a beautiful domination, though sometimes it is not quite justified. It adds to the other elements of affection a passion to join the loved one in perpetuating in the world that loved one's body and soul. It is the lover's unconscious answer to Death:——She shall not die; she shall live eternally on earth.

It is obvious that this definition of love will not be accepted by all professed lovers. We have no right to construct a vocabulary of our own and

say that those who do not love in this fashion do not love at all. It may well be believed, however, that in the world's literature poets and novelists who have written of love have had in mind this sort of thing more often than any other. That which distinguishes perfect love between man and woman from all other affection is something more than reproductive desire; it is the desire less for self-reproduction than for the reproduction of the loved one. In the lower animals, sexual desire is satisfied apparently with indifference to the mate, and usually, at least on the part of the male, without regard to the advent of offspring. This is why human sexual activity without regard to the mate and to offspring is mere bestiality. The higher the animal, the more discrimination is shown in mating. In the human relation, the more the attention is focused on the mate, rather than on the mating, the higher is the type. In the highest type of human relation, sexual desire will go unsatisfied for life rather than suffer what it believes would be with the wrong mate mere degradation. This sort of desire alone seems to be worthy of the name of love. It is at least the ideal toward which the evolution of the race is working. Anything less than this may in the language of convention be called by the name

of love, but it is really only animal instinct humanized by affection—such affection as may exist outside of the marriage relation. The perfect love, which is one of the factors in our American hope, not only centers affection on the loved one, but concentrates the reproductive instinct until desire is concerned less with self than with the perpetuation of the ideals which that loved one personifies. In a word, the essence of love is passion for the perpetuation of an ideal.

Where such love exists, the lover is usually persuaded that he or she, appreciating the loved one better than anyone else, is best fitted to join in perpetuating that ideal; but when one is convinced that one is less fitted than another lover, the perfect love is superior to jealousy, and, withdrawing its suit, accepts its tragedy. Such exalted love is of course rare, but it has been known again and again.

It would be easy, if one were so inclined, to ascribe many of the evils of our civilization to errors in the conduct of the sexual relation. The amount of loathsome disease due to sexual depravity, and visited upon innocent and unwitting wives and children, is admitted by all authorities to be appalling. We are not concerned here with

disease, however. As we have already seen, most of the theories of progress ascribe to parenthood the chief influence over the future. If parenthood is degraded—not merely in its attitude toward children, but in its exaggeration of the physical element—the children are likely to be gross, sensual, impulsive, selfish. A bitter example of that is a common condition of the negro in the South to-day. During slavery times, and even later, many negro women were mistresses, voluntary or involuntary, of unprincipled whites. Such concubinage was an accepted fact. Several generations of half-breeds begotten in mere lust were born in the South. They and their descendants have bred in lust. The unspeakable sufferings of white women from the brute passion of these creatures is warning of the awfulness of sexual instinct divorced from love. This is an extreme instance, not often repeated under such clearly defined circumstances and with such fearful result; but a milder type of the same sort of thing is commonly before us in the sensual and licentious issue of many marriages. The origin of sex is, as we have seen, nature's need in producing certain types. That is satisfied in bi-sexual parenthood. Parenthood seems to be designated by nature as the sole function of sex. Any other use

of the sexual relation appears to be perversion—prostitution. To look at parenthood as an accident or an incident of marriage is to reverse the order of nature. To look at the arrival of children as the price to pay for sexual pleasure—a penalty avoidable with good luck—is to confess marriage a pretense. To welcome the child but deplore its unseasonable arrival is to confess it an accident—to confess that nature refused to be tricked. The fact is that nature recognizes no sexual relation but that of common parenthood, and she pursues with unrelenting vigor those who try to trick her. The penalty is either the defeat of their purposes or the steady degradation of their souls. The perfect parental relation is that which can say to the child, "To that which seemed to me best worth perpetuating, I joined the best that was in me, in order that out of that union you might spring. You were desired; you are welcome." When a parent cannot say as much as this to a child, he has failed to experience the full meaning of parenthood. Nature is having her turn, and shame and deceit and want of confidence are in the house. No wonder the children are sensual, selfish, lacking in reverence; no wonder such parents are unwilling to talk of sexual things to their children; and no wonder such

children go to anyone but the parents for answers to questions of inevitable human interest.

It is easy to say, as some have said, that the ideal marriage relation suggested here is not quite human. The answer is simply the statement that it is life altogether most human. We have already noted the fact that the primitive passions fill only a small part of life's capacity. A meager soul may be filled with the brute passion of mere sex; but the big soul is athirst for something that calls into play not only primitive passions, with all their force, but the eternal conflict between them and the far-sought vision—not mere active passion, but passion held tense with restraint, physical vigor hand in hand with spiritual aspiration, satisfaction forgetting itself in self-sacrifice, years of preparation yielding an eternity of issue. This is the meaning of nature's parenthood—years of restrained exalted passion, the outpouring of vigor and a flood of spiritual satisfaction, and the rest of a lifetime in self-sacrifice for the fruitage of eternal souls. If the passion is not continuous and its exercise controlled, if the satisfaction is not a sort of sacred culmination of a period of preparation, if the physical energy is not etherealized with spiritual exaltation, one of the big things of life has been missed

—one's birthright has been sold for a mess of pottage from the flesh pots of Egypt.

This, then, is the marriage tie—the bond of two souls, complements one of the other, in a union that creates new souls out of the best of the old. Whatever tends to bring into activity any but the best tends in the same degree to weaken the tie. It is in the marriage relation, more than anywhere else, that one loses when one is not at one's best. The relation exists to perpetuate that best—its kindness, its tenderness, its self-sacrifice, its self-restraint, its vigor, its purity, its honor. There, more than elsewhere, must one be conscious of what one is doing, for in parenthood the seeds of eternity are sowed. If a man must now and then throw restraint to the winds, must have his rebellious fling against control, must be a primitive creature, we may pity him for the stupidity or weakness that leave him less than man; but let him not think the field of sex, much less the field of marriage, is for such wanton sport.

What relation does this ideal married love bear to the theories of progress? In the theory of prenatal influence, this love is the chief spring of progress. Since by this theory children inherit their parents' states peculiarly at the time of conception and pregnancy, the ideal state of love is

likely to mean an ideal inheritance—at least in kindness, tenderness, self-sacrifice, self-control, thoughtfulness, purity. It may mean in addition to these all that the parents strive for. Nothing less than the ideal love can give such inheritance, for unless each parent believes the loved one better fitted than any other to join in parenthood, the union of soul is not perfect and the creative act lacks the spiritual satisfaction. Lacking that, it cannot give the child his full spiritual birthright.

By the second theory of progress, which admits the transmission of acquired characteristics but denies the special power of prenatal influence, ideal love, as a factor in the development of the individual parents, is necessarily of great importance, for it tends to round out the individual by making complete his incompleteness; and this improvement is transmitted to posterity. If the love is perfect, the virtues that it engenders and strengthens become ingrain in the parents and are the inheritance of the child. He begins at the point which they attained. Any violation of the ideal, on the other hand, as it weakens the spiritual tie and so robs the fullness of the individual life of the parent, cheats the child of a part of his inheritance.

If we adopt the third theory of progress, which

denies in parents any power to transmit characteristics which were not themselves inherited, we find the element of sentiment in ideal love less important, but the practical fact of perfect mating quite as essential. We can illustrate this by a comparison with the other theories. In the others, the important factor is not so much the fitness of the parent as the lover's belief in that fitness; the sentiment in large part creates the spiritual element in the child. Under this third theory, however, since the child inherits certain hereditary characteristics of his parents and has no part in any characteristics that they may have acquired by conduct or association, the governing factor in his inheritance is not at all what the parents think about each other, or what is their relation to each other, or even what the parents actually are to-day, but only what they inherited at birth. This apparently reduces the situation to a cold matter of fact; but in reality the human heart has a way of warming even to things that are not apparent on the surface. Under our definition, love is passion for the perpetuation of an ideal. It is quite as easy for a man to dote upon an inherited characteristic as upon one that is acquired. He may indeed suspect that the inheritance is more likely to endure, even though it be

less prominent than acquired traits. The inheritance sometimes represents, in a sense, what might have been, and what may yet appear. It is seldom true, of course, that men and women love for what the loved one might have been. They love for what appears to be. So far as they desire to perpetuate what appears, rather than what might have been, and so far as the theory in question is true, progress does not lie so nearly in the palm of men's hands as we well might wish; for the theory tells us that inherited characteristics do not always appear until the second generation —that is to say, while we love what appears, we may be begetting only what might have been. We are compelled to hope that this is not true. Even here, however, the ideal married relation, as depicted previously, is more likely to bring the progress of the race than any other. Though it may be true that one's conduct does not affect offspring, and that selfishness and self-indulgence and lust are not transmitted unless they were also inherited, one cannot know one's fitness to beget children unless one has proved oneself over and over. By this very theory, character is more likely to be inherited than acquired; and the most satisfactory test of inherited character is present character. How can anyone expect to be loved if

the best criterion of his inherited character—which we have just seen to be his present character—declares him unfit? The perfect married love, even if we accept this theory of progress, demands that the best self be constantly at the fore, or the lover may have reason to doubt that the inherited self is fit for perpetuation. Then love dies.

Finally, we have the theory that proper environment is the only spring of progress. What has this to do with married love? This theory denies any individuality in parenthood, for it denies any but physical difference in children at birth. Its emphasis is necessarily on the home, the center and spring of influence. The ideal love, as we have seen it, makes home an epitome of the best life—passionate, restrained; eager, patient; vigorous, refined; ambitious, self-sacrificing; tender, firm; individualistic, collectivistic. Here things must be in the open, for frankness the child must learn. The parent must be able to look the child in the eye fearlessly, or the child will carry his secrets elsewhere. There must be no hidden self-indulgence to build a barrier between the generations. The child is the best self of the parents set in their midst as a witness and as a pupil. If they can bear with a clear glance

the scrutiny of those best selves, the home is a spring of progress. If not, progress is hampered —or possibly thrust back upon itself. Even by this theory, then, ideal love, as we have defined it, is the best assurance of progress.

This ideal love is not too good to be true. It is found where theories of progress are unknown, and where they are pondered. It is a living fact. It is more common in America than anywhere else in the world. It is the ideal American marriage. If the first theory is true, it creates new spirit out of the mere craving of the soul; if the second theory is true, it stores the future with the growing fruit of to-day's struggle after righteousness; if the third theory is true, it passes on the heritage of the ages with increase, provided only we combine wisely the elements of that heritage; if the fourth theory is true, it gives every day a direct value in deepening the path which shall be fondly followed by the foot sorely tempted to wander. As already remarked, these theories do not exclude each other. In their positive elements they may all be true. We may well live as if they were all true. Even if any of them be false, life is actually better worth living when lived as if they were true. Life is worth living in this fashion for its own sake, irre-

spective of progress. That ideal love is its own happiness.

We have spoken of the thought of common parenthood as the distinguishing feature of love between man and woman, as the marriage tie. We are naturally concerned, therefore, with a possible severing of the tie. If in the mind of one of the pair the other is not fitted to transmit its character into the future, that other is no longer desired as a coparent; and if the spiritual side of parenthood is to be given its proper weight, the physical relation becomes absolutely repulsive. In other words, in such a case the marriage has already ceased to exist; the one function which ever can have justified it, which ever can have led to it, operates no more. The principal question is always in such cases whether the marriage should keep its legal status after it has lost its spiritual significance. The history of marriage indicates that its function as a legal institution has been to provide for the maintenance of the children and their mother. It has been necessary to provide not only that the children shall be properly nurtured, at least so far as the law can force such nurture upon the father, but also that the mother shall not be abandoned after she has satisfied her husband's desire for parenthood.

She has trusted her future to the father, and he must care for her. Beyond such outward physical care, however, the legal institution of marriage has never gone. When, therefore, the desire for common parenthood or the satisfaction in it has ceased, the only concern of marriage as a legal institution appears to be provision for the care of children already conceived and for the protection of the mother against abandonment. This, therefore, should be the concern of the divorce laws. In other respects, if marriage has ceased spiritually, it is absolutely a matter of indifference whether it exists legally. From the nature of the case, if the primary function of the marriage in its origin has ceased, the husband can as a husband do for the wife nothing which he could not equally well do for her as a friend or a relative. Consequently, with the cessation of the internal marriage relation, it is consistent and altogether harmless that the extraordinary marriage relation as recognized in legal responsibility should end also with the provision for financial support.

The real responsibility of the husband is more than financial, however. It is to help the wife to make the most of herself. It can be satisfied as a father might satisfy it. It is certainly no greater than a father's, for as the father is responsible

—because he begot her—for her early life, so the man who married her is responsible for what he assumed of her later life. Divorce can relieve him only of the responsibilities peculiar to a husband, and it can do that only because the internal marriage relation is ended. This must be true even when the wife is the one who desires divorce. If the husband has failed as a husband, he is still responsible for the care that he assumed in a father's place—unless the wife waives that care. Morally, no divorce can do more than sever the tie that distinguishes marriage from the other forms of human relationship; the other ties must remain as binding as ever. No longer husband and wife, the man and the woman are peculiarly responsible to help each other because their lives have been so closely interwoven. Under absolutely no conditions can this responsibility be denied.

This theory of divorce has always met vigorous opposition on the ground that it degrades the marriage relation. The natural answer is to ask whether degradation consists in severing legally a relation which has already been severed mentally, morally, and spiritually, or whether it consists in trying to continue physically and legally a relation which long ago ceased to exist in

other respects. Surely, the conception of marriage as already set forth in the first part of this chapter is the highest possible; for it gives to that relation all that is beautiful in any kind of love, and it adds to the other elements of love something which comes as near being godlike as anything can—that is, coöperation with God in a creative act which is primarily spiritual. With this conception of marriage in mind, the horrible thing is not that when love has ceased divorce should follow, but that when love has ceased the pretense of marriage should continue.

If, after the spiritual relation between husband and wife has ceased, another woman's beauty of mind and of spirit seem to the husband preëminently to demand perpetuation, it is the worst possible condition to have him still bound to serve the first in a relation which must be abhorrent to both, whereas he might be free to serve the second in a relation which is godlike. It is clearly true, also, that, when the relation has ceased, the woman should be free with our characteristic American liberty to perpetuate as far as she may the body, the mind, and the spirit of another man, if any seem to her preëminently to demand her aid for perpetuation. It is a wrong to the individual and to the community that the dead thing

should be allowed to decay in the house rather than that it should be buried and a new life spring up in its place. This assumes, as a prime condition, however, that all remaining of the old responsibility is fully performed—all that a father should do for his children, all that a man may do for a woman who is no longer his wife. When these things are not done, remarriage is out of the question.

This argument may seem on superficial reading to support free love. If the words are properly used, it does; but the argument is based upon a sort of love which is practically never associated with the common expression "free love." Certainly it does not attempt to defend lust, or sensuality, or any impulse that throws off responsibility. The freedom advocated here demands only the right to protect a holy thing against sham, and, while all that can possibly remain of old responsibilities is still fulfilled, to assume new responsibilities. Such new responsibilities can be defended only when they spring from a passion for the perpetuation of an ideal.

It is common to read in the magazines and newspapers that the number of divorces is increasing rapidly. This is not necessarily a bad sign. Already we have observed in several

connections the fact that what appears to be a demoralization in the community is only an indication that the general standard is higher—so much higher that the moral delinquents stand out conspicuously. It is true that divorces are increasing rapidly. If this is a sign that the marriage relation is coming into higher esteem, as is perfectly conceivable, it is most wholesome. If in the old days the marriage relation was continued physically when the spiritual element had departed, we should hail with delight the common severance of union. If, on the other hand, the growth of divorce is due to the fact that people are looking more lightly upon all phases of the marriage relation, the condition is appalling. This supposition is to be doubted. It is necessary to consider the fact that the causes of unhappiness in marriage are increasing with the complexity of our civilization. With the growth in the variety of interests—social, intellectual, æsthetic, moral—in every considerable community in the land, it is inevitable that differences shall arise in the conception of how life ought to be lived. Fifty years ago even in our most complex communities the number of occupations for livelihood, for amusement, and for culture, was extremely limited. The common affairs of every-

day life filled the hours of men and women with the same sort of interests; even the moral problems of those days were not particularly complex. The right and the wrong of things were fairly evident. Nowadays, with a hundred opposing interests, the man with the most upright intent is subject to constant error and is in danger of doing extreme harm. His wife, seeing the same conditions—or, more commonly, seeing only a part of them,—undergoing the same struggles of conscience, may be forced by the conditions of her heredity and experience to choose a diametrically opposed course. Either would be degraded forever in his own mind if he should yield to the point of view of the other. There may be an agreement to disagree; but when day after day the courses of two people are so antagonistic that life is a constant surrender of loyalty or ambition on one side or the other in order to keep peace, the strain on the family ties is severe. This, moreover, is a case assuming moral seriousness and sincerity; under other conditions, dissension is even more likely. It is inevitable, therefore, that under normal conditions, even with the same ideals of the marriage relation as existed fifty years ago, divorces shall increase many fold. The development of the moral nature of the commu-

nity during the last fifty years should have led to a growth in the highest ideal of the marriage relation itself; and this is actually consistent with the growth of divorce. A person dominated by the notion of ideal parenthood cannot degrade marriage by a makeshift union: he demands that if the spiritual union has failed, physical union shall end; then legal union is often wisely dissolved. It is to be hoped that marriages will continue to be broken until the right point of view with regard to marriage shall prevail in the community at large. Then there will be less occasion for unions to be broken. The real test of community misfortune in this regard is not divorces, but unhappy marriages. Surely five hundred perfect marriages and a hundred divorces is a better state than six hundred barely tolerable marriages and no divorces. Statistics are valueless except when we are comparing identical things. We must see behind the figures, farther than we can yet go, before we allow ourselves to feel either alarmed or complacent.

Lest this theory of divorce and remarriage be misunderstood, it may well be summarized: it assumes that the old love was dead before any new sprang up—for a new love in the sense that love has been here defined could not grow up

while the old persisted; it assumes that any new love is not merely an intellectual belief in the superiority of the newly loved, but has the sacred elements common to all types of affection and in addition is dominated by the desire to perpetuate the ideals which the newly loved embodies—and, as has been shown, this is something far other than mere animal instinct; finally, it assumes that all the old responsibilities to the former husband or wife—except those of the purely marital relation—and to children shall still be served. It is obvious that if no divorced persons were remarried except under the conditions here given, the purity of the marriage relation would be defended rather than undermined by the greater freedom of divorce here suggested.

It may be well to note, before we leave the matter of love and marriage, that although all our argument has been based on the nature of parenthood, this theory is wholly consistent with a recognition of the beauty of some marriages that are childless and of others after the child-bearing age has been passed. We have been concerned not with all the variations of the marriage relation, but only with its origin and essence. We have shown love between man and woman to be distinguished from other affection by the fact that

it desires to join the loved one in perpetuating in the world, as best worth while, the body, mind, and soul of that loved one. Yet such love may exist where such perpetuation is impossible because of natural physical inability, or because of disability through age, or because of external barriers. Nature has sought to provide lavishly for her own ends, and she has made men and women attractive to each other in many ways. In the evolution of the ages she has differentiated the sexes in more ways than the physical. She has made woman's character in many ways the complement of man's, so that man shall find in woman a satisfaction of the lacks that he feels in himself. These inevitably attract him. He finds that with her the cycle of his life is complete, without her nothing is quite full or whole.

Their union, indeed, may do more than fill out his own life. It often more than doubles his life. A woman is richer, more attractive to man, if she adds in her own person manly virtues and charms, such as courage, to those which we call womanly; he is richer, more attractive to woman, if he adds her virtues and charms, such as tenderness, to those which we call manly. Yet, however a noble man and a noble woman may approach each other in qualities, spiritual distinction is never lost. A

woman may have all the womanly virtues and some of the womanly weaknesses, and she may have many manly virtues thrown in for good measure and be all the more adorable; but the masculine vices she must not have or she is unsexed. A man may have all the manly virtues and some of the manly weaknesses, and he may have many womanly virtues thrown in for good measure and be all the stronger for it; but the feminine vices he must not have or he is despicable. The distinction of sex characteristics, then, lies here: the womanly virtues are those which a woman must have and a man preferably should have for good measure; and the womanly weaknesses are those which in limited number are excusable in a woman but fatal in a man; the manly virtues are those which a man must have and a woman should have for good measure; and a man's weaknesses are those which in limited number are excusable in him but fatal in a woman. A noble woman thus may far more than fill the emptiness in a man's soul; she may be to him another soul, companion to his own. So far may this be true, that even though she cannot bear him a child he may feel that the fulfillment of their lives together may be better worth while than the perpetuation of the soul of any other

woman. His love for her is something of a tragedy, for it still craves the perpetuation of her soul in children; but it is less a tragedy than would be his marriage to another woman while he believes the first to be best worth perpetuation. So Nature, working through her attempt to perpetuate the race, has given us a very beautiful thing with which perpetuation has really nothing to do. This is her bounty. We find it also where men and women have passed the age of parenthood. The ideal, or the memory, rather than the aim or hope, binds them together. If they have children, the fruition of their parenthood is one of their strong ties.

The dreariest thing in the world, on the contrary, is the state of those who in late life find themselves estranged and look back upon a marriage which has been a prostitution—an attempt to cheat nature, to get what Emerson would call the "sensual sweet without the spiritual sweet," successful attempts at race suicide. It is an interesting fact that in more than sixty per cent of recent divorces the marriages were childless.

It is doubtless true that if the only marriages contracted were those classed in this chapter as perfect, the marriage rate would decline rapidly. This might not be a calamity. Few parts of the

world are to-day suffering for lack of population, and these could be more than satisfied without much affecting the surplus in the centers of congestion. What the world needs is not at all more people, but more people begotten and trained in ideal conditions. It may be true that in the complexity of modern life a man finds it harder to see in woman, or in a particular woman, the satisfaction of that ideal which only, if he is sensitive, he desires to embody in offspring. The woman whom any man can adore is farther to seek—just because modern conditions have made women less like each other, and men less like each other, and so a happy mating harder to find; but in just that degree is such a woman better worth the seeking, more likely to satisfy the soul, more likely to be noble—for she is the product of the progress of the race. The difference between the noblest woman and the lowest woman is yearly increasing: the low is as low as the lowest ever was, but the noble is nobler than ever was the noble before, for modern conditions have brought out in her new strength and new kindness and new purity from new trials and temptations that her older sisters never knew. The lowest woman is wholly dominated by notions which the noblest woman never even knew, never could recognize.

The difference between them is world-wide. One will give for a song what the other will keep with her life; one will seek at the cost of the jewel of her soul what the other will shun as the bitterest curse. These are not figures of rhetoric: they are facts of human nature. They are true of men as well as of women. While these things are true perfect love between man and woman will not die from the earth. Like responds to like. Indeed, a little better than this is true. Like responds to what it thinks a little better than its like. The appeal is always upward. No man ever loves a woman whom he does not think more noble than himself, and no woman ever loves except, in her own mind, above her. This does not mean the craving of the moth for the star, for we cannot comprehend what is much above us. This upward faith is one of the beautiful things of life. It is one of the springs of human progress. If marriage and parenthood never occurred except where such love prevails, births would decline but the race would be happier.

Sometimes we hear the statement that a reduced marriage rate means increase of sexual immorality. Such a statement is based on a curious notion of morality. If the mere animal instinct of lust is so overpowering that men must

breed like swine to keep them from degradation that puts them below the swine, the sooner they exterminate themselves by vice the better. No woman with any sense of the dignity in motherhood wishes to be made a mother merely to satisfy the lust of a man who would otherwise go to a woman of the streets. No pure woman wishes to surrender her body to a man whose lust has so dominated him that he cannot live in the holy atmosphere of restrained exalted passion. Womanhood is not a cesspool for the lust of man. Lust satisfied in marriage is as immoral as lust satisfied elsewhere: unwelcome children begotten in lustful wedlock are as much the offspring of prostitution as are bastards. The man who cannot contain himself is no mate for any pure woman, and immorality lies in his marriage to her far more than in his drowning himself and his accursed race in any sink of iniquity. Our task is not to find an outlet for lust, but to dignify marriage and parenthood. Civilized men can live in purity and yet beget no more children than they can support and train for efficient citizenship. The test of civilization is the ability for this.

The foundation of our hope for the future lies, then, in recognizing perfect love in the marriage relation as the first spring of progress.

CHAPTER V

THE TRAINING OF POWERS

WE have considered in some detail our hope as it is related to the influence of heredity. We are concerned next with our hope as the American is affected by what he absorbs from the world outside himself. The most obvious outside influence, perhaps only because it is early, is the school. The others we shall have occasion to examine later. To enter into a general discussion of the problems of education would be entirely beyond the scope of this particular discussion; but a consideration of a few fundamental principles is necessary that we may see how far we are meeting the American ideal.

Bearing in mind again the fact that above everything else we insist upon liberty, brotherhood, and democracy, we must see that only a sort of education which shall open the eyes of the boy and the girl to the world as a whole can serve its purpose. We have seen in an earlier chapter that all men are just what heredity and

circumstance have made them, and that we cannot judge them with censure or praise. Since none can make himself, and since it is beyond his power to choose anything except out of his own knowledge of what is good, it is essential that to every boy and every girl shall be given an opportunity to see for himself the best in the world. This means, if it means anything, that he shall be given opportunity to observe what other men and women have found to be the best way of doing or getting the good things. The tendency in modern educational discussion has been to say that it is absurd to offer to the boy who is to be a blacksmith a course in Latin or Greek rather than a course in manual training. This criticism of old-fashioned methods may be both justified, on one hand, and absurd, on the other. If it is right in assuming that a blacksmith can find no value in the classics, it is justified; but if that assumption is ill-founded, it is absurd. Surely if the boy ought to have the classics, he had best get them in school; for he cannot easily get them outside of school and he can easily learn blacksmithing in a shop. We are trying in these days to raise craftsmanship to new dignity. We shall never do so if we assume offhand that a craftsman is unable as a man to profit by a liberal edu-

cation. What he needs as a craftsman is one thing: what he needs merely as a man may be a far different and far bigger thing.

A further difficulty lies in the fact that we cannot know which boy should be a blacksmith. A boy's fitness for any specific calling is not determined at the time Latin and Greek are offered to him. He cannot choose for himself except so far as his heredity and his environment have chosen for him. If there is in his nature that thing which shall respond to the Greek appeal, he may become a college professor, or a writer, or a teacher of Greek art, or a sculptor who shall embody the Greek ideal, or a craftsman who shall embody in his handicraft the Greek spirit. It is beyond the power of any human being to tell what that boy shall be at twenty, thirty, forty, seventy years of age. Just because wise choice is entirely beyond him and he will make out of his inherited nature just what outside influence enables him to make, it is the duty of the community, so far as we recognize any duty on the part of the community, to give him absolutely the greatest enlightenment possible as to the course of human life. His power to grasp what is set before him will naturally determine the point at which the offering of liberal education

shall cease. When we have given him all the enlightenment he can profitably absorb, he is in a position to direct, as wisely as his nature will allow, his own course.

How much does any one of us know about the proper course of human life for another? How much has any man in the past known about the proper course of human life? It is a commonplace to say that no man living knows one thousandth part of what there is in the world worth knowing and possible to know. The wisest men of all time have made wretched mistakes. It is certainly true in the history of the world that nine tenths of the people who have set up their detailed dictum as to how life ought to be lived have by the present day been convicted as wrong. Neither the individual nor the community as a whole has any business to dictate and enforce a way of life. The only guide we have is our own experience and our own interpretation of the experience of the past. All we can do wisely in our teaching is to show what has been learned in the past. Since the function of education is to furnish the maximum of opportunity, its only scientific method is to present to the young the truth about what men have learned of the art of living. In a sense, history is the one proper subject for

education; but history, as it chances, embraces all the results of human activity. One cannot teach the art of writing simple English sentences without teaching a fact of history, namely, that men have discovered that certain words put together in certain ways produce on the mind of the reader certain effects. The same thing is true in science. The moment we set up arbitrary standards and say that it is our function to teach others how life ought to be lived, we are assuming a wisdom which is the height of criminal egotism.

It is true that progress has never come from any source but throwing down a notion of the past and setting up a new one; but the public school-teacher is the last man in the world who has any right to set up a new arbitrary standard, for he is training a new generation which must set up standards of its own. It is the function of the teacher to interpret the past, to see just what men of the past got out of that past, to see, if possible, how far they failed to get out of the past what it might have had for them. If he is successful in his teaching, the new generation can do its own constructing. The teacher may strive in his own life to set up a standard for himself, to show in his teaching why under his interpretation of history that standard seems to him the

best, but to try to influence the new generation so that it shall have a bent toward the standard which he has set up for himself is to try to cheat the new generation of its inalienable liberty. For him, moreover, to think that he knows better what is good for the new generation than it can know for itself is a fundamental violation of the spirit of fraternity. It is pure egotism. So far, on the other hand, as he can help that new generation to see what he has got out of life, so far as he can help it to see how he has failed to get the best things out of life, he is doing it a real service.

In our examination of the power of choice between good and evil, we saw that failure to choose wisely is always due to a failure to see straight, to feel truly, to think logically. The aim of education, then, since it can only begin where heredity stops, must be to cultivate these three powers. If education is to help the coming generations not only to get out of the past the best that the past can offer, but also to use this in living their own lives, it should be concerned not only with the handing down of mere facts acquired from the past, but also with the cultivation of power to use facts. Altogether too much educational effort, especially in the last twenty-five years, has been directed to the less important end of this double

purpose. Advertisements which promise "a college education in ten volumes" are a witness of the exaggerated notion of the value of facts. The mere truth that facts can be put into a book, whereas mental power is only in living brains, is proof enough of the comparative importance of each. It is true, indeed, that the brain needs a large equipment of ready facts to keep it from unconscious error; but these facts are only to support the application of the power: they are absolutely valueless without the power to make use of them. They are subordinate to the reasoning faculty. A large part of the teaching of facts in recent years has assumed that facts are valuable for their own sake, and has been conducted in such fashion as to prevent the development of the power of reasoning. The facts have been made unduly easy to learn, and the power to see, to ponder, to reason, has been stagnating from disuse. Our young people have been left without the power to apply their learning to their own problems, to see things in wholeness and in due relation one to another, and to distinguish a reasonable proposition from an absurd one. To remedy this must be the first educational reform, and fortunately it seems already to be coming.

It is the fashion to talk of the need for prac-

tical things in education. Not always can the practical man tell what he means by practical things, and not always can he recognize them. Somehow in the popular mind "practical" has come to mean, usually, nothing more than immediate, obvious, simple. As a matter of fact, comparatively little of life is immediate, or obvious, or simple—though to the superficial observer it all appears so. Removing a cataract from a patient's eye by a quick stroke of the knife is to the chance observer immediate, obvious, simple. To the man who knows, it is a matter of long-trained, constantly freshened power, requiring nerve and daring. It is wholly practical in the operation, but nine practical men in every ten would scoff at the process by which the power is attained if they did not know of the exact purpose. Similarly, it is the fashion to scoff at the training of the imagination. "I don't want my boy to fritter away his time on things that don't exist: I want him to know things as they are," says the practical man. He is quite right. He simply doesn't happen to know that no man can see things as they are unless he can also think about things that are not. The only things we know directly are the things that are with *us here and now;* but these are usually the little unimportant things. In practical

life no man lives most of the time with the big things. He lives practically with the meat and drink, the bricks and mortar, the paint and canvas, the ink and paper; but the real things of his experience are the physical life, the home, the inspiring picture, the thought that fills the life. These are too big for the mere selfish here and now. Only as the man gets away from the self, the here, and the now, does he ever rise above the animal. The most practical man lives constantly in the atmosphere of things that are not—things that he is trying to prepare for being. If he could not see beyond the actual, he would be the unpractical man. The practical man is a dreamer. He sees in imagination the thing that is not, he sees it as a whole, he sees the obstacles that do not exist but will arise when new forces, not now in play, are applied to situations that have not yet occurred. Without imagination he would have stood helpless like a hungry dog before a closed refrigerator. Imagination is a power not only for the preacher, the writer, the statesman, but for the engineer, the manufacturer, the merchant, the artisan, the housewife. The practical man who denounces studies that cultivate the imagination is simply blind. What we want is not that pupils shall *learn* about what is

not, but that they shall get the *power* to seize and hold and ponder what is remote. Only so can they see straight or feel truly.

We have made much of the function of dominant notions—of notions that possess the mind to the exclusion of all conflicting notions. Some of these are false and evil, crowding out the truth; they are obsessions. As a safeguard against them nothing equals a good imagination. The obsession is always direct, here, now. It fills the present mind. A good imagination—and imagination is partly memory—presents another picture which pushes the obsession hard and may oust it altogether. We have seen that the choice of evil is made often under an obsession that the evil is worth while. Whatever will take the thing in its wholeness and show it as it is for all time, in all places, for all men, must drive out the obsession of the petty self, the petty here, and the petty now.

It is a fact that most of the evils that men are crying out against are traceable to obsessions, and that most of these obsessions are traceable to a lack of imagination on the part of the perpetrators. To give a concrete illustration, the recent common disasters due to recklessness of drivers of motor cars are due unquestionably not

to the cruelty of the drivers, not fundamentally to their natural carelessness, but to the fact that at the time when a risk is taken the anticipated joy of successfully handling a machine under hazardous circumstances has taken such possession of them that their imaginations are not able to grasp the probabilities or even the possibilities of suffering, anguish, and tragedy which a failure of their calculations will bring upon some members of the community. There is not one man in a thousand who, if his imagination could see the full meaning of the crushing of the life of a child, the mangling of a wage earner supporting a family, the horror of a timid old lady who is saved from harm by the skillful manipulation of a car, would not forego any pleasure that he might have in his reckless race rather than risk bringing these things upon others. Imagination is not one of the luxuries of life. It is one of the safeguards.

Similarly, the man of business who takes liberties with control placed in his hands, and by it raises the price of the necessities of life, or upsets the regular course of business, does so only because he cannot grasp in his imagination the consequences of his act. If he could see the families struggling in grinding poverty to care for the invalid, to educate the children, to pay off the mort-

gage on the home, he would find himself unable to undertake many of the ventures which now fascinate him because of the opportunity to play a big game with other men of his own class. He is obsessed with the fighting instinct, and as long as it lasts he is unable to grasp any idea conflicting with it unless that idea is thrust upon him vigorously from outside. It is notable that many men whose public business transactions have brought calamity to innumerable families beyond their ken have been in their private life, with those whom they personally knew, altogether thoughtful, considerate, and generous. The bigness and the remoteness of their business relations have rendered these men unable, without a distinct play of the imagination, to grasp the full meaning of what they are doing.

The two illustrations given may be taken as typical. The carelessness of drivers shows the effect of a momentary obsession which seems to the person concerned a trifling thing; the heedlessness of business managers is a more or less permanent obsession in a recognized big thing. In one case the chance of harm seems so small that the trifle is not worth considering, and in the other the very bigness of the thing gives it an importance in the eye of the doer so great that he neglects

the fact that other things of an entirely different nature may be even bigger in the eye of the community. The thousand and one other evils against which men cry out will be found on examination to show the same signs—an obsession on the part of some one which makes it impossible for him to see with his limited imagination the full truth about the thing in which he is the principal actor.

It is obvious, from what has been already said, that the most important thing which can be given any child is a power made up of three elements—first, physical strength and health, which must be the basis of all other power; second, intellectual strength, which shall enable him to face a new situation, and in it distinguish between the factors which are like those with which he has had previous experience and those which are new and must be related to old experiences for a new judgment; and third, imaginative strength which shall enable him to see back into the past, and on into the future, and among his fellows of to-day, so that he shall know just what relation his experiences bear to human experience as a whole.

To give all these is no small task. The capacity to receive them, moreover, is different in different individuals. In any attempt to educate the race,

economy of effort must be observed. Certain natures are incapable of developing beyond rather narrow limits, and an educational system which shall attempt the same sort of training for all pupils is squandering energy. It is of the utmost importance to the community, however, that everyone shall have the opportunity to develop as far as his nature will allow. It is not always easy to determine when the limit has been reached. The only safe rule is to continue the education of each pupil as long as there is sign of advance commensurate with the cost. Even in a lifetime no one can learn all there is to learn about the art of living; but a lifetime devoted to study, with no time left for the practice of living, would be wasted. Each member of society should receive such education as will make him most efficient as a member of society; but with all men, after a certain age, the best school is practical experience of life. The schooling of each should progress, then, to that point at which he loses as much from the limitation of his practical activity as he gains from the pursuit of his scholastic studies. The task is to determine at what point, for each person, study shall give place to work. Education lies in both study and work, and both should continue till death; but the public concern is to

determine in each case at what point the education of the individual and his best usefulness to society comes chiefly through work rather than through study. At that point his scholastic education at public expense should cease—and no sooner.

The objection is often raised that the community cannot afford such general training as is here advocated. The community can always afford to make good citizens; and though it is true that the old-fashioned training for culture has often been given to young people who have become very bad citizens, no evidence has ever been given that the school produces the evil. It is a common remark that schooling does not produce virtue, and that intelligence does not assure morality. It is not to be expected, except by those who believe that environment can do everything, that any training will wholly eradicate evil inheritance. It is a fact, moreover, that our attempts to give the higher education have been lacking in more ways than most of us have yet realized. There is more to education even than the three kinds of power already mentioned—physical, intellectual, imaginative. These three kinds of strength are of consequence only in relation to the subjects with which they shall be concerned. It is of no consequence to the community that a man shall have

intellectual power except as he uses it on subjects with which the community is concerned. It is, indeed, of little consequence to the man himself that he shall have powers unless he uses them. Intellectual power applied without relation to the other powers, or applied in wrong directions, may do dire harm. Education fails unless it supplies a unity or balance of powers and also supplies an understanding of what uses of those powers man's experience of the past has shown to be wise. Nothing less than this can be called a fair introduction to the art of living—an introduction that every boy and every girl may fairly demand. We are, therefore, quite as much concerned with the relations of a man to the outside world as we are with his powers for their own sake. The real question is how he shall use his powers and, therefore, what should be his point of view about the world he lives in. He must know certain facts about man's experience with the outside world. Here, and here only, is the value of facts.

Every man has three kinds of relations with the outer world—æsthetic, social, moral. The æsthetic are concerned with all those things which give him pleasure through an appreciation of excellence; the social affect his power to get along with other men in such a way as to get from them

assistance in bringing about his own aims; the moral determine his attitude toward his fellow men as related to right and wrong. It is not enough that the man's mind shall work properly in these relations when the materials are before him; the mind should be so equipped that automatically, on the presentation of a problem, the fundamental and universal considerations shall arise before him and shall dominate him. He may then relate the peculiar circumstances of his own case to the general principles. He should be equipped with these fundamental notions by a general training which shall teach him the best that man's experience has discovered about these relations. Then his own experience can be adjusted, as he thinks wise, to the experience of mankind, or he may be in a position to launch out on conduct that is original. It is absurd to think that any man, of however great powers, is competent to settle questions involving relations with the outside world unless he has learned the experiences of mankind in such matters in the past. It is for this reason that general education should include a liberal instruction in the elements of æsthetics, social relations, and ethics. Indeed, no man is quite a safe member of society until he has considered the most important truths that

the past has learned about these things. We are quite as much concerned about the welfare of the community as we are about the individual. He may not care to know about these things; but since we know that his conduct is necessarily governed by his dominant notions, we may insist that he shall at least have given a hearing to the notions that other men have cherished. We have occasion to examine in some detail, therefore, the relation of each of these three fields—æsthetics, social relations, and ethics—to American life and our American hope. This we shall do in the three chapters immediately following.

CHAPTER VI

THE PLEASURE IN THINGS

IT takes some boldness to assert that the American is by nature adapted to appreciate art. To discover his fitness for it, we must learn first what he naturally finds interesting, and second what is the essential thing in art. In the last analysis, we shall find both these things to be the same—namely, excellence. We have commonly read that Americans have no regard for excellence, but rather are concerned only with bigness, and showiness, and cheapness. It does not occur to the critic that bigness and showiness and cheapness are in their proper places themselves excellences. We are prone to forget that all things are merely relative. It does not follow that because a man regards bigness he has no eye for delicacy. No one desires delicacy in a mountain. No one, on the other hand, would expect a person to be a particularly competent critic of miniatures if he had devoted himself chiefly to the study of mural decoration.

The ordinary American will deny vehemently that he is indifferent to excellence; and he is right. The ground of criticism against him is merely that he is acquainted with excellence of only a few kinds. There is no competent engineer who does not appreciate excellent construction in a bridge; there is no competent manufacturer who does not appreciate excellent workmanship in a manufactured article; there is no competent merchant who does not appreciate a masterful stroke in conducting a buying or a selling campaign; there are few competent mechanics who do not appreciate a beautiful machine. Each of these, moreover, is able to see something more than mere money making or even utility in the thing which he admires: he has a definite notion of finish, of proportion, of delicate adjustment; he has a definite notion of what is to him beauty for its own sake—that is to say, a job done a little better than merely well enough for utility.

It chances that just here—in beauty for its own sake, over and above utility—lies the essence of art. This is not the place to expound art principles. Our real concern is simply to see how it is possible to increase the pleasure which can be found in the things of life, to make better worth while man's relations with the world of things.

First of all, we must recognize that all art is a method of communication between men. The painter, the sculptor, the musician, the poet, have something to say, or at least they have something to show. The aim of art is, as Lowell expressed it in "The Vision of Sir Launfal," to build "a bridge from dreamland." The artist has found pleasure in a thought or in a thing of beauty. He wishes to share that pleasure with other people. He may have a message of inspiration to offer his fellows. It chances that for him the best way to make others share in his emotions is through one of the senses. The emotions that have first had play in himself he arouses, through his art, in another. The bridge must be built from his spirit, by means of a physical sight or sound, to the spirit of the second person. The art is good or bad just in proportion as the means are adapted to the end. No means of appeal should be neglected.

The ambitious painter, for example, is concerned not merely to represent an object, but to represent it in such a light, in such surroundings, and in such relation to other things, that it shall appear in those aspects which are to him most characteristic—at least those that seem just now best worth recording,—and at the same time he

wishes to produce a picture which shall as a whole be most satisfying; that is, he wishes his painting to give most enduring pleasure as a picture and not merely as a representation of the object painted. As this second object may seem unduly finical, let us examine it a little. The artist wishes to make the widest possible appeal. He wishes to throw in excellences for good measure. For instance, the object may appear at such a place in the picture that it shall have just the right emphasis; the colors in the picture may be related to one another so as to give distinct pleasure to the eye; the lines may tend to bind the picture together as a unit rather than cut it up into bits, or tire the eye with fruitless pointings; the masses may balance so that the picture shall not be one-sided or top-heavy, and so divert attention from its main purpose; little touches may emphasize the essential spirit of the picture—such as solitude or companionship, tenderness or severity, cheerfulness or melancholy, dignity or lightsomeness. Often the addition of a bit of color, the change of a color, the addition of a figure, the omission of a detail, the shifting of a light, or the destruction of a line, makes the difference between effectiveness and failure. The quest for these is the quest for excellence; and as excellence

is worth while, these are worth while. The artist is never quite satisfied with the thing he has done, because he knows that in the nature of the case it could be done better if only he or some one else had the wit and the skill to get just that better way. That better way would give his message greater vitality.

This does not mean, however, that the test for a work of art is the effect on any particular observer, for this observer may chance from deficient or peculiar circumstances to see something which other men and women would not see, and yet this something may be just what the artist was trying to show. In other words, an untrained observer may find pleasure in the work of an untrained producer. Their similarity of circumstance enables them to understand each other. As a matter of fact, this is a fortunate occurrence; yet it is not the most fortunate thing that may happen. Chance is too uncertain as a basis for any art. Indeed, in the work of a master the untrained observer is likely to find less pleasure than in the work of the unskillful artist, for he is likely to be puzzled by things which he cannot understand; the trained observer, on the other hand, in such work finds for his admiration many things which not only did not appear in the work

of the unskillful artist, but were not seen by the untrained observer in the work of the master. This sort of thing is familiar to the engineer, the business man, and the mechanic, each in his own field. They enjoy showing their work to men who have been initiated, and they do not expect appreciation from the know-nothing.

It is natural for many men to say that they are not interested in any artistic thing. They do not see the good of art, they find no pleasure in it, and, therefore, to them it is all nonsense. This is the point of view of the so-called practical man. Such a man cannot, on the other hand, understand another man who says that the stock-market quotations, and the baseball score, and the price of copper, are indifferent to him. Unless the man is by nature deficient in the color sense, in a sense of proportion, in a sense of pitch and rhythm, he is quite as competent to enjoy a work of art as the other to find interest in business statistics. Yet it is a common thing for a man of artistic temperament to find interest in the stock market and other business affairs; as soon as he comes to see that any of these things mean anything to him, either through personal welfare or merely through intellectual understanding, he is able to

enjoy them. Similarly, the man without æsthetic training, unless he is hampered as already suggested, finds interest in matters of art as soon as he has placed himself in a position to recognize their excellence. The characteristic pleasure of American men, at least that which appeals with keenest delight to the greatest number, seems to be watching a baseball game; yet it is well known that a person uninitiated in the technic of the game finds little of interest except the enjoyment of others. No one expects to enjoy what he does not understand. In no other field than that of art does a man usually decline to become initiated merely because he is not interested. The fact is simply that the American has a prejudice against art, and this prejudice, like most prejudices, may be removed by enlightenment. Only one who is initiated can see just when a picture is successful, because only the initiated knows what might have been done otherwise. We may again fall back upon our early statement that history is the most serviceable study. The only man who knows the real effectiveness of a picture is he who has learned by experience, and by studying the experience of others, that certain combinations of line, mass, and color have proved more effective than others. If he is a painter, he is able to pro-

duce a picture more satisfying than is the man who has only his own notions to rely upon; if he is an observer of pictures, he is able to understand why the artist chose the particular arrangement, color, and lighting which appear, and this understanding gives him a delight in good workmanship akin to that which the engineer finds in the bridge, and the merchant in the campaign. This delight is unfailing because it is based on a fundamental trait of human nature; everyone enjoys recognizing a familiar principle in a new thing—a principle that he understands, in a thing that he knows to be good. It is the recognition of an old friend in a new guise. This is doubly a delight when we find, as we do in great art, that the excellence of the presentation, a pleasure in itself, is only a bridge for the passage to us of a great thought or a great emotion.

Akin to the pleasures of art are the pleasures of purely intellectual pursuits. Everyone can fancy the sources of satisfaction for the hunter; but comparatively few know that similar to these are the delights of an intellectual quest, either in science, in history, or in abstract reasoning. When one realizes that such a quest involves a plan of campaign, a watchfulness for elusive facts, a marshaling of forces, a wresting of information

from seemingly unwilling treasure houses, and that all this means exciting moments of suspense, disappointed hopes, the satisfaction of doing a difficult task well, and sometimes conspicuous victory, one sees that it adds to the joy of living.

Many of the pleasures of life fade with advancing years; this is universally true with the pleasures of the senses, for after the body has begun its decline the senses are less keen. This is not true, however, of æsthetic and intellectual pleasures, for as one's experience is enlarged, one finds increasing ability to recognize excellence, and increasing sympathy for all attempts at excellence. In cultivation of these, then, one is laying up treasure for the declining years. Many an octogenarian has found through these things more zest in life than is found by the average youth.

The appreciation of excellence, moreover, may be made in another way a factor in the joy of living. It enables us not only to enjoy the work of others, but—possibly to even greater degree—to find joy in labor, joy in doing our own work in such fashion that it shall satisfy æsthetic and intellectual ambition. This gives labor a new dignity and life a new purpose.

The pleasure in excellence is not confined to the product of human skill and intelligence, however. Nature is supplying us on every hand with the materials for æsthetic and intellectual delight. It is a sad fact that most persons are unaware of the satisfaction in a sunset, in a bit of foliage, in the song and plumage of a bird, in the wonders of a flower's anatomy, in the movement of heavenly bodies, in the voice of the wind and the storm, and in the aspects of the sea. These things may be friends, and they are always appearing in new guises. The delight in them is constant, unfailing. It is true that they are not interesting to those who do not know them, but nothing is interesting until it is understood. Their friendship, once made, never fails, and it has sympathy for every mood—comfort, cheer, joyousness, inspiration; and in these days of multiplying nature-books one finds introduction easy.

If life is to mean all it should, a part of the education not only of every child but of every man and woman should be a growing acquaintance with what other men and women, not only in the past but to-day, have found enjoyable in the quest for excellence, and in the perfect work of nature. It is in the American character to

enjoy the good things of life. At least two of the American ideals—liberty and brotherhood—are contributive to such enjoyment and stimulative of good work; for liberty gives the play to individuality, and brotherhood gives the broad sympathy which is essential for any art life. We need a realization that our passion for excellence can be refined by greater interest in the standards which men of the past have learned to be most satisfying to human enjoyment. We do not need to imitate the past, but we should at least profit by it. We have been as a people very largely without standards. We have failed to see the need of them. We are coming to see that an appreciation of excellence is capable of cultivation, and that though the cultivation costs something in time and energy, it is worth while. We take time to learn to enjoy other things, as chess, whist, bridge, tennis, golf. These are all dull at first; but beauty is attractive from the start. A love of it not only increases directly the pleasures of living, but is a factor in the progress of the race. It stimulates the imagination, which, as we have seen, is essential to any understanding of anything beyond the mere self, here, and now; it refines the passions by showing that the primitive and the obvious are not necessarily the best; and

it spiritualizes the ideals, for though it works through the senses, the senses are only the bridges to carry over the emotion to the spirit, and the pleasure lies not in the senses but in the spiritual idea.

CHAPTER VII

THE FRATERNAL BOND

WE turn next to the second of the relations of the individual to the outside world—that is, his relation to his fellows in matters social. We are concerned in it with one of our fundamental American ideals, brotherhood. No one denies that this is an American ideal. Our concern here is to see how far it is or may be made a fact as well as an ideal.

We are coming in these days to recognize as an element in success a thing which has always been powerful but little considered. We are often told that this or that successful business man owes his achievements in large measure to his sound judgment of men and his skill in dealing with them. Tact has always been recognized as a rare social asset, but not until lately has it been considered in a scheme of education. We have been in the habit of considering it one of the things that come by nature or not at all.

Yet it is true that certain principles of adjust-

ing our relations with our fellow men are obvious and fundamental. These can be learned not only out of our own experience, but also out of the experience of others. That is to say, many of the methods of desirable social adjustment can be taught. An equipment of facts concerning human nature and human experience is essential for anyone who is to live among men whether for social pleasure, for individual attainment, or for service to the community. These facts must be not only in the brain, ready for use when required: they must be so far a part of the mental habit, or second nature, that the adjustment of one's relations to one's fellows is to great degree automatic. In social affairs there is normally no time for consideration of each word, attitude, act. The relations between individuals are at any particular moment too subtle, too evanescent, for the logic of the situation to work itself out. One must be in touch with one's fellow through the more sensitive parts of one's nature. One must feel rather than reason out the bond that binds one to the other. Always some bond is there. The appreciation of that bond, the quickness to recognize it, the sensitiveness to its weakening, can come only through an experience directed at least in part to that end. Only the hermit can

dispense with at least a minimum of social skill. The real social understanding involves a recognition of certain things about each of our fellows. These things are of four sorts: first, the elements in him that are common to all humanity; second, the individual characteristics in him that make for a better humanity—and practically every man has some; next, the special limitations of his individual nature which prevent him from attaining all that may well be hoped for him; finally, those peculiarities of his experience that affect his relation to us. All or any of these may require us to adjust our speech, our attitude, our acts, to his power to understand us. His power to understand us, moreover, is likely to vary with his present moods as well as with his past experiences. We must know how his dominant notions are likely to react to our point of view. We must realize that certain of our opinions or ambitions are direct results of certain of our own experiences, and we must not expect those people who have missed such experiences to adopt readily our opinions or ambitions. We must realize that certain experiences of others are likely to lead to certain prejudices; and we must not expect to overcome those prejudices by dogmatic methods. We must realize that certain moods are not favor-

able to certain desires; and we must adopt methods to dispel the moods, or await favorable seasons.

In a sense, this training for social skill is in reality nothing but a training in human sympathy. It is merely a help in the recognition of the full meaning of brotherhood. Unfortunately Judas Iscariot was not the only one of his kind, and it may well be believed that many a successful business man has used his understanding of his fellow men for their undoing. The understanding, that is to say, was in the intellect, and used the fellow for selfish ends. If the sense of brotherhood had been further developed so as to reach to the sympathy—the fellow *feeling*—the common good would have loomed bigger than the individual gain. In other words, as has been already suggested, the imagination had not been at work on the facts that the intellect knew. These cases, then, illustrate the abuse of a principle by a merely partial application of it. They show a knowledge of how to use the common elements in humanity, but not a knowledge of the real meaning of brotherhood.

Singularly, many who abhor such neglect of one part of the principle, and are full of the aims of brotherhood, are equally neglectful of the other

part, and scorn to use a sense of brotherhood as a means. Some of the most kind-hearted people in the world are among the least tactful: they hurt where they would heal; they irritate where they would soothe; they fail in their efforts to do good because they cannot coöperate successfully with others. They consider themselves too honest to be tactful. In reality, they are only so well wrapped in self-content that their nerves cannot be touched by the personality of others.

The real spirit of fraternity has a double aspect. It gives one an understanding of one's fellow, and this enables one to work with one's fellow in advancing both selfish and unselfish purposes; but as its essence is sympathy with one's fellow, it tends constantly to eliminate the selfish. It becomes more and more a matter of the heart. All the true affections are its manifestation. In no case does affection persist unless it grows out of a feeling for the common elements of humanity; and in no case is it wholly happy unless it is manifested so as to recognize also the traits peculiar to the individual.

Out of the social instinct as it stretches toward individuals grows that bigger instinct which embraces humanity. Only as a man is bathed in it does he get out of life all that it has to offer—

the sense of membership in a vast whole, moving toward a goal that he may not wholly understand, contributing his little to the spirit of the time, influenced by that spirit which he helps create, sharing with others emotions that they understand in part as he does and in part as he does not. He can understand himself only as he understands and feels the thrill of the common life of which he is a part, and he can understand his place in life only as he can feel the pulse of the other men and women with whom he must work. He must see that the whole is a unity which means as much to him for its wholeness as his own small part means to him for its private interests. In other words, he must see that his individuality, sacred as it is to him, exists only as a unit in the whole, and it can yield nothing of satisfaction even to him unless it fits into the general scheme of things and becomes a part of the swift tide of life in the community. It was not merely preaching but philosophy which said, "He that findeth his life shall lose it." The individuality must give itself to the community, must seek to impress upon the community the best of itself—else it perishes by the worst of suicides, the refusal of the spirit to fulfill its function.

These fundamental truths, essential to a right

point of view about life, have been learned as a part of the experience of the past. It is the function of education to show them to the new generations—to give the new generations at least an opportunity to behold the vision and learn, from their own experiences, how far the vision is worth making into reality.

Certain notions commonly held about fraternity and the social instinct, especially by men and women who profess to be good Americans, are curiously inconsistent with the American spirit. We have spoken of the true spirit of fraternity as that which recognizes the common element of humanity in our relations with others, knows how to use it, and strives to work with others for the common welfare. It is obvious that this is hardly to be extended to a demand that we shall associate with ourselves, for the mere pleasures of companionship, those in whom the situation brings out antagonistic traits. It is inevitable that certain aspects of life shall be distinctly individual. This does not mean selfish, for among aims that are distinctly individual in their aspect is the recreation of an individual to keep him in good condition for usefulness to the community. A demand that in a man's recreation as well as in his work he shall sink his individual tastes and

think only of the common elements in humanity is encroachment on individual liberty. The demand commonly takes the form of a complaint of snobbishness. We may well concern ourselves with the meaning of snobbishness in America, for singularly we have made little effort in this country to determine what we mean by it and what is the essence of it.

It is interesting to note that snobbishness never appears except in personal relations. We have bigotry enough in the work of the world, as in business, in politics, in art; but in them we find no snobbishness. The moment men and women have to do personally with one another, however, complaint is likely to arise on one side and a denial on the other that snobbishness or cliquishness has crept in. It is difficult to see that either the side which complains or the side which denies is entitled to sympathy. To complain of snobbishness on the part of another is to admit that personally one is not welcome, and it is practically to insist that though one is not welcome one shall be given consideration as if one were. Let us examine the common grounds of welcome or exclusion.

We must realize, first, that the aim of personal association is the pleasure of companionship. If

a man has failed to win the social place that he desires, it is obviously because for some reason, usually unknown to himself, he does not please as a companion those who attempt to exclude him. This failure to please may owe its origin to any one of innumerable causes. It is nobody's business if I have a particular antipathy to people whose speech is nasal and harsh, to people who insist upon clapping me on the back by way of congratulation, or to people whose curiosity is manifest. It is equally none of my business if, because I am taciturn, because I part my hair in the middle, or because I do not regard the prevailing fashion in neckwear, some people find no pleasure in my company. For me to insist that they shall disregard these characteristics of mine and accept me as a companion is to thrust my tastes upon them in a way that would deprive them of liberty.

The complaint of snobbishness more often arises from sensitiveness to lack of breeding or to lack of means than from any other circumstance. No one will deny that it is very foolish to allow one's judgment of men to be influenced by either of these lacks. Let us examine the natural result of each, however. It is obviously true that a person who has large means is likely to

engage in occupations in which the expenditure of money will count for very little, one way or the other, in the choice of his course of action. He cannot in the nature of the case find entire freedom of companionship with one whose every move is determined more or less by the thought of necessary economy. In many respects perfect companionship between them may obtain; but for many other things other companionship is bound to be preferable. A social barrier is present.

A similar thing is true between men of so-called good birth and so-called men of the people. Men of the same sort of birth and breeding, at least so far as social relations are concerned, are usually accustomed to somewhat the same ways of doing things, see matters from somewhat the same point of view, and can move in their various relations smoothly with one another; but a person of different social experience is likely to find himself suffering from awkwardness, indecision, and even blundering which throws the social machinery out of gear. Since the purpose of companionship is pleasure in the common relations of men, to introduce into society an element which will not fit into the gearing that society has established for itself is to throw the whole machinery out of operation.

This is the fact that the social leveler does not see. He commonly does not know when things are out of gear, for he is not trained to the delicate adjustments that sensitive persons have devised—or, rather, he is not sensitive to irritations that sensitive persons find in maladjustment. These irritations are many and varied. They are found in common violation of personal cleanliness, unnecessary reminders of the presence of the flesh, insistent prejudices, egotism, harsh judgment, and innumerable neglects of the individuality of others.

The exclusion from certain social circles of a man who irritates those in the circles does not imply a lack of brotherhood. It may mean simply that for the particular purpose in hand he is not deemed quite so desirable as persons of another class. Those of the other class may hold him in far higher admiration and respect than they hold those whom they invite to their entertainments. They are not by his exclusion setting themselves up as his superiors in any way. They are only recognizing a principle which persists throughout life—that each element in an organization should be put to the use for which it is most competent, and that for each purpose that thing should be chosen which shall serve that

purpose best. A man who invites to his house some men who are of very little account except for social rank, excluding others who without social rank are valuable members of the community, may recognize that the men whom he invites are good for absolutely nothing but to adorn society. In a way, then, the invitation may even be a recognition of the intrinsic inferiority of those invited; but it may serve the purpose of getting together the right people for the purpose in hand.

Experiments have been tried in this matter of refusing to recognize social classes, and almost invariably they have resulted in a recognition of the fact that, for social purposes, the lines of cleavage are rather sharply drawn, and that people of various inheritances and various environments are to great extent unfitted to live happily together in the effort merely to please one another. Social pleasure is made up of an almost infinite variety of elements. It is sometimes affected by mere expression of face, tone of voice, grace of movement; it is sometimes in a ready wit which happens to be the complement of the wit of another; it is sometimes in a liking for similar things in art, in philosophy, in life; it is sometimes in common experiences of travel. Inevitably, where there are few common or comple-

mentary tastes and experiences, there can be little purely social pleasure. To decline to undertake the quest for that little is not necessarily to be a snob. It is certainly no harm to me that a person who does not want me fails to invite me to join him. My discomfort in his presence would certainly exceed his in mine. If, on the other hand, I might give him pleasure by my presence, he is himself the loser by any attempt on his part to exclude me. Why, then, is anyone hurt because he is excluded from relations in which the aim is merely the pleasure of companionship? For a man to demand welcome in a social group is to demand a privilege—and, as a matter of fact, a very doubtful privilege if the welcome has not preceded the demand. At the basis of American ideals is the scorn of privilege. We insist not only that no artificial restrictions shall be put upon anyone, but that no artificial considerations shall be claimed by him. Snobbishness implies something false, an assumption that has no good ground. Before a man be accused of being a snob in America, the accuser must show that he has demurred at association with others for some purpose to which they were surely adapted. To decline social relations with a man who is socially agreeable, merely because he has risen

" from the people " is to be a snob; to decline to assist a neighbor in a public enterprise, merely because he has never learned the secret of agreeable speech, is to be a snob; to decline to receive in your drawing-room on community business your former coachman, merely because he was once your coachman, is to be a snob.

The spirit of fraternity demands that we shall accept all men at exactly their worth to society, and shall govern our relations with them according to the need of those relations. My friend of the political party may also be my friend of the club, of the golf course, and of the church; but, on the other hand, he is no less my friend of the party even if he and I have no other special common ground. My friend of the church may be altogether an irritation to me everywhere else; but he is no less my friend when we are engaged in common worship. My friend of the dinner table may be nowhere else anything but my antagonist, but I can none the less enjoy his return to my offering of talk. Fortunate is the man who finds many friends common to many paths; but he is no snob who fails of this fortune.

It will be noted that this is consistent with the principle of the second chapter, on the power of choice. Men are not really praiseworthy or

blameworthy. They are merely to be accepted at their value—their value for something that the community desires, their value for something that we as members of the community find worth while. Every man has in him something that may be made of value to the community. The spirit of fraternity impels those who are enlightened—those who know the value of life and its possibilities—to try to bring men together in the quest of the common good. The same spirit, moreover, demands tact in uniting those who will pull together for a common result. To assume that all men know all their interests to be common, and will work together in that knowledge, is to be blind to present facts. For different purposes different groups are essential; though, of course, much overlapping of groups is possible. We as Americans have the spirit of brotherhood. When we are brought to realize fully just what that spirit is capable of, we shall begin to see progress in the construction of that commonwealth which our ancestors dreamed of.

It should be one of the tasks of education to show what are the elements of common brotherhood, what are the traits that differentiate men, what are the methods of establishing and maintaining sympathy between various elements of

society, and how men have worked together in common cause. This is social education. These matters are not to be taught by rote. They are not to be grasped by the intellect alone. They must be ingrain—they must be dominant notions, checking automatically any tendency to make an idol of liberty. There must be no ground for the common excuse, " I didn't think," " I didn't realize," " I forgot." The spirit of brotherhood must be cultivated until it is second nature.

CHAPTER VIII

THE STILL, SMALL VOICE

WE must now note the relation of the individual to the world in the third of the three aspects suggested in the fifth chapter. This is the field of morals.

It is an old American notion, coming in part from the days of the early settlers who came to this country for conscience's sake, that every man has implanted in him a monitor which draws the line between right and wrong. To many people, a suggestion that the conscience tells just what it has been trained to tell is practical blasphemy. Yet most people have had experience of the fact. We do with ease of mind what once we could not do without uncomfortable moments. This is not a mere blunting of sensitiveness, moreover, for we all find uneasiness in what we once did easily. Our standards are not necessarily growing lower. They are merely changing as our intelligence and experience grow. We have come to see that things once conceived as evil are really worth

while, and other things conceived as good are not worth while or are actually evil.

The change is not so much in our judgment of the thing itself as in our judgment of how it is related to the rest of life. We see it in a larger aspect, in its effects on ourselves and on our fellows. Right and wrong are not the obvious things we like to think them. Right and wrong, good and evil, gain and loss, satisfaction and sacrifice, are all so woven together in our complex lives that only a careful analysis of the situation and a careful judgment of its elements can strike a true balance. Every closer knitting of the bonds of brotherhood increases the complexity of the situation, for what is good to one may be evil to another, what is gain to one may be loss to another, what is satisfaction to one may be sacrifice to another. With this knitting we come more and more to see that individual good is very often not clear good, for sometimes it is offset by a loss or a sacrifice to some other individual. We have already seen, in the preceding chapter, that the individual can realize and fulfill his individuality only as he makes himself a part of the community. The community good is his own greatest good; and the only absolute right for him is the good of the community. The still, small voice may

mislead unless the man by his intellect and his imagination, guided by his sense of brotherhood, has grasped the real consequence of his conduct. Unless he has learned to see things in the large, in their widest relations, he is helpless, even aided by the still, small voice, to know the right and wrong. This means that the mind must be stored with facts about the effect of conduct on the individual and on the community.

This is what is commonly called moral education; but the method may well be something far different from that usually advocated. We noted some time ago that the educator has no business to try to bend the coming generations to his notions of what is worth while. Each generation has handed down evil as well as good to its successor, and a part of that evil has always been thought good. For any man or small group of men to take upon themselves the decision as to right and wrong for coming generations is too dangerous. They are quite as likely, judging out of their experience of this generation, to be wrong for the circumstances of another generation as to be right. Dogmatic statements of right and wrong are never safe, for no right and no wrong are as simple as dogmatic statements have to be. The task of the educator is to bring vividly be-

fore his pupil the facts of man's long experience of right and wrong. Here is no assumption of authority; here is no dull memorizing; here is life observed in its real relations, as it has been lived, as it is lived, as it must be lived. In this the pupil finds interest, and out of it he acquires wisdom.

The natural vehicle for this instruction is not text-books in ethics, but history and literature. For this service literature is usually better than history, for when it fulfills its function it shows the inner aspects of human experience far better than historical writing usually succeeds in doing. The literature of an era does usually represent faithfully the moral questions of the time, the answers to those questions, and the effect on the community. History and literature together, where literature fails to show results as well as impulses, make the perfect moral guidance.

It is worth noting, for those who look upon the Bible as the perfect guide to morals, that however good it may be in itself, unfortunately those who are agreed on its use for that purpose are not agreed as to its actual interpretation and application. There is almost as much disagreement on moral problems among believers in the literal inspiration of the Bible as among men who take

the Bible as mere literature. For practical purposes, therefore, the Bible is here considered as merely one of the powerful literary agents for moral enlightenment. In it we find no complex pathological psychology, no neurotics, no dissected erotics, no supersensitive consciences; but we find ambition, jealousy, ingratitude, revenge, cowardice, lust, deception, theft, incest, murder—and loyalty, faith, forgiveness, courage, truth, love, purity. We find examples of virtue so high that the heart thrills; and we find depravity so frightful that the so-called yellow journals of today have not reported its like. No other book compares with it in disclosure of the human heart.

To most persons it is heresy to declare that the whole truth may be told to children. The unthinking simply confuse ignorance with innocence. Even young persons who are kept most in innocence are by merely living in the world with men and women forced to know that there are such things as vice and crime, not only imaginable but actual. A knowledge that certain literary or historical characters committed certain named crimes, especially when evil consequences are shown to have followed those crimes, is no more harmful than the knowledge that

certain named or unnamed persons of to-day have committed the same crimes—without, perhaps, the knowledge that evil consequences followed. The evil that any reader can get from any reading depends in large measure on what he takes to it. The little girl of twelve who, looking for the evil that she had heard about, read Genesis through and found no impropriety was a normal child, presumably not particularly virtuous or particularly innocent. Words or ideas that meant nothing to her failed to catch her attention. Many persons who talk much about innocence and its preservation have little notion what they mean by innocence or why they wish it preserved. Lovers of innocence need never fear the truth about human nature, but only falsehood —or the half truth that is worse than a lie. Innocence is freedom not from the knowledge of evil, but from the experience of evil—or the imaginings of evil, which are the same thing. The pure in heart, like the child of twelve, escape contamination in any company; but the child who thinks evil will find it everywhere. From the mere abstract knowledge of evil, moreover, it is practically impossible to protect any child; for the street, the school, the home, the whole literature of our tongue, are necessarily touched by

evil in just the proportion in which they are in touch with life.

The problem in any case is simply how to protect the susceptible against the contaminating influence of evil. Many fond parents who have fancied their children not only innocent but ignorant have waked to facts too late to prevent knowledge from becoming experience, whereas if the knowledge which they could not keep from their children had been made perfect, rather than left as mere half knowledge, the experience of evil could have been warded off and real innocence would have been preserved. Those who are not pure in heart may sometimes be made so by fullness of knowledge. If you treat a common thing as secret, the young are sure to think that a knowledge of it is withheld from them only by perversity. An air of adventure surrounds it. Whisper about it and talk of it only on the sly, and they believe human nature deceitful and a little ashamed of itself. This is not the way to show the truth about moral relations. The truth never made vice attractive or virtue indifferent. For illustration, let a child know the wonders of sex (not only in man but in plant and animal) and the satisfaction and the holiness of parenthood, and unless he has inherited almost bestial

lust he will have in knowledge the surest bulwark against temptation. Let the beautiful thing take possession of his mind—become a dominant notion,—and the thing that antagonizes it will have no opportunity to corrupt him.

We saw in an early chapter that all our choices, moral and other, are made for us by our inheritance and our experience. If we can make a child or a man or a woman really see life as it is, in its fullness, in its adjustments of one element to another, his choices are bound to be right. It is constantly proved true that abstract knowledge does not make virtuous; but when we come to examine the cases (in our own experience, for example) in which knowledge of right did not force to correct action, we find that the knowledge was not complete. It was in the back of the brain, so to speak, marked "to be called for"; it was not at the front, insistently pointing out the neglected part of the truth. Knowledge on the shelf is not, for the purposes of guidance in a choice to be made at any particular moment, any better than ignorance. It simply does not at that moment exist as knowledge. Only notions which are active in the brain at a moment of choice have any power in guiding the will. Moral progress consists in such cultivation of knowledge that the

big truths of right and wrong, the necessary adjustments between my good and your good, between individual good and community good, shall be dominant notions, coming automatically into action when any choice involving them is at hand. Such only may be called complete knowledge. This is the protection not only against innocent error, but against the temptations that do so easily beset us.

The failure of knowledge to reach completeness may be due to inherited weakness, inherited perversion, or lack of fortunate experience and tuition; but no educational system, whether for young persons or for the general community, is serving its whole function unless it gives opportunity for everyone to know, as a part of his mental equipment, the moral achievement of the race.

We have already seen that a sense of responsibility is, in spite of undermining influences, still a dominant American trait. We are a conscientious people. We are at least serious minded. We are at heart idealists. We do desire virtue. Such a people are a specially fertile field for the planting of what we may call dominant notions of right, that is, complete knowledge of the factors that make right and wrong. This knowledge must be made ingrain. Its appeal must be second nature.

THE STILL, SMALL VOICE

It is the still, small voice. It professes not to answer questions with a dictum, however, but only to call vividly before one the experience of other men in problems of right and wrong. It tends to make permanent the moments of inspiration—to make dominant in each life the golden notions of the race. Each one must apply those golden notions to his own problems.

CHAPTER IX

LIVING OR GETTING A LIVING

THE argument of the last four chapters has been for emphasis on the training of general powers and on the teaching of man's experience in putting his powers to use. Attention was given there to the body, the intellect, and the imagination, as trained to apply themselves wisely to three sorts of problems—those pertaining, first, to things, second, to fellow man, third, to right and wrong. This may be called the argument for so-called liberal education. The purpose of such education is to introduce the individual to life, to help him to find his place in it, to help him to get out of it the best it can offer him, and to help him to give it what he can; and this purpose is quite as applicable to men and women as to boys and girls.

The so-called practical man now comes in and says that all this sounds very good, but unfortunately it doesn't provide young people with means to support that life which the scheme is trying to

make well worth living. It is obvious, in the first place, that the main object in life is not to get a living, but to live. The getting of a living is a means; the living is the end. Every community is disturbed by those who can "get a living" but do not know how to live. Indeed, it chances that most of the abuses that we are in these days talking about are committed by this class of persons. If we could teach these people how to live, the rest of us could get more out of life. We Americans, moreover, are just beginning to see that to get a small living and know what to do with it is a happier state than to get a big living and not know how to live. The latter is true poverty. Indeed, it is the commonest poverty in America to-day.

In the second place, it will be shown in a later chapter that those who know how to live very seldom fail in ability to "get a living." The sort of education we have advocated is the training of power and the teaching of how power has been wisely applied. Boys and girls with that education have no trouble in making a living. The economic failures are the incompetents—those who know neither how to live nor how to get a living. For these, of course, vocational education is necessary. The range between the able and

the incompetent, moreover, is wide, and any scheme must provide for all grades of power and inability.

A fundamental difficulty in the extension of vocational training is the lack of wisdom as to what vocation a young person shall prepare for. If he has such good ability that the decision is of any great consequence to the community, he is likely to choose wrongly—for until his education has progressed rather far the gates of life have not been open to him, and he has not had opportunity to gaze upon life with anything like a correct perspective. He has not yet learned what sort of life is for him best worth while, and much less, therefore, has he learned what is for him best worth while as a means of getting a living. Not until he has had some general study of history, literature, and science, can he begin to know his place in life. No one else, moreover, can choose for him, for no one can foresee his development until his powers have been tested. Until something of a liberal education has opened the gates of life for him, he has no right to tie himself down to training for a limited specialized field. Such special training will come very quickly when the general training has prepared the way; but when he is bound down to the vocation, the general train-

ing is little likely to come within his reach, and he may never have the opportunity to learn how to live—he may know how to get a living but not what to do with it. The aim of life is not to get, but to live. It is related of many rich Americans that they envied their poorly paid employees the power of enjoyment in life. They did not know how to enjoy companionship, play, books, pictures, music, nature. The springs of human emotion were dried in them. These men would have been glad to begin life again and learn how to live rather than how to get.

The demand for increased vocational training has led to insistence that it shall be furnished by the state at public expense. This increases the danger. The so-called practical man, especially the practical parent, will under it demand that pupils shall early prepare for work which shall bring in immediate income. A pupil's ambition for liberal training conflicting with the early assumption of a vocation is likely to seem extravagant; and a parent's opposition to it may lead to a cutting off of the possibility of a valuable career for many pupils. The earlier a vocation is chosen, the more likely it is to be a misfit.

The possibility of waste of human powers when vocational choices are left to this sort of chance

to stimulate them, but deadened all their susceptibilities and energies. This has been used again and again as an argument against liberal studies; it is really only an argument against stupidity or lack of courage in facing the situation. The thing to be desired is that every pupil shall be required to carry his general training as far as it can go with results commensurate with the costs, and that after this point has been reached his vocational training shall begin. The purpose of the general, or liberal, training is to show him how to live. Just in the degree that his natural ability is great, his knowledge of how to live will make it easy for him to learn to get a living. Just in the degree that his natural ability is low, his liberal education will perforce stop early, and his vocational training will have not only need but opportunity to begin.

A consideration touching state provision for vocational training is worthy of note here. By offering inducements, in the form of free training, the state assumes, necessarily, additional responsibility. The present demand for vocational training has arisen from the large number of persons unable to earn what is called a decent living. The offer of this training is something of an admission by the state of its desire to pro-

vide the means of support. If the thing is to be successful, therefore, it must serve the purpose of enabling men and women to earn a living. If they choose a vocation unwisely, the state provision has failed, and either a new device must be found, or a living must be guaranteed under the vocation chosen. This comes in the end to a promise by the state that every man shall be secure in a decent living at the vocation which he himself has chosen—unless, indeed, the state is to choose the vocation; and in that case equally, the state must guarantee the living if it is to determine what the man shall do. This is the question of economic freedom, to be discussed in a later chapter.

Another question arises as to the right of the state to provide training for certain vocations and not for others. Can public funds be properly expended in furnishing to some men the means of livelihood, leaving others to their own resources? If the state attempts to debar anyone from preparation for any vocation, however ill fitted for it he may be, a cry will at once go up that favoritism is at work in shutting anyone from highly paid occupations. This, again, is the question of economic freedom.

The growing demand in America for voca-

tional training is a good sign. It indicates our seriousness, our faith in education, and our determination to overcome the ills that oppress us. Much of the energy spent in devising methods seems, however, in view of the considerations above, rather ill directed. It will no doubt be available for a wiser plan of liberal education when the pendulum has had time to swing a little more toward the normal. Then we shall get the right point of view toward the art of living, and also, it is hoped, toward the necessary, but tributary, task of getting a living.

CHAPTER X

THE WILL OF THE COMMUNITY

WE have been concerned so far with a study of the processes by which the individual may be brought to the highest state of efficiency. We are next concerned to see how the community may turn the individual to its own uses when he and the community are not in accord.

We have seen that every man is a traitor to himself, and to the forces that made him what he is, unless he seeks to impress upon his community the thing that seems to him best worth while. His only guide as to the best is the best judgment he can bring to bear on the subject—or the best judgment of those to whom his best judgment defers. He must live according to his own standards or commit spiritual suicide. The community, on the other hand, is not obliged to accept his standards, nor is he obliged to accept the standards of others—unless, and the exception is vital, he by refusing to accept may interfere

with the opportunity of other people to live according to their own standards. This is the spirit of liberty tempered with brotherhood. The community must be bigger than any individual, and its right must always take precedence over his right.

Next to the community right, however, the biggest thing in the world is individuality. No one knows what individual brains and hearts are pregnant with the next big world movement. It is the thing which is different that institutes progress. The different thing is likely to be precious just because it is different. It must strive to impress its difference on its own or later generations. The community, on the other hand, must protect itself against the individual who is different only as he is in the rear of progress. Yet the community frequently — indeed, commonly—does not recognize the man who is in advance. So the conflict is set up. The individual desires to go his own way and to lead other men into it; the community desires usually to be let alone in its present way, and resents difference. However sincere and unselfish and collectivistic may be the ambition of the individual, the community thinks it knows its own needs better than the individual who would serve it,

and the clash continues. Our American principle of democracy comes in and forces the individual into compliance.

In just this democracy many critics of our life and institutions see our gravest danger. It is true that democracy seems not to have done much for manners, for refinement, or even for morals. It is time to remember, however, that in the last fifty years we have assimilated millions of people whose ancestors had not our own standards in any of these respects and that the lump has been pretty big for the leaven. It is common for teachers to deplore the decline of standards in our schools and colleges. Do they realize that the vast majority of the students in our higher schools are recruited from classes that have known even the lower American standards for only one generation? A people is not made in a generation; and the merely obvious attainments of democracy in one generation are not the criteria by which democracy should stand or fall.

Let us review our analysis of the hope of progress up to this point. All progress comes through either a new notion taking possession of the minds of men or a new force at work among men. These new notions and forces arise from individuals impressing themselves on the com-

munity. The individuals become what they are and choose their course of conduct entirely as a consequence of inheritance, of experience, or of both inheritance and experience. This inheritance, on one hand, most students of biology agree is in part determined by conditions which parentage governs; and the experience, on the other hand, is in large part determined by conditions over which the community has control. A part of this experience lies in education, which, as we have seen, may not only stimulate physical, intellectual, and imaginative powers, but also produce a receptive attitude toward beauty, fellow man, and right. This education does not end at maturity, however, but may and should continue indefinitely. It is true, also, that among the other experiences that determine a man's method of life are the conditions with which the community surrounds him.

Let us put together three of our principal propositions and see how they are related. Man must choose the good when he really comprehends, through a dominant notion, that it is the good, and this determines not only his own course of action, but, in part at least, the inheritance of his children; the community has the means to help everyone to a comprehension of

the good, for the test of good is the accumulated experience of men; the individual, in his effort to express his individuality, tends constantly to bring the community to a reëxamination of its standards and to teach it by his experiences when those standards need amendment. Here, then, is a possible cycle of progress.

The question to be determined is just how the community may most wisely exercise its power as an agent in progress. Shall it trust itself consciously to guide its own destinies, or shall it sit idly and curiously by while the slow course of Nature unassisted yields the product.

If the community is consciously to take a hand in its own progress, democracy is the inevitable agent. We in America will not listen to talk of an oligarchy, a patriarchy, an aristocracy—even an aristocracy of brains or culture. We trust ourselves in the large; rather, we trust liberty and fraternity manifesting themselves through democracy more than we trust brains or culture. What are the prospects of progress under democracy? It is true that democracy tends in one respect to crush the individual, for it often applies to him unenlightened standards that may be far beneath his own. It tends, on the other hand, to stimulate the individual, for it assures him that

he has as good a chance as any other man to impress upon the community his own conception of what is worth while. The community's judgment is likely to be wrong, for its standard is always an average standard; but the safety of it lies in the fact that the American community is always ready to be convinced. Few deep-rooted prejudices block the way. Couple with this condition the fact that all men must choose the good when they comprehend it, and we have in our democracy a safeguard of progress rather than a barrier. We are little likely to be carried away for long by a wave of error; we are little likely to be shut out long from a good thing by mere inertia. Grant that anyone desires the truth to prevail, grant that any individual is ahead of his time, grant that any power is working for good, and we find the conditions of progress in just this America here and now.

Let us see some of the practical methods open to us. We start with the fact that a man must choose the good when he comprehends it, as was shown in the second chapter. In general, the community has the power to make things attractive or unattractive to individuals; for it can always attach rewards or penalties to a line of conduct. The penalties are not intended to make

men virtuous: they are intended simply to express public judgment about certain things. Men are influenced by what their fellows think. If the community really believes an act heinous, many men without opinions of their own are likely to accept that opinion ready-made. This acceptance does not make virtue; but it protects the community, it creates a sentiment, and in time that sentiment crystallizes into a permanent point of view which is taken as a beneficent matter of course. It is a well-known fact that in recent years many men who violated many common principles of business probity, and did so out of mere blindness, have come, as a consequence of legal restrictions expressing public sentiment, to see clearly the evil in what they did; and to-day they would be among the most vigorous in opposition to a repeal of the laws. They have been educated to see the truth, and to-day, for them, neither law nor penalty is necessary. This is progress. It confirms our proposition that men perforce choose the good when they comprehend it.

One penalty that lies in the disposition of all of us is that of disapproval. As a people we are too good-natured. We have not learned that we are responsible for our neighbor's errors if we

fail to help him see the truth. Since sin is only unwisdom, we are not good Samaritans, but only publicans, if we leave our neighbor in his distress. We need not intrude upon him, but we should at least help him to see the truth when he has placed himself within our ken. We have no business to judge the man, for we do not know the steps by which he reached his state; but we should express our judgment of the act if it is a matter of public concern.

The man who cares nothing for the manifest opinion of his fellows went long ago to the wilderness as a hermit. Every other man not only cares what people think of him but is governed largely in his action by the treatment men give him, by his wife's hope of social success, by his daughter's chances for a happy marriage, by his son's desired standing in college. He will not jeopard these if he can see their relation to his own conduct. If we were not criminally good-natured in condoning iniquity, we should find less satisfaction in the social entertainment paid for out of the wrecking of a bank, in our daughter's visits to the girl whose father put poison in the food of the people, in the scholarship or the athletic prowess of the boy who is supported in luxury out of the sale of worthless corporation

stock. We are too good-natured to protest except in vague generalities that fit no one exactly. We stupidly think the sinner knows his iniquity; and he stupidly thinks we know ours. If we could make him see his sin as we see it, he would sin no more; and if he could make us see our sin as he sees it, we should sin no more. Frank expression of personal disapproval, or exchange of personal moral judgments, is all that we need to purge away half our evils. It is not a spirit of brotherhood that keeps us silent; it is the good nature of sheer laziness or indifference to moral responsibility.

This method of public disapproval is too weak to correct all our evils, for the offenders are often beyond the social reach of those who have the intelligence to comprehend the offense. Here direct legal penalty is the most effective means for opening the eyes of the unenlightened. The community must commit itself clearly and definitely to condemnation. Most offenders against public order and public welfare are dominated by some desire which cannot be satisfied without harm to the community. Such domination is not met by newspaper articles, pulpit denunciations, and academic discussions. A person who suffers from an obsession is proof against these, and

does not even give them thought. He must be reached by something that gives him a distinct shock, a rude awakening to the possibility of other points of view. Then reason and imagination and the other elements of good judgment may come into play. A threatened period of imprisonment will usually penetrate the armor of any obsession. The sense of right will always prevail when it is given an opportunity; but it must first fall on ground from which prejudice has been removed.

The best way to combat dominant notions that are evil is to provide dominant notions that are wholesome. One of the wonders of physiology is reflex action, by which a sensation acts directly upon a muscle and produces the desirable effect before the brain has had time to act. This is well illustrated by slipping on ice. When the foot goes astray the sensation is communicated to the brain; but if nothing were done until the sensation had reached the brain, and the brain had thought out a course of action, and the desired action had been communicated to the muscle, the man would be down before the muscle had begun to move. What happens is a short cut from sensor nerve to motor nerve, and the muscle acts before the brain has received the message. The

child just learning to walk cannot easily keep its balance, for the proper response of muscle to sensation has not yet been established by frequent experience. Practice, however, makes the balance automatic. Training is at the bottom of the performance. The same sort of thing is possible in mental processes. The mind is not fully trained if it cannot direct wisely on common matters until it has stopped to think out the various arguments for one course or the other. The mental processes must be matters of habit. The response to the common elements of the situation must be immediate, more or less automatic. A true dominant notion must make difficult the entrance of a false dominant notion.

Let us take a few concrete instances. No man of sense in an inhabited community shuts his eyes and then after a pause fires a loaded revolver. A part of his mental equipment is a realization that he is seriously derelict if he sends a bullet at random. He knows that the community will hold him responsible if the bullet does harm. He cannot plead in excuse that he did not know anyone was to be in the line of the bullet. Yet drivers of motor cars are constantly doing an equivalent thing. They are constantly driving an engine of destruction, far worse than a bullet, at such a

pace that they do not know what will be at many points in the path by the time they arrive. The only safety is to see that always it can be stopped in a distance so short and so clear that no obstacle can be reasonably conceived to be in any part of the path before the car reaches that part. If a car is going around a curve, the control should be such that it can be stopped before the unseen portion of the road is reached. At a crossing, the control should be such, and the distance from other vehicles should be such, that the car can be stopped before collision is reasonably conceivable. It is common for drivers to assume that another vehicle or a pedestrian is going to continue on the present course. Yet one has a right to change one's mind or conclude to stop or turn. To shoot a bullet at a point where a man happened a moment ago to be walking, on the ground that it is safe to assume that he will have passed on before the bullet arrives, is an act that no one would think of committing. Yet motor cars are constantly sent past other vehicles and pedestrians on exactly that principle. Many fatal accidents, fatal both to motorists and to others, are due simply to the failure to see that sending a car at a rate that will take it beyond the sure clear point of control is even more

heinous than with closed eyes to shoot a bullet. The community has protected itself against the blind firing of weapons, for it has created an automatic reaction in the minds of the people so that the temptation to fire is always met by the thought of consequences. It can do the same for reckless driving of motor cars. The community must lay aside some of its indifferent good nature, and must declare itself unmistakably. It must open the eyes of the blind to the real meaning of what they are doing. It must help them to see the truth. It must penetrate the obsession of speed and substitute a realization that a pedestrian stepping suddenly from the roadside, a carriage rolling in leisurely fashion around a curve, a nervous horse startled by any sudden apparition, are common things, are legitimate things, are desirable things, and that their very existence is threatened by any speed that will carry a motor car beyond the point of necessarily clear path. This realization must operate automatically in the presence of temptation. A penalty that operates heavily enough to give a mental shock will make it automatic. Fines and traps and paroles are a mere jest. A man who takes chances, even probable chances that other people are going to do this or that in driving or

walking, must be shown that he is too dangerous to be at liberty. A threatened term of imprisonment will show him that there are things bigger than his momentary pleasure or business. When he has once really grasped the truth, the community is safeguarded; but he must see it as a dominant notion—so dominant that it is too persistent for any temporary obsession to supplant.

A crying evil in these days is the lawlessness of the young. It ranges from ruffianism in public to vice in secret-fraternity halls. The remedy is in the hands of the public. Until legal majority the child is in the charge of the parent. If the parent is capable of taking proper care of the child, but will not voluntarily do so, he must be compelled. If he is incompetent, the state must step in. Many parents both competent and willing are blind to their duty. Every man of sense knows that boys and girls of high-school age are not competent to conduct their affairs unaided. Yet parents defend high-school fraternities. The essence of the secret society is that it shall be self-contained; and a parent who allows his child to take the oath of such a society, however good the society and its membership may appear outwardly, is derelict in his fundamental duty—the duty to keep informed of that child's develop-

ment and supervise his conduct. The oath undermines the whole social fabric based on the family relation. The problem of such secret societies is not fundamentally for the school: it merely by chance happens to be identified with school life. It is a problem for the community. The community must show parents that they may not properly allow their children to cut loose from home bonds and establish dominant notions of loyalty to outside irresponsible agents. In a sense, the high-school fraternity does not offer a problem at all, for it obviously violates the fundamental social principles and must be eradicated. The problem is simply one of tact in the method of eradication. The attack should be not against the irresponsible pupils, but against the irresponsible parents who have allowed their duty to go by default. Parents must be given a dominant notion of their responsibility for their children's offenses, whether the offenses be violations of the right of others or degradation of the children themselves by vice. There must be no escape from the recognition of the fact that they who propagated the child must make him fit for life in a community with others. It would seem queer to sentence a derelict parent to keep his child for thirty days always in sight; but if this

were the parental penalty for a child's first public offense, such offenses would rapidly decline. We can devise penalties that will give dominant notions of parental responsibility if we will. The time seems to be approaching when we must.

Another evil against which we are battling is the risk to human life from improper food and drugs. The remedy is obvious if we really mean business. "A life for a life" is old doctrine, and somewhat out of fashion; but it may be worth reviving.

It is time, indeed, to consider what is, after all, the function of any penal code. It is not the function of the community to visit punishment, for vengeance is God's. Indeed, we have seen that no man can at any time choose otherwise than he does at that time Men are not blameworthy, but benighted. The function of the community, then, is enlightenment, is the creation of dominant notions of truth. No means is too severe, and no individual right can interpose between the purpose and the means, for accomplishing this end. If a man endangers the life of others, he must know that he far more endangers his own; the community, in order to enforce that notion, must see to it that the man who endangers the life of others shall lose his own.

This is hard doctrine, but the remedy for no disease is likely to be agreeable. The value of life must be made a dominant notion, even if in making it so we have to sacrifice a few obsessed individuals who hold it cheap. In the practical conduct of many persons human life actually is cheap. Witness the self-destruction by suicide and by vice; the slaughter by criminal operations on pregnant women; the sacrifices by war over trivial material values; the consumption of life by dangerous industrial processes; and, on the other hand, the swinelike breeding of unwelcome children by unthinking sensualists. A few of those who hold life cheap may well be spared in the effort to make it dearer. The threat of the death penalty may not affect as a deterrent the hardened criminal accustomed to brutish passions, but it would give marvelous dominance to certain desirable notions in the minds of most dealers in unfit food, of reckless drivers of motor cars, of irresponsible railroad officials, and of all others amenable to humanizing influences.

Since, finally, penalties are intended not for punishment, but for education, they should be applied both when the result is evil, even though accidental, and when the intention was evil, even though the result was nothing. What we need is

that men shall have a new sense of responsibility: that they shall have dominant notions that are on the watch for danger, that foresee mischance, that forefend harm. Innocence of evil intent does not protect the community against the wandering smallpox patient, nor against the hunter who shoots first and looks afterwards to see whether the moving figure was his friend. Neither does the happy chance of good air and good exercise protect the community against the milk dealer whose cans are washed and dried in the barn. Life is full of hazards for all of us; but the time must come when the man who takes the hazard shall be the one to bear the burden: nowadays we pass the burden on unless we can prove both distinct evil intent and distinct evil result.

The same sort of thing is true with every imposition which the community to-day suffers. Democracy assures a remedy as soon as the community is convinced, for the community can always express its judgment in a form that will penetrate any obsession.

This method of creating dominant notions is serviceable, moreover, for positive progress as well as for restraint. If we create in the community, as we are able to do by proper education, a sentiment for the best things of life, we can

raise its whole tone. When men's experience of lust is understood, a passion for purity becomes dominant; and then illegitimacy and prostitution must decline. When the consequences of greed are really understood, business cupidity is largely supplanted. The main enlightenment that any man can have is a sense of responsibility—responsibility to learn the best, to cling to it until the choice of it is a part of his automatic mental processes, and to help others to see it. When enlightenment comes to a man, he knows that he is responsible for his actions, even in the effects that are remote. He knows that he cannot disclaim responsibility for fraud in his corporation merely because he has hired others to run it; for if he has conferred powers on them, it is his responsibility to see that they do not abuse those powers. If he is a director, he knows that he must direct. If he cannot perform the duties of an office, he realizes that he must not take it. If any man is unable to see the responsibility of great power, he is too dangerous a man to trust with power. It is the function of the community not only to protect itself but to make him see the truth.

One cause of the decline of responsibility, besides the unfortunate educational theories already

mentioned, has been the growth of corporations. The essence of a corporation is lack of responsibility. Legally a corporation can do no harm, and the responsibility of stockholders is usually limited to the risk of losing what they have contributed to its funds. Corporations are managed by men who are merely agents. Such agents are released in the common interpretation of the situation from all requirements of anything more than obeying the technical law and earning maximum dividends for their employers. We have had established in our midst, therefore, a very large body of very able men who have been set apart from the rest of the community to the extent that no human quality is to enter into their transactions except the quality of intelligence. With the growth of business of corporations it is commonly true that the officers in control have been unable to keep run of the details of the work under them. It is impossible for the directors of a large bank to know more than a few of the loans made by that bank, for the directors of a large railroad to know more than the fundamental transactions of its operation, for the directors of a large industrial corporation to know the real methods by which it is building up trade or destroying competitors. This is especially true

when, as we find the case nowadays, many men are directors in several corporations. The directors judge the men below them by their ability to earn money. The stockholders judge the directors by their ability to direct the earning of money. From the corporation point of view, it is nobody's business from the humblest in the ranks to the president of the corporation to know whether the dealings of the corporation are based on justice, public spirit, or anything but dividends; and this care for dividends must necessarily pervade the whole establishment. No man dares, if he regards his standing with his employers, to think of anything which has any larger aspect than income. The inevitable result upon the community is that, since probably more than half the financial transactions of any community are under corporate control, the sense of fraternity is dulled. It is not a conscious blunting of the better self on the part of any of these men. It is simply an inevitable result of the standards put before them in the business life of perhaps eight or ten hours of the day; and these standards result in something of a dulling of the edge of their sympathies and breadth of view in their remaining hours.

No one can question the vast increase in production arising from the growth of corporations.

No one can deny the improvements in the means of human enjoyment which the organization of industry on a very large scale has put within the reach of every man. Nowadays families which have been separated can be reunited on holidays and other occasions from distances over which it was impossible to travel before the days of consolidation of railroads. The growth of corporations has reduced the arduousness of much labor, for it has made possible the use of labor-saving machinery which small capitals could not have compassed. Yet it is doubtful whether these conveniences have actually increased human happiness. The real sacrifice of labor does not consist so much in the arduousness of the task as it does in the reaction upon the mind and body and spirit of the laborer. Twelve hours of hard labor under good conditions may be far less a drain of individual force than five hours under the conditions of many modern factories. The improved transportation facilities have probably resulted less in a reunion of families previously separated than in a wider scattering of families to be reunited, so that the ultimate result in this respect is nothing. To put this in an extremely bald form, it is possible to believe that all the good ever produced by the development of corpora-

tions, through the increase of physical comfort, luxury, and convenience, is far more than offset by the evil which lies in dulling the sense of responsibility and sympathy. Few will listen to a demand for the abolition of corporations; but all of us are demanding that a greater sense of responsibility be created in those who manage affairs that affect the community as a whole.

To summarize this chapter, then, we may say that we can, if we wish, make men take to heart their responsibility, not only for evils produced, but for good neglected. This can be done in large measure by the force of outspoken condemnation; but where that fails to awaken the moral consciousness of the offender, the stamp of disapproval can be made impressive and effective by a penalty that shall shock the mind of the offender into a new grasp of the big truths.

CHAPTER XI

ECONOMIC FREEDOM

WE have been considering some of the methods by which the community may secure the sort of progress that it wants. It is obvious that these methods are applicable for the relief of many of our economic ills. Yet just in proportion as means are powerful, care should be used in applying them to situations that are not thoroughly understood. There is ground for fear that many in our American communities are misled in explaining our economic ills, and believe to be evil those things which are really the roots of our greatest economic good. These people are likely to desire to make dominant many erroneous notions, for they wish to eradicate what ought to be nourished. It behooves us, therefore, to examine briefly some elements in the economic situation and see whether they conform to our fundamental American ideals.

The main complaints against our industrial

system are based on the fact that three mischances are possible under it: the willing worker cannot always get land to work on; he cannot always get capital to work with; he cannot always, even when employed, get a decent wage. Many minor evils have led to innumerable minor complaints, but these are admitted by all to be mere excrescences and not inherent in the system itself. The chief evils, moreover, are not usually designated quite as they are designated above. We are not usually told that a man cannot get land or capital, but that he cannot get work. The latter is a more effective way of putting it, for it appeals directly to the emotions; the other requires a certain putting-together of unfamiliar ideas before the meaning of the situation is quite clear. It happens, however, that the emotional way of putting the thing often suggests something that is not quite true. If we are to consider the situation carefully, therefore, we must take it exactly as it is. What does it really mean to say that a man cannot get work?

Many years ago the discovery was made that the only physical work man ever does is to move things. The most complicated operations are successions of movings of things. The cook moves the kindlings to the fuel and the shavings to the

kindlings. She moves the match against a rough surface and friction sets at work chemical forces which produce flame. She moves the flame to the shavings. She moves the kettle to the water tap, and she moves the faucet to allow gravity to carry the water to the kettle. She moves the flour to the sifter, and moves the sifter to a point from which gravity will carry the flour to the pan. She moves salt and sugar and other things so that gravity shall add them to the flour; she moves a spoon about until the ingredients are mixed; she moves the mixture to the fire; the heat and other chemical forces bake the cake. All man does is to place things so that nature will do for him exactly the work that he wants done. Besides this, man's power is confined to the brain work of planning and the social work of dealing with other men.

The simplest productive labor, then, requires three things: first, the products of nature to work on; second, the mental power to know how the work should be done; third, the manual labor of placing those products so that natural forces shall work on them as desired. The simplest labor may well be illustrated by the picking of berries. Nature made the berries, the mind of man plans how they may be gathered most expeditiously and

in the best condition, and the labor of man moves them according to the plan.

The moment we go farther in the scale of labor, however, we get a new element. As I am writing, a telephone message tells me that a crowd of children has been picking berries in a pasture which with much labor I have prepared for a blueberry crop. My planning and my labor have gone into that pasture, and the result is an increase of product. We have five elements: the natural product, the planning and the labor of increasing the product, the planning and the labor of picking. Here, then, is something more than natural product, present planning, and present labor. We have introduced the element of past planning and past labor. They entered into the product, and contributed to its amount. In this case, however, since the children carried off all they picked and stripped the pasture, that past planning and labor got no compensation. The present labor carried off not only its own product but that of past labor, or so much of it, at least, as is represented by this year's crop. Not only has the past labor so far received no compensation, but if strangers get the berries in subsequent years by a similar contrivance it never will get compensation.

It happens that the present increased productiveness of the land due to this past labor is simply capital, and that all capital is of similar origin —the product of past labor not consumed but devoted to further production. It may chance now not to be held by the original producer, but produced it was and consumed it was not; and the laborer who produced it is entitled to benefit from its production as clearly as is the laborer who produces things to-day. He may, moreover, transfer to another his right in that capital—or else there is no liberty. If the laborer wishes to lend that capital, he may get compensation in the form of interest; this, however, does not compensate him for the original labor, but only for allowing another to make temporary use of it. His original capital, stored labor product, is still unimpaired, and he may consume it at his pleasure; or he may sell outright his stored labor product of the past.

Either of these things anyone would say that I might do in the blueberry patch. I might each year demand for every bushel picked a certain number of quarts as my share of the picking—for my labor has made picking easier—or I might sell outright to another my claim to such royalty. In the first case I should be getting interest on

my investment of labor, that is, compensation from another for allowing him to use the results of my labor; in the second case, I should be getting direct compensation for my labor. If I had been so eager for half-ripe berries that I had gone to the pasture before the children and had gathered the crop, I should have reaped directly this year's return for my past labor.

For the present, to simplify our argument, we may combine the planning and the manual labor, and call them both labor; and we may consider all natural products as land, for all such products are realizable only in connection with land. Our essentials for production, then, as we have seen, are nominally land and labor; but in actual life, that is, as soon as we get even the simplest tool such as a pail for gathering berries, we require the use of something produced by the labor of the past; and so in any life above that of the primitive savage, capital is as much a requisite as land and labor.

As a matter of fact, few men of the wage-earning class except those who have a love for agriculture care for land as an agent of production. They wish to work in shops, stores, factories; but their work is largely on the product of land—lumber, metal, food-stuffs, textile ma-

terials. They cannot work at their chosen trades without such products. Not producing these products on their own land, they must procure from others. The labor which others spent on these products must be compensated. It happens, moreover, that most wage earners do not, for one reason or another, wish to buy the products upon which they are to work. They prefer to supply the labor and let others supply the materials. For the labor on these materials, however, as we have just seen, compensation must be given. This the capitalist provides. So it is true that though the laborer says that it is work that he wants, he really means that he wants placed at his disposal some products of land and past labor—that is, practically land and capital. Our task, then, is to learn how far private control of land and of capital interferes with the laborer's "right to work."

Let us examine first the meaning of private ownership of land. The easiest way is to see first what happens in a community small enough to be seen at a glance. Let us suppose the families of two brothers to be settled on an island. The families are of the same size and are similar in character. The island is divided equally between them. In the second generation one of these

families is small because the members believe in providing better care for each individual than will be possible if the numbers are large; the other family has increased rapidly. This disparity in the growth of the two families continues for a century. At the end of that time on one half of the island the population is several times as large as that on the other; and on the first half the demand for food and other natural products, or the raw material out of which to manufacture goods, is so great that all the best land has been long in use and much of the poorest is now required for cultivation. On the second half of the island, since the numbers are very much smaller, the pressure has not carried cultivation so far down upon the poor soils. The poorest land in use on this second half of the island is as good as the average in use on the first half. In another century, if the increase of numbers continues in the same proportion, those on one half of the island are obliged to cultivate land extremely infertile, while those on the other are still well supplied with land of fair productivity.

It is inevitable at this point, if not long before, that the crowded population will wish if not even demand a redistribution of all the land of the island. It is equally inevitable that the smaller

population will deny the justice of such a demand. Both families from the beginning have had power to choose between a small population with ample land, and a crowded population with crowded land. Each made its choice, and now the one which has indulged its own tendency to increase demands the fruits of the self-restraint of the other. It may be true, of course, that in many cases the restriction of population is not a virtue but a vice. We are assuming, however, a normal or rational situation in conformity with the notion of progress indicated in the chapter on the marriage tie. It is certainly policy for the community to encourage the rational situation, and we are concerned to test things on that basis. It is hard to see why, under our supposition, the more prosperous community should surrender to the other the source of its prosperity—namely, the superior ratio of its good land to its population. This ratio has been the result of a conscious determined plan carried out by a restraint which the other community never attempted to practice. For the large community to demand its surrender is to demand what the other has earned.

It is obvious that if there were any real fear lest the large community should be able to enforce its demand for a redistribution of land, the

small community would hesitate to incur the costs of making improvements on its half of the island; but if such fear had no ground, such a prosperous community would be likely to make many improvements which would be more profitable than forcing cultivation down upon inferior soils. This is simple human nature. No one—except in charity—will systematically or permanently make improvements on any soil unless he is assured that he will reap a reasonable benefit from them; and yet progress would long ago have ceased if land improvement had not gone on without cessation. Few things can be of more importance to a community than stimuli to a more effective use of its natural resources.

We have seen that the small community is justified in refusing to divide its land with the large community. If, moreover, outsiders were now to come to the island and demand that it be reapportioned and that they should share in the apportionment, the resentment of the more prosperous community would be justifiably increased. The old inhabitants could hardly be expected to open their lands, honestly acquired, to possession or common ownership by whoever chanced to come to the island.

Yet all this is just what has happened and is

happening in America. Let us follow it through some of its phases. It may not be possible to set up a claim that the original holders of land in America were more worthy than the later claimants; but it is true that the original holders secured their titles usually by legitimate methods, and that the security of the community requires that the stimulus to further improvement be not impaired by any denial of the right of transfer of titles. Let us examine very briefly the historical origin of land titles and land transfers in America. Most of the land of this country was practically given to the first settlers. Some of it, indeed, was given to royal favorites, or sold to trading companies or individuals, but even in these cases the early settlers obtained it at prices that are insignificant. Even to-day land is given away by the government to actual settlers. Many railroad corporations have held vast tracts of land granted to them as aids in building through and developing unsettled country: such grants may not have been wise; but they were not necessarily iniquitous, and they were believed necessary to induce anyone to build railroads. That land has been sold at low prices. There was a time, then, when any one of us or our ancestors might have taken possession of land in

fee simple, either without cost or at a very low rate. The right to buy and to sell, moreover, has been practically unrestricted. Many men now holding land inherited it from ancestors who were original holders, and many others have bought land out of their savings from labor or their profits of business. The system of land ownership and transfer has been at least natural and unhampered. Frauds have no doubt been perpetrated in many cases, but such are inherent in any system and do not arraign the principle of private property. The spirit of the laws has been impartiality, equality, and justice; and the method has been to uphold, as all justice must uphold, first, the right of priority, and, second, the right of transfer. There have been practically no other restrictions on ownership of land in America.

Let us return for a moment to the illustration of the two supposititious families on the island. If any business relations are maintained between them, one circumstance may establish for the poorer community a claim against the other. The richer community may, if it likes, let to the other some of the land not needed for its own purposes. Those who are tempted to hire will find it profitable to engage land from the members of the richer community even if they are

obliged to pay for that land almost all that it produces above the poorest lands cultivated in their own territory; that is to say, if very poor land is worth cultivating at home, no loss is suffered (beyond the expense of transportation) if one cultivates better land away from home and pays exactly the excess product to the owner as rent. No gain, on the other hand, is made when land is so hired. The moment such land can be hired for less than the value of its extra productivity, however, it is worth hiring. In other words, the community with a small population is able to support itself in comfort on its better lands, whereas the community which has indulged its animal instinct for increase is forced down on soils so poor that a struggle with poverty has begun; and the poorer community finds profit in paying rent to the richer for any lands better than its own poorest. This is a common economic situation; indeed, in essence it is the situation wherever the right of private property in land is maintained. Here arises the obvious objection to our land system.

Why should the richer community make a profit out of the necessities of the poorer? Is this the application of our American ideal of brotherhood? If the richer community can get

ample support from its better lands, why should it force its neighbor to pay for the use of land which can be spared? This is the question asked by those who advocate the "single tax." It can have only one reasonable answer, and no reasonable man has ever given any other answer. The richer community has no right to a profit made out of the necessities of its poorer neighbor, even though those necessities have been brought on by the improvidence of that neighbor. The advocates of the single tax seem generally to think that this answer is all that is needed to establish the justice of their desired reform. It is really, however, only the beginning of a new problem. It is true that as a fundamental principle of ethics no man should out of his abundance make a profit from the necessities of others; but it is not necessarily true that private property in land should therefore be abolished, or that taxation should render private ownership too expensive.

The increase in the demand for land, and therefore the growth of rent, is due to the pressure of population crowding occupation of land to inferior soils and inferior locations. As we saw in our illustration of the two families on an island, one was prosperous because it escaped

pressure, and the other was pinched. This should mean more than mere financial difference, moreover. It should mean, and usually does mean, for the more prosperous community some degree of leisure for the brighter things of life, some enjoyment of the beauty of nature where the land is not strained to support a teeming population, some opportunity for cultivation of the human mind and soul. If there had never been private control of land in the case of the island families, the big family would have swamped the small one—would have forced all alike to the lowest standard that could be maintained on the overcrowded soil. The big family would have robbed the small family of its power to live in fair abundance, in reasonable leisure, in refinement—on the products of its own industry and foresight—and undegraded by its animal instincts. In other words, private control of land is essential to protect one part of a community from the degradation of its standards through the tendency of another part to grow beyond its power to support itself in dignity. The part of the community which prefers quality to quantity in its population cannot attempt to control that part which prefers quantity to quality (except so far as encroachment on rights occurs); but neither can that part

which breeds like swine claim a distribution or nationalization of land against those who regard a low ratio of population to acres as a requisite for progress. With fundamental differences of notion as to how life should be lived, community of interest in the prime necessity of life would be intolerable. The possibility of private control is the only safeguard of anyone's right.

As we have seen, there was a time when anyone in America could secure land for a song. It was good fortune for those who got it, or for their descendants; and it was not their fault that others then in Germany, Ireland, Italy, or Russia, failed of the opportunity. No more is it to-day the fault of those who hold land that the teeming millions of Europe and Asia have had no opportunity to share in the land of America. Every man living has had ancestors for countless generations: and every man's ancestors, at some point in his family tree, had as good an opportunity as any other's to acquire land. If those ancestors failed of opportunity to get land in America, either through unwisdom or because of untoward circumstances, the land owners of America may be sorry for the descendants; but that fact does not make American land extensive

enough for the prosperity of all who would come and share in it if they could. What claim to land in America, except by lawful inheritance or purchase, has any descendant of a Pilgrim father, or descendant of a recent immigrant, or yesterday's arrival, better than the claim of the poorest South Pacific islander? There is no possible point at which we can draw a line and logically say that, if we abolish private property in land, all on one side of that line may share American land and all on the other may not. It is universal ownership or private ownership. To abolish private control, with either immigration or growth of population practically unrestricted, would be to offer the land of America to the world; and this would mean a rapid falling of standards to Asiatic level. Land to-day in America is not monopolized. Thousands of men who started life without a dollar are every year becoming land owners—not only in rural districts but in the high-priced districts of the big cities. They are doing this without benefit of fraud or favor. They are doing it in manly fashion out of manly virtues.

Of the profit which they make out of the growing demand for land, something will be said later. This, as already indicated, properly should be taken by the community. It may be taken, how-

ever, without interfering with the general principle of private control.

We find, then, the principle of private property in the land of America defended by three considerations: it has come about by natural process, without artificial interference or abuse except distinct frauds which violate the spirit of the principle itself; it furnishes a stimulus to improvements; it is the protection of those with high standards against encroachment by the teeming crowds of those with low standards.

Let us examine next the nature of private control of capital. Whence came the capital which is now a great resource of this country? In comparatively slight degree it has come as investment from abroad. Most of it has come through the earnings of labor of the past, or the accumulated profits upon the capital of the past invested by our early settlers and later immigrants. It is very easy to argue that the chief source of all capital is labor, because originally the only sources of wealth in the world, aside from the forces of nature, were natural materials and labor. Only when the product of labor is in excess of consumption and that excess is saved and used to assist in new production, does capital come into existence; and all capital in succeeding

time has been of the same nature; and just as labor produced the first capital, so labor has produced all other capital with the assistance of the capital previously produced by labor. It is true, then, that all capital is accumulation from the labor of the past. So far we must go with the radical socialist. Before we go farther, however, we must ask who is entitled to the payment for the use of that accumulation. The socialist would give it always to the laborer. This is right if he means the laborer whose labor produced what was accumulated. We must not forget that so far as capital has been accumulated at all, the original labor which produced that capital has never enjoyed the consumption of what it produced, for if the product had been consumed it could not have been accumulated as capital. The laborer who accumulated it may have received interest for lending the accumulation, but he cannot have eaten his cake and still have it to lend. So long as he lends it, he has not enjoyed its consumption; and yet if he produced it, it was his to enjoy. If American liberty is not a mockery, a man may pass such accumulation to his descendants to enjoy or lend as they choose. The labor of the past is robbed if a man may not enjoy the fruit of the toil which his ancestors endured

for their descendants' sakes. It is true that the earnings of capital do all belong to labor—but not necessarily to the labor of to-day. The labor of the past has refrained from enjoying all its product, and much of that product has been handed down as inheritance to men who are not to-day laborers. Some of it has been transferred bodily in exchange, for land or for other things, by the laborers who produced it, to men who are not laborers. It is not the American notion of justice to declare void such a contract of exchange. It may be true that often the exchange was not a wise one or a fair one. It may be true that unwise and unfair exchanges are made to-day. The remedy lies, however, not in forbidding the right of exchange, not in declaring void contracts of the past which are now seen to have been one-sided, not in demolishing the system under which capital may be transferred, but in providing that the exchange must henceforth be fair.

One ground of objection to the present industrial system this argument seems at first sight not to answer. It is sometimes said that the laborer never gets the full product of his labor, even in the first instance, and therefore he never gets a fair opportunity to save and accumulate

stored labor product; in other words, he is shut out from the possession of capital. Our argument up to this point has only defended the right to capital once saved: it does not defend an employer in giving the laborer less than the full product of his labor. In actual industry, unfortunately, it is impossible usually to know just what is the product of labor. We can see easily what is the product of capital and labor together, but we can as little tell the share of each as we can tell the share of sun, of soil, and of water in producing vegetation. Capital without labor can produce nothing; and labor without the use of stored labor product of the past, or capital, produces insignificantly.

The fact is simply that the laborer wishes some one to supply him with capital to assist him in production, and the employer wishes to find some one who will, under his own direction, employ his capital. The arrangement is a clear matter of bargain and sale. The laborer buys the use of capital as clearly as the employer buys labor; but the laborer buys more than capital, and he pays usually an uncertain sum. He buys, usually, not only capital—in the form of tools and advance payment before his product is marketed—but the use of land and some of its products,

and he buys direction or supervision of his labor —that is, he engages some one to coördinate his labor with that of his fellows and find a market for his product; and he pays not a fixed sum, but all that is left of the combined product—of labor, capital, and land—after the fixed sum agreed upon as wages has been deducted. This may be an unfortunate arrangement in any particular case; but nothing iniquitous lies in the principle. As a matter of fact, the most important thing that the laborer buys, in the exchange just outlined, is direction or supervision of his labor. It plays far more part in his payment than what he pays for the use of capital and land, and rightly is the amount left uncertain; for the value of the total product is influenced to a high degree by the direction which labor receives. In other words, the value of the product varies with the value of the direction, even when the laborer's own share in the productiveness is unchanged. It follows, then, that the laborer can afford to pay for superior direction practically the excess of product that the superior direction yields. This is just what the present industrial system provides for. The laborer hires direction, and pays for that direction what it proves itself worth —namely, the total product less a fixed sum pre-

viously arranged by contract as the measure of the laborer's own share in productiveness.

Unfortunately, critics of the present industrial system often forget that though the direction of labor is connected with capital, the amount deducted from the total product and kept as payment for direction is in no sense what the laborer is paying for the use of capital. That amount is really payment for labor—labor of a high order. It may or may not chance to go to those who own the capital employed. The share of total product kept by capital as capital is comparatively small. Capital is too quick-moving to escape the leveling influence of competition. The competition of laborers for employment with capital leaves always some share of the total product for capitalists; but the competition of capitalists to find employment for their capital makes it impossible for the capital share of total products ever to reach a high figure. It is simply not true that capital gets the lion's share, or anything like the lion's share, of total product. So far as it gets anything at all, it does so only because laborers wish to produce something with the aid of capital, and they bid for it in the form of an agreement to work for wages; and this share obtained by capital is simply compensation for the use, by

present laborers, of the products of past labor which the producers were too provident to consume. If any man's capital has come chiefly not from his own accumulated labor product, but from what he has withheld from other laborers as compensation for the use of his original capital, the principle is still true: he—or some one in his behalf—has at some time saved labor product, and laborers, wishing to use that capital, have agreed in return for its use to accept a fixed wage and leave the balance of the joint product to him; and so even in his case the origin of the capital was labor which has not yet been compensated, and its growth has been due to the further postponement of consumption because later laborers wished to use the product for their own advantage. Our whole capital, then, has only two normal origins—past labor which has handed down a part of its product to our time, and natural accretion of this because later labor, unequipped with capital of its own, has offered and given compensation for the use of that transmitted product. The possibility, for every man, of accumulating capital of his own, even under the wage system, we shall see later.

The real complaint of labor against the share of product demanded by capital, then, is simply

that the heirs and assigns of the labor of the past, who are the owners of capital to-day, are getting more of the product of the present than the labor of the past could justly claim. The laborer of to-day seems not to realize that this assault upon inheritance from the labor of the past must inevitably in its result, if it has any result at all, weaken the claim of his heirs, and even his own claim in later years, to his own savings of to-day. No man will save if he cannot expect to control the fruit of the saving. To refuse to pay for the use of capital is to take away the chief motive for saving. Then only primitive methods of production are possible.

If it is true that the labor of the past has been too well compensated, so that it, or its heirs, has accumulated capital which in turn is to-day receiving too great a share of the product of its use, the quarrel of the laborer is not with profits or interest themselves, as he seems to think it is, but with a mere detail of compensation for the use of capital. The quarrel is not with the present industrial system, but with certain methods of its operation. His objection to the profits of capital as such can have no ground whatever unless he can show that labor stripped of all capital can with its own bare hands applied to the natural

resources of the earth produce more than the laborer is to-day receiving. If he can do this, the wonder is that the laborer is so eager to obtain employment under modern conditions and that he does not rush out on the bare land—and land can still be bought or hired for a reasonable price—and secure his rights by natural production. Everyone must admit, as the socialists are fond of asserting, that all the capital in the world is found to be, if traced back far enough, saved wages or savings from the payment for the use of saved wages; it belongs, however, not necessarily to present labor, but to the heirs and assigns of past labor. It enormously helps to increase the product of industry. Neither those who produced it nor their assigns have taken the benefit of its production—or it would not now exist as capital. It is only justice that they should receive compensation for its use. This is the defense of private ownership of capital.

One feature of private control, both of land and of capital, is commonly neglected. We fail usually to realize that ownership does not necessarily mean consumption. If the capitalist consumes his capital in riotous living, he no longer is a capitalist and no longer controls things. The landholder does not usually consume his land.

He must employ men to cultivate it, or, if he keeps it for enjoyment as an estate, other men get enjoyment out of it. Many a toiler passing a landed proprietor's estate gets far more pleasure out of the trees, the grass, the flowers, than does the owner. However selfishly intended, the maintenance of such estates is a public benefaction. The railroad or industrial magnate, with millions of dollars at his beck, cannot enjoy those millions. The mere fact that he controls them entails disagreeable duties, self-denials, encroachments on his leisure. He can consume only a limited number of creature comforts. The rest of his power is devoted to the uses of other men —often unwisely, but no less certainly. His lands must be used, his capital must be employed, or he makes a colossal failure; and he must find a way to make it worth the while of other men to work for him. He has no real control in his own hands after all: he can do nothing without the consent and the coöperation of the working masses. It is in their power to make and unmake him.

It is true, as often remarked, that in some circumstances capital can wait in a struggle with labor; and labor, since it must live, can be forced to an untimely surrender. These circumstances,

however, are not natural, and they do not arise directly from our industrial system. No reason can be found why labor should be dependent on capitalists. The dependence is really on the other side. We have seen that there are no artificial restrictions on land or on the accumulation of capital. There is no reason why the laborer should not have his own land and capital. The explanation lies in a simple economic law.

It is true that in any community the rate of wages must be high enough to support laborers and at least minimum families; for if it is too low marriages and births decrease, or deaths increase, and the decline or limited growth of population increases the rate of wages. This law no monopoly of land and of capital can prevent, for land and capital without labor are helpless. If, then, with a rate of wages sufficient to maintain a family, the laborer postpones marriage—or, at least, propagation—he has an available fund out of which he may save; that is, the money which a family would cost him he may now save. Capital and land, if he wishes to buy them, are his. This is a possibility that society perforce presents him, for automatically the rate of wages adjusts itself so as to yield enough to support a family; and the laborers themselves fix the standard of a

family, for wages must continue at that point at which the laborer is willing to raise a family. If he declines to raise a family until he has accumulated capital enough to make a modest independent start in life, wages will inevitably rise —because of the competition of capitalists for labor—so high as to make that start possible.

To many this prospect for the laborer seems not happy. Why, they ask, should he be forced, even temporarily, to deny himself the satisfaction of marriage and family life? Has he not an inherent right to raise a family? Just here is the test of the whole matter. A man has a right to raise a family if he has the means to support it and to equip it for self-support when his time of service is over. Let us look at this fundamentally. No man descended from heaven or came from the caves of the earth. Every man had a father who begot him either consciously or in brutish lust. If the father begot the child without the means to support it or the prospect of making it self-supporting, he took the risk that either the child should not survive or the community must assume the burden of its support. He begot exactly as a beast of the field begets. The history of poverty and of charity shows that a large part of mankind breed with

little thought of consequences. When the community guarantees the support of children, the population increases at a pace that soon brings all to destitution. Every community abounds in irresponsible persons who are governed chiefly by animal instinct. Of course calamities overtake even the most provident and excellent families, but taking things in the large it is true that if a present-day family, descended from untold generations of ancestry, has acquired no land, has accumulated no capital, has acquired no productive skill or personal charm that makes its services desired in the community, it has bred in an uncivilized fashion. It has been said that "civilization in every one of its aspects is a struggle against the animal instincts." The family that we have described is not yet civilized. To grant to such a family the right to breed without economic provision for the offspring is to impose upon the civilized portion of the community the certainty that its land will soon be overcrowded, that its capital will soon be demanded for uses which may violate the very aims of its voluntary accumulation, that the standard of living will soon be forced down to the lowest point at which human beings will breed and survive. This is no part of any one's ideal, and it is absolutely at

variance with the American notions not only of liberty and democracy, but even of brotherhood itself. This is only a degradation of brotherhood.

Charity is one of the sweetest things in life; but the spring of charity is a sense of brotherhood. If a man's need arises not from those things in him which are human, but from those which are irresponsible, unbrotherly, brutish, the quality of mercy is strained. So great need exists for charity in cases where it can go along with brotherly love, that to lavish it—or the pretense of it—on those who hamper civilization is worse than extravagance.

A man who has no capital, no land, and not skill enough to assure him of wages to support a family, should postpone propagation until he has attained what he needs. This means simply that since his ancestry has discredited him, as any ancestry must do which breeds faster than it can equip its offspring, he must prove his superiority to his ancestry by rising above the uncivilized plane in which he was born. He must show that he is superior to mere animal instinct. Since no community can be sure of supporting in dignity all who are born—or would be born if support were guaranteed—he must show by self-restraint or late marriage that he is fit to live as one in a

civilized community. This is not only his duty: it is his privilege. He should rejoice in the opportunity to show his manliness. If he has recently come from a land where no opportunities were open to him or to his ancestors to accumulate capital, land, or skill, he will not, if he is manly, now claim that those who are fortunate here shall divide with him on that account; for granting such a claim would establish for every newcomer a claim against him if he ever by force of energy and will accumulates capital and acquires land. On the contrary, if he is manly, he will welcome the opportunity to show that in this land where freedom prevails he can do without favor or charity what other men have done before him.

Sometimes we hear the statement that postponement of marriage and self-control in marriage mean increase of sexual immorality. This has been discussed in the chapter on the marriage tie, with the conclusion that marriage is not a safety valve for lust, and that civilization demands restraint within the marriage relation as well as out.

Historically, we have been shown again and again that the race which has made a failure of life has either bred too fast for its sustenance or

has fallen into moral degeneracy. Race suicide consists not in the self-control which gives small families of well-begotten children, but in the self-abandonment which either breeds thoughtlessly or indulges lust. The law of evolution is that the unfit do not survive. This law is working in human progress. Those who breed thoughtlessly must not be allowed to stop progress; those who yield to vice must be allowed to attain their own destruction: the institution of marriage must not be prostituted for the protection of either class. To say that the begetting of eight or ten children is a benefit to the community is at once to raise the question, What can those children do for the community? Can they do more than merely move things? Can they plan things? Can they contribute to the physical and spiritual welfare of the community? If not, they are not needed. Already in the world are all the people needed to do the world's work of moving things. If we were to distribute the overcrowded populations of many districts to the sparsely settled regions, the manual labor needed for man's happiness would be supplied. It is in the task of planning things, of exercising judgment, of understanding how to get the good out of life, that we need help. Yet it is just the class capable only of moving

things which usually breeds thoughtlessly. It is also the class which is chiefly interested in things, as distinguished from ideas or ideals, which lives in lust. The protection of those who order their lives for wise parenthood and for the care of their offspring demands that the institution of private ownership and control of capital and of land shall continue.

It will be noted that the only defense of ownership of capital and land so far undertaken has been not for corporate ownership, but for private ownership. The springs of progress, as already indicated, lie chiefly in parental responsibility. The essence of corporation control is irresponsibility; and the opinion has already been expressed here that the human race is not really happier—though in many outward physical things more at its ease—for the invention of corporation law. The adjustment of our economic difficulties lies not in an abolition of the present system of ownership of the agents of production, but in provisions that the control be so exercised as to fulfill the purpose for which it was inaugurated—namely, the stimulus to energy and to foresight and to providence, the improvement of land, the preservation of natural resources, the saving of wealth, all these so that in later years, or in later

generations, greater prosperity may be attained out of the fruits of the present.

We have been examining the general defense for the private control of capital and land. We have seen that when the " right to work " is made to mean a right to demand land and capital to work with, it has no ground to stand on. It is simply a demand that the bad fortune of one shall be alleviated out of the good fortune of another, even when the good fortune of the second has been due to energy and foresight and the bad fortune of the first is no fault of the second. The absurdity of the demand is increased when we find, what is the case, that if the same demand were made for all mankind (and why not, if for any?), the good fortune would shrink into comparative insignificance when generally distributed, and a general level of poor fortune would be universal. The absurdity of the demand is extreme when we find the bad fortune due to error or fault in the unfortunate or his ancestors. The results of the self-sacrifice, the providence, the self-restraint of generations would go for naught in the swelling sea of mankind. The rich lands of America would soon be overcrowded with a struggling, ever-increasing horde, and the capital of America

would be wholly inadequate to furnish for labor implements and materials that would yield enough to support that crowd according to dignified human standards.

It is worth while to go farther and see the negative argument for private control—that is, the effect of its alternative. The alternative to private ownership of land and capital is nationalization, or state control, of the instruments of production. This is the extreme of democracy, and at first glance it looks like brotherhood; but examination shows that it is very shortsighted brotherhood, and it surely is not liberty. State control of all industry means either that any man may obtain, from the state, land and capital to work with in his own way, or that the state shall direct the application of his labor; for labor, land, and capital must work together. The first of these alternatives means that the choice of industry shall be made by the laborer, and then some one shall be responsible to determine how much land and capital shall be supplied him, what security for their proper use he shall offer, and what compensation he shall give. This must be done for every self-supporting individual in the land; for with the abolition of private ownership no one will have income from any source but

labor, and no one will have private land or private capital to work with. Merely as an administrative task this is something oppressive to think of. The other alternative is for the community to direct labor as well as the use of land and capital. Some one must be responsible to direct each worker to the work for which he is apparently best fitted—the scavenger, the sewer man, the farmer, the clerk, the teacher, the artist.

It is not easy for the common man to find satisfaction in this sort of government supervision. Most of us are a little skeptical about the ability of most men to administer the affairs of others. Most of us are wondering by what process the corruption, the self-seeking, and the inefficiency of government officers, as we find them to-day, are to be exchanged for honor, broad vision, and ability, in the scheme of state control. The temptations and the honest difficulties under the new régime would be increased multitudinously, for the functions of government would pervade almost all our affairs. The tasks of administration would be infinitely more disagreeable to sensitive and refined natures, for they would involve decisions of occupation affecting the pride and inner happiness of multitudes. Democracy has been commonly blind to the finer qualities of

men, and politics would under this scheme be far more petty and yet far more penetrating than to-day. The progress of the community would be intrusted to a majority vote where self-interest, as distinguished from community interest, is most pressing and immediate. Individual ideals would have no opportunity to grow and to push themselves, for men would be under the thumb of the hordes of government administrators.

A common complaint against the present régime is the selfish control of land and capital by private or corporate interests. Yet this control is always by human agencies. By what agency can state control be maintained unless by men? Does enlarging the field of control, and scattering responsibility over a larger area, and increasing the difficulties of wise administration, promise improvement?

As a final criticism on state control of the agents of production, we have only to recall that it is really based, in the last analysis, on what is commonly called "the right to live." This usually means simply the right to a living; but, as in the case of "the right to work," the first phrase is so much more dramatic that it is commonly employed instead of the correct one. The community cannot recognize any claim to a living

when the community employs no agencies to limit births. Progress implies responsibility. The responsibility must go with the final creating agency. If we leave uncontrolled creating power with parents, parents must perform the duty of supporting their children and of preparing those children for self-support. There is no such thing as a right to be maintained alive as against a community which has no use for the life. If the life cannot maintain itself—that is, if those who created it cannot make it self-supporting or worth while for the community to support—it has no reason to be. The spirit of brotherhood does take care of the unfortunate, and happily so; but to demand as an enforceable claim what is only a voluntary charity is to open the floodgates of increase among the irresponsible. The duty of parenthood is toward the future—that is its very essence. The course of the ages is forward. In the family relation parents exist for their children, not children for their parents, and the order of nature is reversed when we for a moment admit that parenthood may be divorced from responsibility or that children owe their allegiance to the preceding generation and not to the following. If I cannot earn sustenance, I never should have been born; if I cannot make my life worth while,

I should not continue to live. This is not a recommendation to suicide, as the next chapter will show; it suggests only that the laws of nature should be allowed to work, or the life should be made worth while. For the thoughtful parent, the possibility of private control of the agents of production is a great hope for the protection and welfare of his offspring, and it is the only check on the tendency to destructive increase in those who are unfit.

That the private control of land and of capital leaves in the hands of individuals much power that may be abused, that the law has not yet learned to forestall such harm, that public opinion has not yet awakened to the possibilities of iniquity under it, may be readily admitted. The point is that the system is a natural historical growth. It is not a manufactured thing imposed on the community by the capitalist or the landholder, but a product of the development of the country. It has often produced unfairness, but such unfairness has been a chance consequence; the system was not devised to produce unfairness, and it has about it no element of the arbitrary. It may not be perfect, but it is not in itself an engine of iniquity. No reason can be found to doubt that the natural evils arising under

it may be corrected by man-made changes in it. Whatever we attempt to do with it, however, we must realize that we are dealing with a growth, an evolution, and that it is likely, from its historical origin, to have such virtues as man-made structures usually lack.

One of the abuses under our present industrial system is the profit derived from the necessities of our neighbors, as already indicated in the illustration of the island divided between two families. It is true that the small family has the right to hold its land for its own uses, and that it may enjoy that land in its own way so long as that way does not injure the other family. If, however, the small family can spare some of its land and lets it to the other, the profit derived from the rent is not due to any energy, foresight, or providence on the part of the large family, but to the improvidence of the small. The large family has by its increase created a demand out of its own necessities, and it is bidding against itself for a privilege. As this family continues to increase, moreover, the pressure for land increases, and rents rise. It is obvious that this increase is not due to any virtue of the smaller family. With this increase the smaller family had nothing to do. In strict justice, therefore, it deserves no

profit. If it makes sacrifices in order to lend land to its neighbor, or if it has improved land, it is entitled to compensation; but its demand for increase in land rentals due to the growth of general population is no part of any defense of the right of property in land. A man may hold land for his own use, and if he acquired it honestly no one can say him nay; but if he tries to get a profit by selling it or renting it, and that profit has arisen from increased general demand for land, he is trying to take for himself something that the community has created. That increase of value belongs to the community that created it.

This "unearned increment" the advocates of the "single tax" wish the community to take in the form of taxation on land. They desire that all land shall be taxed for the full value of the rental less the value of improvements and compensation already given to previous owners. The violation of liberty in this is that a man may be by it prohibited, because he cannot pay the tax, from putting the land to use which to him is desirable but to the community may not seem so. For example, the maintenance of an estate, with not only the beauty of natural objects but peace and quiet away from the noise and bustle of city din, is a desirable thing. Every family should

have plenty of land about its home. If population had not multiplied with undue rapidity, land would abound for such a purpose. The families which, by restraint, foresight, saving, have provided such a home are deserving of credit and protection. Yet the application of the single-tax idea in its crude form would force thousands of such estates on the market, to be cut up into tenement-house lots or factory sites. The integrity of the home demands the integrity of land about which the associations of home may cluster. The strict application of the single tax means that the standards of the irresponsible multitude must perforce set the normal standard of land ownership for every individual.

Though it is true that the individual has no right to make a profit out of the necessities of his fellows, it is also true that they, by irresponsible growth in numbers, have no right to demand his surrender of rights acquired and maintained by thrift. The justice of the matter is that only when a man tries to realize profit, either by sale or by rental, out of the unearned increment, should the community claim that it has created anything of value to him. As a matter of fact, until that time the community has usually done him harm and not good. Thousands of beautiful

homes throughout the country have been ruined by the march of change—the noisy, dusty trolley car, the destructive automobile, the swarming tenement, the busy shop, the clattering loom. The only escape from the annoyances of too much company is in the possession of property in land. Any attempt to restrict one's right in this, so far as personal enjoyment of it is concerned, is a violation of fundamental liberty; but the demand that no man shall make a profit out of it is simple brotherhood.

Another abuse under our industrial system is the occasional power of employers, under peculiar conditions, to take advantage of the necessities of labor. It is true that laborers have sometimes thought themselves forced to pay too much for land and capital to work with; that is, they have accepted a rate of wages so low that the amount of product left for the employer was far more than enough to compensate him for his land and capital employed. This has never been for long or for much, however, for we have already seen the laborer's power to acquire capital and land for his own use, and his escape has always been open except in temporary stress. The actual causes of non-employment or unfair wages are always inefficient or otherwise unsatisfactory

labor, sluggish times rendering employers loth to run their works, or a supply of labor so much in excess of the immediate demand that employers without the feeling of brotherhood can set laborers in competition with one another to their own detriment. Each of these conditions is unfortunate, and we may well wish them impossible, but they have come from purely natural causes. The first is due to the labor itself; the second is one of the hazards such as are common to all forms of life; the third lies equally in the hardness of heart of the employers and in the improvidence of the laboring class. None of them is directly caused by the present industrial system. If the system were abolished, to be sure, this exact form of evil could not recur; but we should be likely to face as a permanent and therefore hopeless condition, already outlined, an evil rather worse. The remedy lies not in abolishing the system, but in creating a sound, effective public opinion, through the agency of dominant notions of right, which shall curb the power of the prosperous and ease the dependence of the unfortunate—not as charity but as brotherhood. This is possible without infringing any sacred liberty; and this can be done for all the abuses that our system leaves possible.

In our industrial system we find attempts to limit the liberty of the individual in his disposition not only of land and of capital, but even of labor. Such limitations have been imposed mainly by trade unions. Fear among the unions that there shall not be enough work to go round has led them to attempt to restrict the performance of each individual. This is based on a curious economic fallacy. It neglects the fact that in modern industry no man makes much of what he consumes. Everything is based on a division of labor, an exchange of commodities. The amount of goods a man can get is limited absolutely by the amount he produces. The more he makes, the more he has to exchange; and the fact that he and other men are willing to work proves that he and they are eager for more goods. To say, then, that there can be too many goods produced, so long as any men are willing to work, is to commit the absurdity of saying that men must be prevented from working for fun. In limiting the hours or productiveness of labor, in the hope of extending the field for employment, the unions are simply cutting off the supply of goods out of which labor may be paid.

It is a curious fact that no concerted effort seems ever to have been made by laborers to ex-

ercise any sort of check over the repeated increase of numbers among those of the lowest economic classes. The surplus of labor has long been known to be among those who are unfit for any but the lowest classes of work. Except in times of extreme depression, the demand for the highest class of labor, both manual and mental, has never been met. It seems the height of mathematical absurdity, in the attempt to get a larger measure of wages for each participant, to reduce the product to be divided rather than to limit the number among whom the division is to be made. The labor unions have, indeed, sometimes endeavored to reduce the number of participants by excluding from their ranks all who do not meet their requirements for membership and by limiting the number of apprentices who shall be taken in each trade. Though this may be successful in maintaining wages in a particular line of work, its effect is always to increase distress in the trades which are thus left to bear the burden of the increasing population. It is based on distrust of one another and eagerness to take advantage one of another. It shows that strife is not merely between employer and employee, but quite as much between man and man. Here is no dominant notion of the spirit of either liberty or brotherhood.

In the struggles between laborers and employers the trade unions have found some apparent advantage in what is called "collective bargaining." This presupposes that a large number of men together may secure a more just bargain than individuals. This considered on the theory of averages is, of course, true. The laboring men have objected to the individual bargain for wages on the ground that it tends to degrade labor to a mere commodity, whereas the collective bargain forces a recognition of the human element. As a matter of fact, collective bargaining neglects exactly that element; and upon just that element any principle whatever ought to lay most stress. The value of any particular workman to any employer is dependent to great extent upon the personal quality of the employee, except, indeed, so far as the labor union by setting a standard minimum of efficiency has reduced him to a mere automaton. In very few lines of work is it true that men are equal even though they on the surface appear to produce like results. The real results of a man's labor are dependent upon the quality of his work as well as upon the amount that he produces, and that quality is not always in tangible things. In such matters as watchfulness, responsibility, and growth, the employer

finds a vast difference between one man and another; and these can spring only out of something approaching loyalty—if not to the employer, at least to the work, to the idea of excellence. Any business relation which has been established through collective bargaining, especially after a contest between employer and employed, is cheated of that loyalty which is at the basis not only of all brotherhood, but of all effective labor. Many an employer, through fear of interference with his plan of work, has been compelled, in order to compensate himself for the great losses caused by the risk of strikes and other labor difficulties, to pay normally a much lower rate of wages than would be possible and probable if he had freedom to arouse in his employees the spirit of loyalty. The unions have so thoroughly interfered with the privileges of a laborer to do his best for his employer that the old-fashioned *esprit de corps* which made many shops pleasant has disappeared, and many of the human elements in the relation of employee and employer have been destroyed. This, again, violates not only liberty but brotherhood. It is founded on distrust. The distrust may be warranted, but it is none the less unfortunate.

The fact is that distrust prevails throughout

the business world. We have seen that the laborers distrust each other. The common failures of coöperation and profit-sharing are further illustrations. The employers distrust employees, for they know that many receive wages for work which they do not do; and the employees distrust employers, for they fear that they will not be paid for what is actually done. Finally, business men distrust each other, for they expect every man to charge for his goods what he can get rather than what they are worth. This distrust is not a product of our present industrial system. Opportunities for it would be just as great under any system of state control of industry. The ground for it lies in our judgment of our fellow men; and, as has already been pointed out, any state system must be administered by men. If we distrust men nowadays, when many of our affairs are in our own control, how much more should we distrust them when as state agents they should manage many of our affairs for us? The remedy for these distrusts and strifes lies not in destroying individual control and individual responsibility, but in arousing dominant notions of brotherhood which operate, through individual control and individual responsibility, to seek a common end.

We saw long ago that the mainspring of prog-

ress is in the individual seeking, out of that which is to him worth while, to impress his personality on the world about him—and this he may do not only in his life but through his descendants. The most precious thing in the world, then, is liberty. To prevent liberty from becoming license, however, the spirit of brotherhood must put us in right relation to other personalities, and democracy must give that spirit of brotherhood a tangible guiding expression. We must see, however, that of these three the greatest is liberty, for it alone is a creative force; the others are guiding forces. In our economic life, therefore, we need to see that in our efforts to eradicate evils, to suppress abuses, we do not sap that liberty which is a spring of progress. The industrial system which has grown up under American liberty is at the core sound, for it furnishes to every man the maximum opportunity for self-development. It does leave the way open for hardship, for misfortune, for misery; but there is tragedy in life under any conceivable system. Not all men are equally fortunate in birth, in talent, in charm, and no economic system except absolute communism can give men economic equality; and that would reduce the sense of responsibility so much that in a few generations the general standard of

living would fall to a semi-brutish level. Then those who were fit to survive in a dignified existence would rise in rebellion against the rest, and civilization would begin once more on the individualistic basis.

It is not true that a system which leaves the way open to hardships, misfortune, and misery is necessarily a bad system. The fact is that the Supreme Being has allowed man to suffer sin, pain, sorrow; and many evils we have not yet learned how to avoid. They seem to be a part of the training of life, and without them life would be not life at all, but only automatic action. The economic evils are only some among the many that we endure. We may hope in the progress of the race to learn how to avoid some of them; but to arraign any system because it leaves economic misfortune possible is to talk in a child's foolishness, not in a man's strength. Some discussion of the general problem of evil will be found in the next, and concluding, chapter.

CHAPTER XII

THE ATTITUDE TOWARD LIFE

IF a philosophy is good for anything it must bring together the disjointed experiences of life and put them into a unity that represents the worth of life as a whole. Not until a man has attempted to construct his philosophy can he say that he has seriously tried to make the most of his personal opportunities. The really human thing about any life is simply what that life considers best worth while. No person was ever interesting unless to some quest he gave at least half-souled devotion—unless to him something was supremely worth while. The aim may have been low, as low as can be conceived; but if effort and struggle and enthusiasm were there, the life is interesting to every student of human nature. The aim of a life is the real test of its belief—its religion. This is true, too, whether a man has tried to think out his aim or is unaware of the motives that actuate him. It is true whether he is an adherent of the traditional doctrines of the

evangelical Christian denominations, is a so-called liberal thinker, or is a mere materialist: in the first case, the supreme thing to him is salvation through faith in the Cross; in the second, it is the application of the principle of love to all the affairs of life; in the last, it is the maximum ultimate physical comfort and pleasure. That supreme thing gives his life a unity.

Whatever phraseology we use, the test of a religion must be practical—for a test that cannot be applied is no test at all. In the last analysis, then, a man's religion is what he believes practically about the worth-while and the not-worth-while; and of what he believes, the only practical tests are the efforts, the struggles, and the enthusiasms of his life. Since the supremely interesting thing about any life is its quest for what seems to it best worth while, and since that is the true expression of its individuality, the last word about any life is its religion—the summing up of its relation to the Infinite as manifested in detail in its relations to the finite. To one man, only God is worth while, and the affairs of earth are dross, except as he can relate them to his conception of God; to another man, whatever is worth while is God—that is, his notion of God is derived from whatever seems to him best worth

while. Whatever a man's notion is, unless it has so far entered into the fiber of his nature that it has with him become dominant, it is not his religion. He may profess to believe this or that; but unless his conduct accords with the profession we know that he does not truly believe. Throughout our discussion we have dwelt upon the danger in obsessions and the value of making dominant our notions of good. When we come down to the root of things, we find that, after all, a man's religion is simply his chief dominant notion—that thing which for him looms biggest on the horizon of life. Very often it is not what he thinks it is. He has allowed some trivial thing to magnify itself until it hides the big thing. His conduct reveals the truth, for, as we have seen, that is determined absolutely by his estimate of the value of things.

The failure of the church to influence men in America is due to a curious confusion of notions regarding the place of religion. Some churches, believing that religion is the whole of life, have undertaken to direct many of the details of living; and others, with the same nominal belief, have been very little concerned with living at all. One class has set itself up as competent to formulate a policy for all mankind in all situations, and the

other has forgotten that religion is anything more than a theory of metaphysics. We are in the habit of congratulating ourselves on the gradual decline of the latter class, with its emphasis on theological doctrine; but the rise of the former is nevertheless deplorable. The churches of this class have undertaken to convert the world to prohibition, to single-tax, to socialism, to what not. These things may be all very well in their time and place; or, perchance, they may not be good at all. The point is that they are at least disputable.

Some men, seeing certain factors of life to be of great importance, believe heartily that socialism would be a good thing in any time and place; and they would gladly give their lives to bring it to acceptance. Other men, seeing other factors, would give their lives to prevent that acceptance. Similar differences of opinion appear concerning other policies for general welfare. No minister of the Gospel has any right to use his official influence in the church to turn the scale one way or the other; for in the first place he doesn't really *know* how good or bad is socialism or any other policy of practical affairs, and in the second place the church should stand for something bigger than any form of social order. Socialism is a

mere policy. Individualism is a mere policy. The church is not the organ of economic reform, though the teachings of the church should stimulate much activity for reform; it is not the organ for political reform; it is not the organ for social reform. It is the organ for working upon the minds and hearts of men so that they shall be fundamentally moved to all good reforms or to make reform unnecessary; but the details of policy and the disagreements arising from the differences of point of view can be settled only in the practical world of affairs, and the church only weakens herself when she allows them to usurp her attention and to estrange those who disagree with her ministers on practical policies of the hour.

Many church attendants are quite as competent to determine details of social and individual policy as are their ministers, and they are bored with sermons in which the blind are leading the blind —or the half blind are trying to lead the clear-sighted into the mists of surmise. Serious-minded men want inspiration, a sight of the visions that sometimes get dimmed in the clouds of conflicting passions, a freshening of the notions of eternal truth. They wish new power to comprehend old truths; but the application of

these old truths to the problems of their individual lives no minister or anyone else is competent to make for them. We, as lovers of liberty and individualism, resent attempts to prescribe cut-and-dried details of conduct.

The church stands for the eternities, for the "things that we do know." When men are agreed upon the eternities, when they are dominated by the fundamental truths of life, they will no longer quarrel over the details of policy. What should we say of the father who is so busy settling the petty disputes of his children that he never has time to show them the principles of fraternity? The preacher's task is to keep open the sources of inspiration. His art should turn the flood into the channels where it will overwhelm "the world, the flesh, and the devil." The church should be the home of religious enthusiasm; and that enthusiasm should take the form of tested notions that shall dominate the lives of men and teach them how, each in his individual way, they may bring about the brotherhood of righteousness. The church, in other words, should stand for the universal in religion, for that which ought to be common to all men and is helpful to all. With these common elements as a basis, as dominant notions, a man may go into

the world and work out his own problems in living. That working out of his problems is his individual religious life.

To show the method of the religious life has really been the aim of this whole book, for in the last analysis religion is the whole of life. We began with the proof that we are all the creatures of our dominant notions. We have devoted most of our study to the possibilities of progress through the cultivation of sound dominant notions. The conclusion is obvious. The supreme delight and duty and aim of each soul is to search for and seize and cultivate and make dominant the notions that seem to that soul in its best moments preëminently worth while. The best self is not necessarily the habitual self, and yet the notions at any time dominant control the life at that time. The soul is successful, then, just in that degree by which it brings the habitual self into agreement with the best self. This is accomplished by making the dominant notions of the best self also the habitual dominant notions. It is simply making the exalted moments habitual. This is the task and the joy of the religious life.

In matters of practical conduct, this means a constant recognition of several facts: first, we are

the creatures of notion; second, our notions are not always true; third, we have not always the wish to take the trouble to find the truth, for we commonly have notions that something else is just now better worth doing; fourth, and here is the important thing, in our exalted moments, when we are at our best and desire the truth, we may search for the truth, snatch it, cling to it, impress it upon ourselves, fill ourselves with it, and put out the latch string for its return when the ill chances of practical affairs shall have crowded it out. In cherishing the notions that belong to our exalted moments we tend to make them dominant, and herein lies our hope of individual progress. Similarly, we may often, by taking a favorable moment of exaltation, go far to quell a false notion that has sometimes beset us. By and by the old false notion, often refused admittance, will give permanent place to the new and true. Then the dominance is established and conduct is automatically brought into accord with the ideal. The means for utilizing the exalted moments to make sound notions dominant are of course various. One type of person will resort to self-examination and penance; another, to contemplation; another, to prayer; another, to a sort of self-hypnotization. All these processes are

somewhat akin to the method of so-called conversion; but the difference lies in the fact that whereas conversion is often a domination merely momentary, having no deep seat in either conviction or habit, this is a slow growth confirmed in both conviction and habit.

It is well to put together the fundamental dominant notions that make up a part of American religion. Since our religion is, by our definition, the things we believe supremely worth while, it consists in large measure, if we are sincere, in the three ideals that have long occupied our attention. To fulfill our religious life, then, we must see these ideals so big that they cannot be overtopped by trivial notions of the moment. We are false to ourselves as individuals, false to the spirit of liberty, false to our destiny as a people, if we fail to provide every means that will insure the constant vision of those ideals before us. We must provide for that vision not only for ourselves individually but also for our fellows. What does fraternity mean if we are to cherish our vision as a private preserve? We have seen that a man must follow the light when he sees it. Our hope is in each bringing his light to the common meeting place and sharing it with others, letting them accept or reject. If any has a baleful light, the

majority rule of democracy may compel him to hide it; but if it is evil in appearance only, because too bright for the rest, he need suffer only disappointment—not discouragement, for it will surely prevail as men's eyes grow accustomed to the truth.

Our fundamental American ideals, moreover, are adequate for guidance in the problems of practical living, and that is the first obvious concern of religion. No serious problem of conduct is beyond solution by the principles of liberty, brotherhood, democracy. The first involves not only the power but the duty to fulfill our own individualities; the second involves the duty to heed the good of our fellow man; the third involves the duty to realize that however well we may think we know what is good for our fellow, we must not thrust even that good upon him unless we can win confirmation for our plan. The first is the force working toward individual progress; the second is the force for helping others along with ourselves; the third is the force that tests the notions of individuals and weeds out those which do not prove able to serve human need. No evil of to-day would long continue if it were subjected to the tests of these three ideals. What we need is not a new system, but a renewed ap-

beauty, sweetness, strength, purity; but even in his dreams he must see these things in action. They mean to him the possibility of physical vigor and grace; of kind words and deeds; of endurance and resistance and initiation; of rising above the animal. It is really not what she is, here and now, that he revels in; it is what she will be in other times and places. He loves her as virgin largely in the thought of what she will be as wife; he loves her as wife largely in the thought of what she will be as mother; he loves her as mother largely in the thought of what she will be as companion of her children and as grandmother. We find delight in our children in infancy largely in the contemplation of their promise as boys and girls; in their childhood we see them as youths and maidens; in adolescence we see them as fathers and mothers; as fathers and mothers we see them as factors in the community. Our relish is never in the thing that is. We find our delight in the probability that the thing we know shall grow out of itself into the thing beyond. This principle is equally true of physical things. Our delight in work lies in seeing the thing coming. When the end has been accomplished and the full purpose has been served, our interest is gone. In our play, we are striving after something *to be*

attained. Even the sense of victory gives delight only because it is a testimony of strength, or expertness, or tenacity, which may be put to attaining *something else*. Contentment is not the aim of life; it has fitting place only on the death bed. Life is always seeking, struggling, enduring for a future end; and only so is there something to live for.

What, then, have we to say of the problem of evil? If there were no evil in the world, there would be no such thing as necessity. The fond dream would also be the reality. But then there would be nothing to seek, nothing to struggle for, nothing to endure. Lotus eating would take the place of life. In such a world even love could find no place. The essence of love is service, and the delight of love is in self-sacrifice; but in a world where there is no necessity, no service can be performed and no sacrifice can be made. Love desires to master necessity; only so can it manifest itself. Sometimes, however, necessity refuses to be mastered: it will not yield to courage, or patience, or strength, or strife: it is inexorable. Then we have tragedy. Here is the real evil, the evil to which many refuse to be reconciled. This is the evil at sight of which "the fool hath said in his heart, 'There is no

God.'" Yet this evil is quite as essential as the other. What satisfaction could any man find in struggling with necessity if he were always sure of mastering it? The delight of battle, the life-giving power of contest, lies in the possibility of defeat. Take away that, and one might as well take away necessity altogether and give a world of mere dreams. The only possible world for life that shall be worth while is a world in which necessity gives us many a pain, many a sorrow, many a struggle, many a defeat, many a tragedy.

This is comfortable doctrine when we are reasonably successful in our contests with necessity; but what is our attitude toward life and the Master of Life when necessity is inexorable and we are defeated? Have we only to carry out the spirit of the game and "take our medicine" with a nonchalant "You win"? To do this is better than to cringe, and whine, and abandon life. Cynicism is better than cowardice. There is something else, however. There is a vision that transcends the "here" and "now." It is a big thing to be an individual, to have an individual life with one's own hopes and aspirations and temptations and strength and weakness. It is a bigger thing to know oneself a part of the big

human current, one with other men in the brotherhood of common thought and passion, influenced by that current and contributing influence to it. It is the supreme thing to feel oneself a part of a current which knows no time or place, which is eternal, which finds in the sum of all thought and all passion the rounding out of the perfect ideal, the complete realization of the Divine. God's purpose is in the ages and in the universe, not in time and in place; so far as He is manifest to us, He works through human agency, and every individual is working out His will—either directly, in the good, or indirectly, in the evil opposition against which the good may work out and develop its own goodness. The history of mankind presents a working out of God's ideal through the progress of the ages. In God's ideal, as we find it reflected in our own ideal, are not only the courage and strength of battle, but the courage and patient endurance of defeat, of long suffering, of tragedy. God's ideal can be manifest on earth only as these things *are embodied in human experience.* The man who attains these is creating himself in God's image, is a coworker with God in the working out of God's ideal. He is then no pessimist, and no cynic. His attitude is Godward. His religion has set him free from

the necessities of time and place. Necessity for him is no longer inexorable. He has mastered it. He has made dominant in his life a consciousness that he is part of eternal truth, and, whatever life may bring forth, life is for him worth while. He has found the preëminent worth-while not only in doing God's will but in being reconciled to that necessity which is a part of God's plan of the universe. This is the perfect peace.

Let us summarize the method of the religious life. It is, first, to know the best self, to find those ideals which satisfy the best self; second, to see how those ideals are related to one's fellow and his ideals; third, to see how those ideals are related to the eternal truths which transcend the truth of "here" and "now"; fourth, to grasp the exalted moments, to see how the notions that exalt them are related to self, to fellow, to God; fifth, to weigh and balance and even prune the exalted notions until we are sure that in them neither individual right encroaches on community right nor community right on eternal right; sixth, to strive to make these surviving exalted notions so dominant that in time of choice the truth be not overshadowed by obsessions, and the best

that the soul has dreamed be embodied in the life.

Have we hope of all this in America? We began with the fact that Americans are idealists. We saw next that a man must choose the best when he recognizes it, when it becomes a dominant ideal for him. We found ideal marriage to be the chief source of progress; and ideal marriage is commoner in America than elsewhere in the world to-day. We found the possibilities of education in creating dominant ideals to be vast; and everyone knows that the American interest in education is intense. We found the American notion of liberty conducive to the highest development of individual attainment; and individuality is likely to be emphasized by conditions springing from race mixture. We found the American notion of brotherhood conducive to the keenest recognition of the claims of fellow men. We found the American notion of democracy a safeguard against the harmful practice of theories which cannot convince. We have, then, every hope for progress up to the last point discussed—namely, that phase of religion which means not only a desire to do God's will but reconciliation to His ways. We have no ground to fear the American character here. We are idealists. We

are loyal. We do not count costs when big things are at stake. We like to conceive of things in the large, to feel the thrill of world movements and of eternal truths. The individual with us does commonly surrender individuality in enthusiasm for something too big to bear anyone's name. We are optimistic and can bear defeat. We are proud of endurance and we scorn to show the white feather. These are just the qualities that reconcile a man to the existence of evil—that enable him at all times to say, with Job, "I know that my Redeemer liveth." The American hope is well defined.

It would be sad to think that the doctrine of this book is a balm for discontented souls. It is meant not for a sedative, but for a stimulus. We in America have before us, just here and now, something better than a hope: we have an opportunity—the grandest opportunity any race ever had—to develop men, to make life obviously worth while, to help on the will of the Divine. The conditions are right. We have the physical resources for abundant physical life; we have a complex social and economic structure beautifully adapted to bring out all the best qualities both of individuality and of brotherhood; our character fits us to see the big truths of eternity

and to adjust ourselves to God's plan; we have lurking ideals and exalted moments out of which we may in ourselves and in others develop notions that shall dominate for righteousness. Our task is to be awake, to see our opportunity, to snatch it, and to make the most of it.

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